The Charity
Aviation
Maritime
On a busy Monday morning after a major public outdoor event resulting in busy helicopter movements to and from London, the Heathrow/Thames controller repeatedly admonished callsigns requesting ‘Traffic Service’ in accordance with ATSOCAS* norms. The claim was made that “We are not part of the LARS system so I will only provide you Basic Service”.
It is during these busy periods where the majority of the onshore helicopter industry are operating in and out of controlled airspace frequently, and in the vicinity of it without wishing to enter, that we are faced with high density traffic and elevated risk of mid-air collision. This is the exact time we need Traffic Service, not when it is quiet. There is clearly a culture across ATS units with radar to a) refuse to provide Traffic Service, b) refuse to provide any service (Bristol, Cardiff, Solent) or c) when claimed too busy immediately downgrade some in receipt of Traffic Service to Basic. The airspace immediately in the vicinity of Controlled Airspace is often the highest risk for mid-air collision especially if not using the same frequency due to lack of service.
Also there are increased instances of controllers of Controlled Airspace instructing callsigns to ‘change enroute’ or ‘QSY enroute’ immediately upon exiting a Class D area. This reduces the safety margin greatly with no knowledge of what is awaiting in the uncontrolled area outside and often no other ATS unit to transfer to in order to get service, let alone Traffic Service. ‘London Information’ cannot provide this. Again in this instance often controllers ignore requests by crew to remain on their frequency effectively trying to force them away. Solent and Bristol are particularly regular offenders. The ATSOCAS* system is as a result often ineffective, and the majority of units driving this are contributing to the risk of collision. Per CAP774 all ATS have a duty of care to crew, passengers and all those airborne in their vicinity. This appears to be ignored and must end. If crew aspire to only get Basic Service then perhaps the ‘Listening Squawk’ should be promoted more, allowing ATS units to improve the necessary standard. Ultimately we are at ever increasing risk and this culture will result in more fatal collisions in UK airspace.
*CHIRP Note: Air Traffic Services Outside Controlled Airspace (ATSOCAS) has now changed to UK Flight Information Service (FIS).
The CAA is largely funded by charges on the commercial airlines (along with receipts from services such as licencing) and the UK airline industry, in general, is not in favour of cross funding the GA community from charges on the air transport industry. Although there are ATCUs funded to provide LARS, not all of them are (eAIS Part 2 ENR6-11 gives a map of LARS units and their theoretical coverage).
Those ATCUs that can give a LARS service will only do so when there is sufficient capacity, and ATS units are increasingly focusing on core radar activities within their airspace rather than the provision of LARS. This is because many ATCUs are short on manning and industry wide are struggling to recruit trainees. These issues are recognised by the CAA, which is in the process of defining and designing what FIS will look like (and how it will be funded) within the scope of the overall UK airspace review. But that doesn’t help in the immediate practicalities of day-to-day operations that the reporter is concerned about. All users of Class-G airspace are encouraged to make full use of in-cockpit conspicuity technology available, such as ADSB-OUT, to assist in situational awareness of other airspace users when operating without a radar-based ATS, such as a Traffic Service from a LARS unit. Please also note, for information, the description of airfield services reproduced in Report ATC859.
Dirty Dozen Human Factors
The following ‘Dirty Dozen’ Human Factors elements were a key part of the CHIRP discussions about this report and are intended to provide food for thought when considering aspects that might be pertinent in similar circumstances.
Resources – Insufficient resources to enable safe conduct of air operations.
Communication – Information flow between participants degraded.