The reporter raises an interesting and important point around the psychology and effectiveness of training.  The operator changed its strategy several years ago after feedback showed cabin crew were nervous about the annual recurrent training event.  Their entire focus was on passing the exams.  The exams were old fashioned written papers which required the delegates to precisely answer the wording in the manuals.    This led to a behaviour that instructors would deliver training focused on passing the exams and the delegates would just remember those bits.  The wider purpose of the day was lost.  Furthermore, the whole class was given the same or similar questions, which were then circulated.

We want to drive a joint pilot/cabin crew training day that allowed delegates to focus on developing their skills and learning from group facilitation.  We want them to leave not just with a pass, but to take safety and CRM “to the aircraft”.  The intent is to make the training day a professional-to-professional event, in style more like a conference or workshop than a school class.  So, in conjunction with the authority, it was decided to publish the entire question bank to allow revision prior to the event.  On the day, no one person receives the same exam.  Each delegate is pushed a random selection electronically to their electronic device.

Cognitively, revising by self-testing is for most people more effective than simply reading a manual.  Forcing the brain to retrieve information builds pathways to make subsequent retention easier.  That is why Computer Based Training generally has questions at the end to test understanding and reinforce the learning.

Whilst there are differing opinions as to the efficacy, evidence appears to show that this approach has not unacceptably reduced knowledge, although the operator does accept the industry wide problem that generation Z does not like rote learning.

Let’s examine safety incidents for which crew error is the primary cause, for example, inadvertent slide deployment.  Crew interviewed after these events can invariably recount the correct procedure and process – so applied knowledge is not the problem.  Normally the problem is either inattention (rare), fatigue (sometimes), distraction (common) combined with another simultaneous task that should have been given a lower priority (very common).

If we look at safety incidents that are not crew errors (e.g.  oven fires, disruptive passengers, medical emergencies, etc…), these are generally well handled using a mixture of knowledge, CRM and reference to the Cabin Crew Quick Reference material which is held on each crew members iPad.  This leads us to conclude that our training events are effective and focussed correctly on competency rather than just raw knowledge.  All the operator’s cabin safety instructors are also qualified CRM instructors.

The operator will continue to monitor the effectiveness of the training approach, but current evidence suggests that on balance this is the right strategy. Crew are also encouraged to report any concerns or hazards via our safety reporting system. Reports are treated confidentially but if they wish to protect their identity further they have the ability to submit anonymous reports.

Training is intended to provide a benefit to those attending that they can apply in the operational environment.  In making this comment, the number of questions in the question bank is not known, however, it should be such that it would make it very difficult for trainees to effectively remember each question.

Since the pandemic the business was subject to a reorganisation. As a result, the Occupational Health function has been outsourced and the recruitment process simplified which may have contributed to some incidents regards to neurodiversity.

A number of steps have been taken as below to prevent reoccurrence:

• For future training courses, delegates will be sent a link with a declaration to say they do/do not have reasonable adjustments to declare.
• This will be reviewed and see if any support is required. Any concerns will trigger a formal review including an Occupational Health referral.
• A company neurodiversity policy is being written as we write which will cover ‘safety critical roles’ such as cabin crew.
• If crew fail to disclose neurodiversity and this is later discovered an Occupational Health referral will be required and a review by the line manager.

Some challenges experienced with neurodiversity subject:

• The regulator does not provide guidance on neurodiversity for the recruitment of cabin crew
• Neurodiversity conditions are on a spectrum which normally require individual assessment around safety related behaviours

Employment law would have a part to play in the form of the Equality Act (2010). If ‘reasonable adjustments’ cannot be made/those adjustments are incompatible with the role/or the safety concerns are so significant then the operator has the ability to manage the behaviours from a safety angle and if required, terminate the employment contract.

Our organisation spent a considerable amount of time and effort giving people every opportunity from point of application to declare, confidentially any condition that they have that might require support and adjustment. When this does not happen, it will be for crew management to address following an occurrence report

The assessment of cabin crew fitness is carried out by Aeromedical examiners or occupational physicians appointed by the Authority. These individuals have the requisite knowledge of this safety critical role to make appropriate decisions on fitness. This includes experience in assessing individuals with neurodiversity, the spectrum of which is broad. Individuals must declare medical conditions to their examiner and this is part of their obligation to maintain the safety of flight.

