GA1392 (S&P) – Skydiving reserve ride after tension knots – longer version
Report summary:
A recently-licensed skydiver (A licence achieved five months prior) with just over 100 jumps had completed Canopy Training 1 (CT1), during which landing accuracy had improved but emergency malfunction training had not progressed beyond what was taught during initial instruction. In particular, the risk of spiral dive on opening had not been discussed.
During the jump in question, the individual deployed their main parachute at approximately 4,000 ft above ground level. The canopy was large, rectangular and free from damage, but a tension knot in the rear cascade lines caused an immediate spiral dive equivalent to a full brake input. The reporter countered this rotation using rear riser control but assessed their canopy as “not safe for landing” and did not know how to clear the tension knot. They initiated the standard emergency procedure: cutting away (jettison by pulling a handle) the malfunctioned main canopy and deploying the reserve parachute.
The reporter noted that the riser input was instinctive, thanks to prior paragliding experience. They also believed that stabilising the canopy before the cutaway improved reserve deployment, making it cleaner and free from twists. A safe landing followed without further incident.
They did not record their altitude post-deployment or at cutaway, nor did they check for a spontaneous brake release (brake fire). Peers later suggested that a “deep input and release of both brake toggles may have cleared the tension knot”.
They do not know what altitude they were at after deployment or at cutaway. They did not report whether they had checked for a spontaneous brake release (brake fire). Peers later suggested that a “deep input and release to both brake toggles may have cleared the tension knots and prevented the need for reserve”. However, the reporter observed that their emergency training had not covered tension knot clearance and recognised the risks of informal advice from peers, particularly misinformation or incomplete information.
Lessons learned and thoughts:
- Trained emergency procedures remain the frontline defence against malfunctions; in this case, they led to a safe resolution.
- Effective emergency drills supported a quick, confident reserve deployment.
- Informal advice on handling malfunctions should be ignored unless reinforced by formal training.
- Perhaps training could be improved; for example, enhanced canopy malfunction training could benefit skydivers at this level.
CHIRP Comment:
First and foremost, student parachutists must follow the training provided by their instructor. The observations that follow are specific to this reporter, who is a licensed parachutist.
The reporter is to be congratulated for promptly assessing the malfunction as ‘not landable’, taking the correct action for their experience level and executing the emergency procedures without undue delay and at what was probably a safe altitude. Although altitude awareness would ideally have been maintained, in the high-stress environment of a spiral dive malfunction this is a common omission. That same combination of time pressure and cognitive load is exactly why non-standard corrective actions can be hazardous, consuming precious altitude that may be needed for a safe cutaway.
After incidents like this, it’s common for others who weren’t in the situation to suggest that a different course of action might have worked better. Such comments, though often well-meant, can undermine confidence or lead to unsafe adjustments of established emergency drills. Under stress, even experienced individuals can experience reduced awareness and decision-making ability. Every malfunction is unique, and there’s rarely enough time to diagnose and experiment with potential fixes. That time is often not available, and, without perfect altitude awareness, the time can all be used up, leaving no good options. The value of having two parachutes and a simple, practised emergency procedure is that it removes the need for complex analysis and tailoring actions to a specific scenario when seconds matter most and cognitive load is high.
As experience and ambition grow, licensed skydivers may seek to expand their knowledge into more advanced canopy control and emergency handling. This should always be done under structured guidance, appropriate to one’s equipment, recency and experience. They should involve qualified individuals such as the Chief Instructor (CI), a CI-nominated Advanced Instructor, or a qualified canopy coach. Progression through the canopy training system and the A/B/C/D licence system both provide opportunities for conversations with qualified, well-informed people and more nuanced discussions around malfunctions.
Many drop zones run annual safety days and suspended harness drills that give opportunities to explore complex scenarios and discuss hot topics safely under supervision. These are all optional and it’s very much down to the individual, once licensed, to seek out further training, coaching and qualification. Beyond this, while CHIRP agrees that more advanced emergency training could be beneficial for experienced recreational skydivers, establishing this would require investment in infrastructure, sustained funding, and broad community support.
CHIRP is grateful to the reporter for sharing this experience and fostering valuable conversation on how emergency training evolves with experience. This incident offers useful contrast to the situation described in GA1383 (https://chirp.co.uk/hot-topic/skydiving-special/).
Reporter’s specific questions and CHIRP responses:
The reporter asked two specific questions; the CHIRP General Aviation Advisory Board’s skydiving members provided responses and additional information.
Question 1: Is it big? Is it rectangle? Is it free from damage? When a canopy opens with a tension knot and immediately spirals, are those questions alone enough before initiating emergency procedures?
CHIRP response: The full assessment sequence should be:
- Is it big?
- Is it rectangular?
- Is it free from damage and knots?
- Is it fully and normally controllable?
In this case, the reporter had reached a “not landable” decision, implicitly addressing question four without formally stating it. The normal controllability check would consist of taking off both brakes and pumping both toggles to a full flare and surge twice, then doing a normal turn to each side. The British Skydiving Canopy Training Manual (Student CT, CT1, CT2 page 47) addresses tension knots and brake fires as causes of a turning canopy. The wording suggests the controllability check for a single premature brake fire but does not suggest going that far if a tension knot has already been identified. Attempting such checks with a tension knot may occasionally clear the issue, but the success rate is low and comes with risks – most importantly, delaying the cutaway decision below a safe altitude or worsening/accelerating the spiral on brake release.
Question 2: Informal advice comes with risks of misinformation and/or incomplete information.
Is there scope for structured advanced malfunction training similar to SIV in paragliding?
CHIRP response: We agree that informal advice is risky and that structured updates are needed. However, the Simulation d’Incident en Vol (SIV) paragliding programme trains pilots to resolve malfunctions in non-jettisonable paragliding canopies and carries inherent risk – even conducted over water. Skydiving equipment is jettisonable, and every skydiver must carry a reserve. Techniques effective in one aviation discipline may not translate safely to another.
That said, CHIRP strongly supports opportunities for licensed skydivers to refresh and expand their handling of canopy incidents. Two recent British Skydiving Boards of Inquiry have emphasised not prolonged troubleshooting but prompt execution of emergency procedures.
- 2022 – Skydivers should be reminded of their pull priorities and of carrying out their reserve drills as high as possible.
- 2024 – Emergency Procedures: Skydivers should be reminded of the importance of not delaying the cutaway procedure for too long, whilst attempting to kick out of diving line twists.
A 2024 recommendation also calls for an expanded malfunction and emergency procedures guide for licensed skydivers, including premature brake fires, brake releases, and variations in canopy spin and twist scenarios. It appears the improvements sought by the reporter are already in development.
Human Factors Considerations
The following Human Factors were central to CHIRP’s discussions on this report:
Safety Mindset – open reflection and sharing of experience to support wider learning and training improvement.
Stress – reduced cognitive performance and awareness under high workload and time pressure.
Pressure & Peer Influence – pressure to accept or act on informal, unverified advice.
Skills & Knowledge – understanding current training limits and knowing when to seek qualified guidance.
Situational Awareness – maintaining altitude and time awareness during abnormal events.
Decisiveness – taking appropriate and timely action.
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