This was an open and honest report describing an event that could happen to anyone, and probably has to many of us, albeit not always with such a dramatic outcome. The reporter’s reflections contain valuable human factors insights about operating around aircraft, particularly during pre-flight checks. Their willingness to share this painful lesson will no doubt help others avoid similar mishaps.

Beyond the obvious message – “try not to bump into things” – there are several wider safety considerations. Far more injuries occur on the ground than in the air, yet these are often under-reported. Although technically an injury does not become a ‘reportable incident’ until the pilot enters the aircraft with the intention of flight, such occurrences should still be reported so that common themes can be identified and safety improvements made.

Working around aircraft exteriors can be surprisingly hazardous. Walk-rounds should never be rushed; it is far better to find a defect or problem on the ground than in the air. Student pilots should be briefed about external hazards during initial and differences training, and pilots should remain alert to the particular features of their own aircraft. When carrying passengers, a short, calm briefing about key external hazards can help prevent accidents, as noted in Safety Sense Leaflet 2 – Care of Passengers in GA, which was highlighted in CHIRP GA FEEDBACK Edition 105. Pilots have a duty of care for their passengers and should always accompany them on dispersal; inadequate briefing might even have implications for insurance liability in the event of injury.

Typical hazards include flaps, aerials, pitot tubes and tailplanes that can be walked into; fluids that can splash into eyes; or steps on low-wing aircraft that can cause falls. Many professionals working airside wear bump caps, which can be purchased relatively cheaply (£15-£20) and may be worth considering for GA use. Similar arguments could apply to other forms of personal protective equipment when appropriate.

It’s not just people who can get hurt – any impact can also damage the aircraft, particularly older ones where skin or structure may already be fragile. Care, time and situational awareness during pre-flight inspection are essential defences in preventing both personal and aircraft injury. Finally, don’t forget that if you’re distracted during your pre-flight for any reason, it’s good practice to go back to the beginning or a known break point and start again, rather than try to carry on from where you stopped.

This incident provides a powerful reminder of several key GA safety principles, particularly around fuel management and cockpit communication. It is a positive step that the event was reported to the CFI and that the P1 remained calm and acted swiftly to recover the situation. However, the situation could easily have ended very differently.

The key lessons include:

• Never rely on minimum fuel for a flight, no matter how short – build in a margin and err on the side of caution. Fuel in the aircraft is always better than left in the bowser.
• Cross-checks are essential – especially when flying with another qualified pilot, there is value in mutual oversight and the sharing of observations.
• Threat and Error Management (TEM) principles should be applied to every flight, however routine – particularly in planning stages, where risks like low fuel can be identified and mitigated.
• FREDA checks are there for a reason. Rigorous in-flight checks provide multiple opportunities to spot and correct developing threats before they escalate into emergencies.
• Crew Resource Management (CRM) and authority gradient considerations are not exclusive to the commercial cockpit. It can be difficult to speak up assertively as a passenger, but it can be even harder for a PIC to receive advice, especially if ego or familiarity plays a role. Respectful two-way communication and a willingness to listen are vital. Breaking down a hierarchy in the cockpit and stressing that none of us are infallible can assist a voice to be heard. To assist a passenger or crew in escalating concerns, the graded assertiveness method – Probe, Alert, Challenge, Emergency (PACE) – is a useful guide. Another suggestion if you’re feeling uncomfortable is Ask, Suggest, Insist (ASI). This enables a discussion rather than an argument and highlights the outcome or consequence of not taking a suggested action, eg in this case the outcome of not taking sufficient fuel could be “we will run out of fuel”.

The reporter in this case did the right thing in voicing concerns and remained observant throughout, as all passengers with relevant knowledge should. A shared culture of openness and mutual support in the cockpit, regardless of role, is critical to safe flying.

CHIRP encourages pilots to see such near misses not as failures, but as invaluable learning opportunities that, when shared, can make a real difference across the wider community.

Finally, although not necessarily relevant in this case, CHIRP notes that some syndicates have informal rules about landing with minimal fuel remaining to allow flexibility for the next pilot. Such practices can create undue pressure to operate with marginal fuel reserves. This is not considered good practice; pilots are encouraged to prioritise safety and maintain an appropriate margin for error over adherence to syndicate conventions.

Credit to SkyDemon for this comprehensive explanation and for designing the system to ‘fail safe’. This report usefully highlights the potential safety risk of over-reliance on electronic planning and flight aids without adequate cross-checking. SkyDemon has become an indispensable tool for many GA pilots, but like all software it’s only as reliable as its data inputs and the user’s understanding of its limitations. In this case, the anomaly was spotted because the reporter cross-checked multiple sources, something that not every pilot may do.

Instructors increasingly report pilots arriving for club check-outs or lessons having based their planning solely on “what SkyDemon says”. While the software is an excellent aid to situational awareness and can help mitigate risks such as airspace infringements, it is not a substitute for independent weather assessment and sound pre-flight preparation. Features such as “Flyable Conditions” can be helpful visual indicators, but they are still forecasts, subject to the same uncertainties as any meteorological product. On marginal weather days especially, a display that suggests “flyable” could unconsciously bias a pilot’s decision-making towards launching when conditions merit more caution.

Good airmanship means using technology as a tool, not a decision-maker. Pilots should continue to interpret TAFs, METARs and other weather data themselves, comparing outputs from different sources and checking how well automated features align with actual conditions. That human layer of sense-checking and scepticism is what keeps electronic assistance working for us rather than in place of us.