Cabin crew receive annual training where some sessions are joint with flight crew.  The aim of these sessions is to understand the workload associated in the flight deck when responding to an incident. Cabin crew are trained to recognise the flight crews’ order of priority: Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.

In this scenario, we know that as each minute goes by, in the cabin that could feel like it is taking far longer than it should. This is also discussed in various training courses and the perception of time when under duress. A duration of 5 to 10 minutes might not seem like a long time when we routinely talk about it, however in a pressurised situation it will feel much longer. During that time, if the conditions of the cabin change significantly the cabin crew (using the chain of command) should contact the flight crew using the emergency interphone call. We support the actions of the flight crew to focus on aviate and navigate whilst problem solving the reported incident which is likely to have increased their workload at that time e.g. communicating with the ground, using checklists etc.

Reporting (using our internal safety reporting method) is important for continuous learning and leads to reviews of procedures by the relevant teams e.g. flight operations, cabin safety and training. Real events feed into training and carve the way for us as an operator to understand a bit more about the incident and implement learnings or change, if that was recommended.

The reporter spoke to the customers, which we fully support. Providing information known at the time, and regularly helps the customers and crew know that something is going on and that the flight and/or cabin crew are responding to it. This is likely to be led by the SCCM.

CRM training places emphasis on the effective use of all available information to support decision making.  In such a scenario as that described, flight crew will assess reports from the cabin crew, data from engine instruments, outside environmental conditions and possibly other sources such as ATC to ensure any actions are based on a sound decision.  Where an aircraft is on the ground and there is no immediate threat to safety, there is more opportunity to diagnose and review before committing to action.

It is each crew members responsibility to ensure they are fit to operate a duty. There is an established sickness process in place that crew are required to follow if they are sick. As with all companies, there is an internal process for following up with crew who call sick including checking their welfare. We have a number of crew who follow this procedure successfully. There are no repercussions should crew follow the correct process. We have a robust reporting culture that allows crew to report not only occurrences but safety hazards they see on the line. Crew can report internally using the safety reporting system or through the confidential reporting system.

It is a requirement that a crew member does not report for duty when unfit to do so. It is recognised that companies may have sickness management policies intended to identify recurring sickness for welfare purposes, however, such policies should not encourage cabin crew to operate when unfit.

There are two responses to this answer. The first will is the regulatory explanation and the second addresses how this might feel on the day.

For the {aircraft type}…

1. A minimum of 4 serviceable extinguishers are available in the cabin of which 2 must be BCF and one must be water; 1 serviceable BCF extinguisher is available on the flight deck.
2. The regulation we refer to UK REG (EU) 965/2012 (Air Ops), contains a hand fire extinguisher section (CAT.IDE.250) and states various requirements including number installed. The minimum number of hand extinguishers with the maximum passenger seating operation on the {aircraft type} is 4. To meet this requirement, refer to point 1 above.

On this occasion, the flight crew’s assessment is correct and meets the regulatory requirements. Cabin crew do not have access to the MEL as it is a flight crew function. The role of the SCCM is to collect the equipment checks from the cabin crew and report their findings to the flight crew, which includes any anomalies.  The Commander is responsible for ensuring the flight is operated compliantly, hence the flight crew consult the MEL as and when required.

We understand how the reporter felt when they were presented with 2 fire extinguishers in the cabin, when there is usually 4. They correctly repositioned the 2 they had throughout the cabin.  The third being the water extinguisher and the fourth in the flight deck. If the reporter has completed a safety report, we would be able to share this feedback with the engineering team to ensure if equipment is missing it is repositioned. When we have debriefed previous incidents where a fire extinguisher was used, the crew reported that they used a few squirts to contain the fire. For most incidents, they did not use it apart from standing by with it. The main control is to break the components of the fire triangle where all three elements (fuel, heat and oxygen) are required to start a fire.  Cabin crew are annually trained, and rehearse through practical means isolating electric’s which could prohibit ‘heat’. Examples are isolating the power by switching the oven off and pulling the circuit breakers, or switching the IFE off, or submerging a PED in water etc. Informing the flight crew immediately, will help as they will consult their checklists. They may further isolate power to various parts of the cabin too. Successfully completing this action will likely put or reduce the fire without use of the BCF, although crew will be standing by with a fire extinguisher just in case as part of the fire drill. The fire extinguisher lasts for about 15 seconds. This does not sound long when verbalised, but, using it, together with the volume of the extinguishant, means fully using a bottle is unlikely provided isolation measures, if applicable to the incident are followed. This response is based on the fires commonly reported in industry and experienced within our operation.

