This report highlights how easy it is for confusion to lead to misunderstanding and then interfere with what should otherwise be routine communication between an aircraft receiving an air traffic service and the controller – in this case initially a Traffic Service downgraded to a Basic Service just before a frequency change. On this occasion, it appears to have been a mistake during the controller handover that led to the confusion. The new controller was probably quite understandably frustrated by the apparent situation and keen to quickly resolve a problem in a busy piece of airspace. However, the use of accusatory or other language with similar connotations will likely only ever exacerbate problems, especially if a low airtime or less confident pilot is involved. Remaining calm, addressing the most immediate problem, ensuring everyone is safe and then trying to understand the causes in slower time (possibly even on the ground afterwards) is a good approach. It never costs anything to be polite. We can all safely assume that no one in aviation ever sets out to deliberately do something wrong, and indeed may not have even done anything wrong, so giving the benefit of the doubt and resolving immediate issues with a helpful open mind can make a big difference. Moreover, a positive, supportive attitude by all parties will not only benefit the current situation, but will also affect people’s subsequent actions, for example in this case, a willingness to request a TS in future when weather deteriorates and safety margins are eroded.

The pilot who submitted this report is very experienced (6,000hr CPL), made some really sensible airborne decisions and coped well with some difficult radio calls, maintaining the situational awareness (SA) to understand and explain the issue whilst continuing to aviate. This is a great share and a salutary reminder to all of us not to be the weak link in the safety chain and to reflect if our R/T is always professional and constructive, no matter who we are and how frustrated we feel.

CHIRP is certainly sympathetic to the reporter’s frustrations. Especially since the reporter is working hard to promote safer collective airspace use. However, notwithstanding the reporter’s views, AROps does recommend use of a ‘generic area NOTAM’, requested no later than 2 working days in advance, to cover the planned event. Thus, in the cases when a NOTAM applied for on the day cannot be processed by AROps due to workload, other airspace users are still made aware of the event itself. Whilst this may not be ideal, especially for events such as gliding competitions, ultimately, we must do our best to work within the constraints of the system currently in place to ensure that the safest possible protection is afforded to airspace users.

The airfield concerned is a CAA licenced aerodrome with A/G radio only. This means that all airfield users need to be extra vigilant when taxying, entering, departing and crossing runways as well as during take-off and landing. This report highlights what can happen in an uncontrolled environment that does not have the added ‘eyes and ears’ of ATC contributing to the overall safety of ground and air operations.

Leap frogging in front of an aircraft at the holding point, as described in this report, in order to expedite one’s own take-off, is not only inconsiderate but carries a great deal of risk e.g. such an unexpected manoeuvre could have caused an over-reaction from the aircraft in front at the holding point. Moreover, this unusual manoeuvre indicates an element of impatience, even rushing, on the part of the pilot in command of the overtaking aircraft, which is often a precursor to poor decision making as well as other human performance influencing factors. Finally, the overtaking pilot could not rely 100% on their aircraft to take-off normally. We all know to be prepared for an engine failure or partial engine issue on departure; had this occurred it would have seriously compromised the aircraft on short finals.

CHIRP acknowledges that there are often pressures to get airborne at a particular time, for flight planning reasons, or to maximise time available for instructional flights, or reduce the amount of fuel used in holding.  However, even these pressures must not contribute to poor decision making since this will likely result in an unsafe situation developing, as appeared to be the case here.

This is a really interesting example of differing perspectives and how it is only by someone asking questions that the bigger picture emerges. Hence why reporting and adopting a questioning culture is so important. It’s very possible that this reporter wasn’t the only pilot operating into Popham who had concerns about the trees on this approach. Equally, the airfield probably felt that they had gone to very reasonable lengths to provide all necessary safety details for pilots and assumed that the details of and rationale for their unusual approaches were well known and understood. The raising of this report to CHIRP has left everyone better informed and allowed us the opportunity to promote the key messages and safety resources for Popham. A great example of just culture in action.

Considering more broadly, how aware are you of these sort of details for the airfields you fly into? Also, at your own airfield, do you keep track of trees and other obstacles on approach and departure? The trouble with trees and other vegetation is that they grow! Therefore, whilst trees that presented minimal hazard a few years ago may gradually become more problematic. Relatively small, incremental change is unlikely to be obvious to those who operate and fly regularly from an airfield. This can lead to complacency, with an assumption that it’s always been ok before so must still be now. Where there is capacity, adopt a questioning culture, don’t just assume that something is safe, but instead question and test the status quo. Just as this reporter has done.

For any approach path with obstacles to negotiate, it’s important to be careful about approach angle; equally, technique on final approach is critical. Pilots should always be prepared to go-around if they are not happy with the approach. It’s invariably better to reassess and have another go, rather than ‘cut it fine’. Pilots could also consider a steeper than normal approach at airfields where there are obstacles on the extended centreline. Recognising that non-licensed airfields do not have to comply with any specific requirements in respect to obstacles on the approach, pilots should also check all available information before visiting an airfield (such as Pooley’s, airfield websites or equivalent) so that they are aware of any likely warnings or issues and could modify their approach technique and approach angle if required. A simple 1:60 or similar calculation if unsure might be worthwhile when considering obstacles at airfields.

CHIRP highly commends the reporter for this candid report, which was also communicated to the reporter’s line manager. Could we all honestly say that we would have done the same? After all, they got away with it and no harm done. But, by altruistically sharing the experience, there’s an opportunity for everyone to learn and consider the human factor implications of this ‘near miss’.

It serves to remind us all how a combination of tasks and cockpit activities carried out in close succession can quickly lead to distraction and loss of focus of attention away from the flight instruments at a critical point. The reporter self-identified the key lesson as being communication and teamwork in the cockpit. The decision to configure the aircraft just when VNAV capture was expected meant that the crew became distracted from monitoring the flightpath. Avoiding selection of services at critical points for an approach is advisable to prevent such occurrences, albeit that’s sometimes easier said than done, as there may have been a valid reason that caused the flaps and gear to have been selected at that point.

Don’t forget that as well as enabling the experience to be shared through this FEEDBACK, all reports to CHIRP also contribute towards our disidentified safety database and our efforts to analyse and understand the bigger safety picture.