As any GA pilot will attest, discovering a magneto switch selected to OFF in flight would be an unnerving experience, particularly when the cause is uncertain. Whether the switch was accidentally caught by a flying-suit sleeve or mis-selected through a momentary cognitive lapse, this report is an excellent example of a “third age” report: one that nobody else could have known about unless altruistically shared. The reporter deserves full credit for their honesty and humour in describing a situation that offers valuable human factors lessons.

Two possible causes were identified. The first – that the sleeve of the flying suit caught and moved the switch – is entirely plausible. Loose clothing can easily interfere with cockpit switches, with potentially serious consequences. It’s a timely reminder to select appropriate clothing for the task. In addition to avoiding garments that might snag or obscure controls, pilots should consider clothing suitable for other risks too. For instance, fire-resistant materials for balloon operations or warm layers for cold-weather flying (especially in the event of a possible forced landing). Long hair or jewellery can also catch on switches, or move controls, or become trapped in a canopy causing injury; passengers should likewise be briefed on suitable clothing for comfort and safety. Threat & Error Management (TEM) isn’t just about the flight plan; it extends to preparation, equipment and environment.

The second possibility is that the magneto switch was mis-selected, either during the pre-flight checks or in flight, and simply not noticed. Despite diligent checking, it’s easy for expectation bias to creep in, leading us to ‘see’ what we expect rather than what is actually set. Checklists are a vital defence against error, but no system is foolproof. For multi-crew operations, challenge-and-response checking provides an extra safety layer; for single pilots, ‘read and point’ is a recognised technique to reduce error probability. Ultimately, action errors – where the correct intention is formed but the wrong action is taken – can never be completely eradicated, but their exposure can be reduced through disciplined routines and continuous awareness. Of note, in 1970 the Chipmunk rear cockpit magneto switches were modified to include a guard, which prevented inadvertent deselection by curious passengers; the front cockpit though wasn’t similarly modified!

In this case, the pilot approached the flight responsibly: aware of not being current on type, mindful of differences between aircraft, and methodical in preparation. Yet, as often happens, human variability still found a way through the defences. Faced with unexpected vibration, the pilot did exactly the right thing i.e. stayed calm, flew the aircraft and landed safely. Perhaps there was more cognitive load at play than realised, with a combination of recency, aircraft differences and tailwheel handling considerations subtly raising workload. Whatever the root cause, it’s likely that magneto switches will now feature more prominently in this reporter’s scan, and that the sharing of this experience will help others stay alert to similar traps.

First and foremost, student parachutists must follow the training provided by their instructor. The discussion that follows is specific to this reporter, who is a licensed parachutist.

The reporter is to be congratulated for promptly assessing the malfunction as ‘not landable’, taking the correct action for their experience level and executing the emergency procedures without undue delay and at what was probably a safe altitude. Although altitude awareness would ideally have been maintained, in the high-stress environment of a spiral dive malfunction this is a common omission. That same combination of time pressure and cognitive load is exactly why non-standard corrective actions can be hazardous, consuming precious altitude that may be needed for a safe cutaway.

After incidents like this, it’s common for others who weren’t in the situation to suggest that a different course of action might have worked better. Such comments, though often well-meant, can undermine confidence or lead to unsafe adjustments of established emergency drills. Under stress, even experienced individuals can experience reduced awareness and decision-making ability. Every malfunction is unique, and there’s rarely enough time to diagnose and experiment with potential fixes. The value of a simple, practised emergency procedure is that it removes the need for complex analysis when seconds matter most.

As experience grows, jumpers may wish to discuss more advanced techniques with appropriately qualified instructors or canopy coaches. These conversations should always be structured and tailored to the individual’s experience, recency and equipment. Many drop zones run annual safety days and suspended harness drills that give opportunities to explore complex scenarios safely under supervision.

CHIRP thanks the reporter for sharing this experience and for prompting valuable reflection on how emergency training evolves with experience. More detailed discussion and guidance on this topic can be found in our Hot Topic feature – Skydiving Special 2.

This honest and reflective report contains several valuable safety lessons. It’s easy to become task-focused when under pressure – real or perceived – such as finding a parking space at a busy, unfamiliar event. With attention drawn to searching for a marshaller and noting another aircraft with a running propeller, a key element slipped the scan: wingtip clearance.

Good airmanship doesn’t end after touchdown. Focus and situational awareness must continue during taxiing and parking. Humans are generally poor at judging distance, and with wing sweep this becomes particularly difficult at the wing tip, so using a marshaller whenever possible is an important safeguard. The pilot’s perception of the ‘bump’ as uneven ground illustrates confirmation bias – interpreting new information in line with expectations. A simple but powerful takeaway is: if in doubt on the ground, stop. The equivalent in flight might be to reconsider your progress into a potentially worsening situation; pressing on despite uncertainty is a well-known precursor to error.

The subsequent walk-round inspection was a great piece of airmanship that prevented the damage from going unnoticed. However, even apparently minor wingtip strikes can cause hidden structural issues. Any such impact should be assessed by an engineer before further flight, as loads transferred through the wing can affect joints and spars in ways not visible externally. This is especially pertinent at the wing tip, given the long moment arm to the fuselage which multiplies a force.

This occurrence also highlights challenges at fly-ins and air displays, where temporary fencing, unfamiliar layouts and limited marshalling can create additional hazards. While it remains the pilot’s responsibility to avoid obstacles, organisers should, where possible, provide clear guidance, parking routes and trained marshallers to assist safely.

Credit to the reporter for sharing this experience which is a useful reminder that vigilance, patience and good post-flight habits are just as important on the ground as they are in the air.