Flights are required to be operated in accordance with the Minimum Equipment List (MEL), which states the minimum permitted quantity of serviceable equipment required to dispatch a flight. Whilst cabin crew generally do not use the MEL it should be accessible for reference. Safety equipment should not be repositioned by cabin crew unless it can be correctly stowed in a location marked for its stowage, and only with the authority of the captain and ideally performed by an engineer.

We are aware some crew find west coast trips challenging. We do however also receive positive feedback on these trips now as crew members are learning to manage their sleep effectively and appreciate the benefits of less acclimatisation when they return to base as their days off are less affected by recovery.

We continue to monitor the west coasts and for the W23 season there will be only 1 of these trips per day, which will lessen overall exposure to them. We are also looking at the possibility of limiting them to 1 per month from S24, but this has yet to be agreed and will depend on the feedback we receive over the winter whilst they are limited purely by frequency.

Reporting fatigued for duty is essential if a crew member does not feel fit to operate, and it is encouraged for the safety of our operation. Whether that is due to tiredness or fatigue is a conversation that is necessary in order to better understand how to manage any re-occurrence. It is in no way intended to be accusatory, it is a necessary part of the fatigue process and understanding the difference between the two can be helpful to all involved. They are similar, and in some cases almost identical, but understanding the circumstances in each instance of fatigue is key to managing it, and that is critical in our business.

It is a fine balance between running a safe, secure and punctual operation in aviation – however, safety and security must never be compromised. As the reporter refers to, sometimes there will be extenuating factors, out of the control of the crew that could impact punctuality. The organisation’s focus on punctuality is no different to other UK and worldwide operators.  For reasons where crew feel pressurised to complete safety and security checks, a safety report should be completed documenting the occurrence if, for example there are pressures on the completion of safety and security checks with as much objective information as possible to help the safety and security teams understand the issue.

Communication is key between all crew and ground staff.  Concerns about pressure to board should be reported to the Captain, especially if safety and security checks are being compromised.

When cabin crew related delay reports are received, the cabin crew management and operations team are keen to learn the events and reasons that led to the flight not meeting its target time.  The cabin crew management and operations team were contacted and a copy of the email communication that is sent to crew was reviewed.  It states:

• There is no obligation to reply on a day off.
• The communication is not positioned as a performance issue.
• The communication seeks to understand ‘what happened’ to allow a review of the process and prevent recurrence.

It also identifies if crew require support – there are no punitive actions associated with the follow up.

There are many factors that contribute to on-time performance, it’s important that as a team we continue to engage, learn and deliver improvement.

Action has already been implemented from the responses already received. The team have received many responses to date. So far, changes have been made to some report times for more challenging flights and at stations where there is a long transit time through the airport. These adjustments will help crew complete their pre-flight safety and security checks in the time provided.

Pre-departure safety duties should never be deviated from in order to achieve on-time performance.  If errors occur or omissions made owing to actual or perceived pressure, these should be reported to the company using the occurrence reporting scheme.

Thank you for submitting a report about crew using their personal devices during the critical stages of flight. The policy in the operating manual for device use states that for the majority of the crews’ duty, it can only be used for operational reasons.  Credit to the reporter for challenging colleagues when they contravene this policy. All incidents of this nature need to be reported in a safety report. When they are triaged by safety, reports of this nature are brought to the attention of the cabin crew management team to contact the crew member to reinforce the policy. Safety reporting is crucial to allow us to build a picture of the trend and report to the various teams within the organisation.

Reporting such incidents enables an operator to identify adverse trends and determine the root cause.  Whilst appropriately addressing non-adherence to procedures with the individuals concerned may provide corrective action in those cases it is unlikely to provide a preventative measure that stops others from doing the same. Establishing the reason for an event is  essential to enable the implementation of effective measures to prevent a wider re-occurrence.