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Parachute display NOTAM penetrated

This event occurred during a Parachute Display at [Location] at 0959L in Class G airspace. The pilot of the parachute aircraft was in receipt of a Traffic Service from the closest ATSU. After dropping the parachutes, the pilot descended, orbiting the highest canopy. This was so as to provide a radar trace for ATC and other pilots. At around 6000ft AMSL, the pilot of the parachute aircraft was notified of an incoming aircraft by ATC, also at 6000ft. The pilot copied the traffic and maintained a good lookout.

At around 5000ft AMSL, the pilot of the parachute aircraft called visual with the traffic. There was 1000ft separation between the aircraft, and safe, but a NOTAM had been issued for the parachute display up to 10,900ft AMSL between 0945L and 1015L. Had the penetrating aircraft been 1min earlier, or 1000ft lower, it would have been level with the highest canopy, and potentially caused an Airprox or worse with the parachutists.

A phone-call with the penetrating aircraft’s pilot revealed that the pilot:

  • Was not aware of the NOTAM.
  • Had a flight plan, but deviated from it because the flight-plan gave a longer routing around some danger areas.
  • Was visual with canopies, display smoke and then the parachute aircraft.
  • Was on a Traffic Service with a different ATSU, this ATSU had apparently given a traffic call of the parachute aircraft, but not of the parachute display.

I do not want to get the pilot in trouble for this because I believe the lesson has been learnt by them and nothing will come from any punitive action. I would like to remind others to check NOTAMs though. I’m not sure what more we can do as the pilot/display team. NOTAMs, and all appropriate notice was given to the CAA etc. Traffic Service from the closest ATSU, and a good visual lookout by DZ control, jumpers and pilot. I would love ideas on how to improve.

It’s disappointing that the other pilot was not aware of the NOTAM, and this may suggest sub-optimal pre-flight planning. Associated with this, our first thought is to wonder what information ATC gave them as they approached the area of the parachute display NOTAM? The controller would usually have briefed themselves on NOTAMs during their start-work procedures and, although it’s not a mandatory requirement, it would be considered good practice for them to have reminded the pilot about it. The para-drop aircraft would also likely have been squawking 0033 (the parachuting conspicuity code). But perhaps the controller felt they had given sufficient information as part of their Traffic Information about the parachute aircraft itself rather than specifically reference the NOTAM.

Even if a para-drop NOTAM has been raised, parachutists will often be dropped outside of the NOTAM area (perhaps even more than 4-5nm away from the DZ) depending on weather conditions pertaining at the time.  For practical reasons (to avoid promulgating huge NOTAM areas to take account of all potential factors), parachuting NOTAMs will probably not encompass the whole activity, just the landing area and its immediate environs. Care should therefore always be taken when approaching para-drop NOTAMs (especially from upwind) because it is possible that parachutists may be in the air outside of the NOTAM as they transit towards their DZ.

Ultimately, Class G airspace is a sharing environment and, even though NOTAMs do not necessarily have to be avoided (depending on their classification), there is still a requirement ‘not to endanger’ others, and so that is why it is good practice to avoid most NOTAM areas. In this respect, if the display was being conducted within an H-series NOTAM, then others were not specifically required to avoid (although common sense would dictate avoidance if they were aware of it, which it seems they were not). If a J-series NOTAM, then others were required to avoid or be in contact with the controlling authority to gain permission before entering that volume of airspace. Similarly, those publishing NOTAMs to highlight their activities (such as paradropping) should understand that they do not necessarily provide segregated airspace unless they are of the appropriate type (J-series). Some useful links (see QR codes) for understanding NOTAMs are within the CAA Infringement Tutorial and UK AIP Gen 3.1 (Aeronautical Services) (see Table 3.6.3.4 reproduced) which explains what each of the 18 NOTAM series types are.

Unfortunately, some pilots don’t understand the connection between a para-drop aircraft and the parachutists. There sometimes seems to be a belief that simply avoiding the aircraft and the airspace below is all that is required. In fact, it is not usual for para-drop aircraft to follow the parachutists down in day-to-day practice, this is only done during displays (and then not always) and so it is not a reliable way of avoiding parachutists: most para-drop aircraft actually descend below the parachutists in an attempt to land before the parachutists reach the ground.

The fact that the pilot in this case saw the canopies (or at least some of them) may have given them a false sense of security that they were clear of danger. It’s practically impossible to see fast-moving, free-falling parachutists approaching from above, and the difficulties of even sighting canopies when they have been deployed should also not be underestimated.

Dirty Dozen Human Factors

The following ‘Dirty Dozen’ Human Factors elements were a key part of the CHIRP discussions about this report and are intended to provide food for thought when considering aspects that might be pertinent in similar circumstances.

  • Awareness – Other pilot was not aware of the NOTAM.
  • Knowledge – Other pilot did not obtain the NOTAM information.
  • Communication – ATC may not have effectively communicated the NOTAM to the other pilot.
  • Complacency – false assumption that sighting canopies or drop aircraft means that parachutists have been avoided.
loss_of_awareness, lack_of_knowledge, poor_communication, complacency