Having got my newly minted PPL in Autumn 2019, I (and everyone else) had my plans and experience-building disrupted by COVID. I was only able to get back in the cockpit in late summer 2020, at a new and more local aerodrome to that where I did my PPL.

I was aware of skills fade, the new airfield procedures & local area (and psychological doubting Gremlins that had crept in as a newbie) combining, so I undertook revision training. I found the new Aerodrome a good fit and felt I would settle well, with better procedures, clearer guidance and online aircraft/aerodrome specific documentation on a dedicated portal. 5 flights and 4 hours later, I was signed off to fly solo and hire aircraft. The same day as sign off, I went up for two more circuits to cement thinking of myself as a competent pilot (for my experience) to fly safely.

Two weeks later, I returned, wanting to consolidate confidence and minimise future skills fade. I could only go after work so I planned only a few more circuits before sunset. The A/G radio was due to cease operating at 5pm so I had planned and confirmed the procedures to make blind calls on frequency, as I knew I would not be up before 5pm. Wind was low. Just a few quiet circuits, I thought. My take off time was 17:45. It turned out the A/G radio was still operating and so I flew as normal with A/G. I completed 2 circuits, building my confidence. In part of my circuit, the radio was readable but not good, but I was able to understand the calls.

On the third circuit, I was downwind to land when a call from a small commercial aircraft requested a straight in landing on the same runway but from the opposite direction. The situation quickly became stressful for me. Imperfect radio and stress combined to hinder me but it became clear that the other aircraft was planning to land in the opposite direction to me on the same runway. My immediate thought was not to land but what exactly to do next?

I don’t think this was covered in my training. I knew I had taken off with full fuel so didn’t ‘need’ to land right now. I called to say I was already established in the circuit (N.B. I had been for 20-25min) to land in the opposite direction to the other aircraft. Poor radio again, but I think I was being told to change the circuit pattern. Reasserting in my mind that I am responsible for myself and approaching base turn, I knew at the very least I couldn’t continue on. I wasn’t sure how far out the other aircraft was but two more turns and we could be nose to nose before I knew it.

Calling before to assist all, I did a 180 degree turn away from the runway to begin another downwind in the other direction, offset from my previous track. Maybe I should have just left the circuit and orbited until I heard the other aircraft was clear. But my unfamiliarity with the area and stress level made me sure I wanted to stay “safe” in the circuit. I think I heard the other aircraft call a 4-mile final. This is a situation I had at least experienced before and the radio was better. I called to extend downwind until I had visual. I did and saw the other aircraft. I regained my confidence a little and called that I had visual and would position behind.

Waiting for the aircraft to pass a good way, I turned base and went through the normal landing checks. The other aircraft seemed to have some confusion on which taxiway to take and was stationary on the runway, to a little exasperation of A/G to get them to clear. Having got myself back to a manageable situation, while on final I watched the aircraft with A/G stress rising and still trying to instruct them. Just above decision altitude, I decided and called to go around. There was some doubt, and I had had enough excitement for one day. A/G apologised. I landed safely on the next circuit.

To an experienced pilot, this might have been an annoyance and some heated exchanges later. Even writing it, it doesn’t seem like that big of a deal. But the realisation of being out of your comfort zone without an immediately obvious path to safety was shocking. What are the ideal reactions for next time!

Dirty Dozen factors involved: Stress and pressure – it was a highly novel situation to me; Communication – difficult so could not coordinate a response as effectively; Awareness – I seemed to have been forgotten about. The other a/c didn’t seem to be aware of me.

Flying fairly late in the day with a first-time GA passenger as a favour to a relative, sunny with some haze, airport fairly quiet. Called for start and airfield information, no reply from the A/G service in the tower. Looked up at the windows, couldn’t see anyone in there, which wasn’t that unusual, nor was the lack of reply, so I didn’t think any more about it.

Started, taxied out, completed pre-flight checks, called ‘ready for departure’, still no reply.  Again, not unheard of to have nobody in the air that late in the day and nobody replying from the tower, so I made a blind call that I was entering and backtracking [active runway]. Checked both directions of the active runway before crossing the double yellow line and entering the live side of the airport, entered the runway…and about halfway down the backtrack an aircraft on final appeared out of the haze.

It immediately dawned on me that I had a radio failure, so I got as far over to one side of the runway as I could just in case the approaching aircraft hadn’t seen me, waited for it to go around, then performed a 180 and got back off the runway.

Taxiing back in, there was someone halfway down the tower steps waving a handheld at me – my suspicions seemed correct. I made my apologies to all concerned, then taxied back to the hangar to see if I could discover the problem. I was very surprised, as the radio had been working perfectly a few days before when I had been talking to the local international airport and also someone on a handheld at a grass strip. I checked aerial connection, swapped headsets, swapped which pair of headset plugs I was connected to – all seemed fine.

Then I noticed that where the frequency on the radio should have been showing a zero, it was showing an eight. I had returned to [Airport] out of hours when I had flown a few days before, and I must have inadvertently selected this incorrect frequency when switching back from the other services, but as it was out of hours there was nobody manning the tower A/G radio, so the lack of reply on return to [Airport] did not alert me to the problem. The difference between the 8 character on my radio and the Ø was a minor difference in the direction of the line in the middle of the character (horizontal on the 8, slightly sloping on the continental Ø it uses).  That small difference was pretty much invisible to me in bright sunlight, especially with the aircraft jiggling around during taxi. I selected the correct frequency, and everything worked perfectly.

What more could I have done: check small displays such as radio frequencies in the shade of the hangar, with the aircraft stationary. I could see the error clearly enough when I did that, and would have avoided the problem completely had I done so before starting and taxiing. The other thing which occurs to me is confirmation bias. I believed the radio to be working and on the correct frequency because I thought that was the case on my previous flight…hence I interpreted all the subsequent information in the light of what I already ‘knew’. A more sceptical attitude would also have helped to avoid the error. But, ultimately, a quick glance at a small digital display in unfavourable lighting was the root cause.

Dirty Dozen factors involved: fatigue, time pressure, distraction, but mostly complacency – the radio was working perfectly very recently, so radio failure wasn’t something I even considered when receiving no reply to several calls. Question assumptions!

[Airport] have recently seen an increase in controlled airspace infringements. As a result of investigations and ongoing analysis, it has become apparent that this is at least in part due to an increase in pilots operating under the misapprehension that our airspace was closed (NOTAM’d deactivated). A common theme amongst a few of them is the use of ‘third-party software’ as an assist to flight briefing and navigation, and a failure to properly understand and assess the information displayed under the NOTAM tab.

For example, during the month of June, [Airport]’s Class D CAS was de-activated daily between 2000-0530Z. When issuing a longer-term NOTAM covering set daily closure periods such as this, the NOTAM Office require us to issue the NOTAM from the 1st-30th, with a daily schedule for the closure periods, as opposed to a separate NOTAM for each day.

We have approached the manufacturer of one such popular provider, who were most accommodating in their response. It seems that all information is readily available for the pilot. The problem seems to be the pilot’s interpretation of the information displayed. On investigation, it seems that an easy mistake for the pilot to make is to read the headline ‘Deactivated by NOTAM from X to Y’ and either misread, don’t understand, or fail to notice, the ‘Schedule’. They have the option to ‘touch for more details’, which opens the full NOTAM text in another box, but either this is not being done, or again the ‘schedule’ part is misunderstood.

The purpose of this email is to ask, via the medium of CHIRP, that pilots using popular third-party systems as a navigation/flight briefing aid, are made aware of the need to fully interrogate NOTAM information as presented to them on a digital display, especially the ‘schedule’ part, and to be made aware of its purpose and meaning.

Basically speaking, if ATC are operating, it’s best to assume that the CAS is also active. Always call in good time and ask, irrespective of what you believe the NOTAM says. If asked to stand-by, or no clearance is received, route around and avoid – operate under the assumption that CAS is active unless confirmed otherwise by ATC/ATIS. ATC are obliged to MOR every incursion, however minor. This includes those where mode ‘C’ indicates inside but the pilot reports outside.

Please don’t rely on the summary page of nav-aid without question – it is no defence against the MOR!