FEEDBACK

Pressures, Procedures and the Power of Reporting
Every report counts
Thank you to every crew member who has taken the time to send a report into CHIRP. Each report helps us build a clearer picture of the real-world challenges you face, from rostering pressures to SOP deviations and everything in between.
This past summer has seen one of the busiest periods on record for cabin crew reporting to CHIRP. This alone is telling, it shows both the pressures crews are under and the increasing willingness of colleagues to speak up when things donât feel right. Every single report adds weight to the conversation and helps us reflect the operational reality.
A recurring theme in this edition is pressure. Sometimes it is the pressure to begin boarding before safety checks are complete, sometimes it is the strain of long duties with little rest and sometimes it is the expectation to keep going even when fatigue takes hold. Whether the pressure is real or perceived, its effect is the same. Rushing, cutting corners, or hesitating to speak up all carry real safety risks.
That is why reporting matters so much. Without reports, operators and regulators may never see the full extent of the pressures affecting daily operations. By choosing to share your experiences, you are not only raising individual concerns but also helping to build the bigger picture. Reports highlight where safety culture is working well and where it still needs strengthening.
The more detail you include in a report, the more useful it becomes. One sentence might highlight a concern, but fuller information allows us to see trends, ask the right questions and push for practical solutions.
Weâre also seeing increased use of AI tools in report writing. Used thoughtfully, these tools can help structure your thoughts or clarify key points. But there are risks too: automated wording can unintentionally change tone or meaning and AI may not always use operational terminology accurately. There are also potential concerns around data security. At CHIRP, we see technology as a useful aid, not a replacement. The most valuable reports will always be those written in your own words.
Please continue to share your experiences with us. Whether it is fatigue, rostering, pressure during boarding, or something else entirely, every report builds the bigger picture. It is only by seeing the full picture that meaningful change can happen.
Stay safe,
Jennifer Curran
Senior Programme Manager

Jennifer Curran
Cabin Crew Programme Manager
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CC7109
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Unsafe first-wave boarding issueUnsafe first-wave boarding issueInitial Report
Iâm reporting a systemic safety concern regarding commercial pressure during first-wave departures at {operator}. Cabin crew are expected to complete full safety and security checks, deliver a briefing, and prepare the cabin â all within a 15-minute window, before automatic boarding at -30.
Passengers are released to board whether or not the crew are ready. While it is technically possible to delay this by notifying the ground staff, in practice this is discouraged. The culture suggests any delay is a failure, and that SCCMs should simply âmake it work.â This creates significant pressure to rush checks or cut corners.
Yes, crew can stop boarding if needed â but thatâs not the point. The problem is a structure that assumes ideal conditions and shifts blame to individual crew when things donât go to plan. Responsibility is pushed onto SCCMs without giving them time, authority, or genuine discretion.
This isnât about isolated failings. Itâs about a system that quietly erodes safety margins and encourages rushed departures under the guise of efficiency. {Operator} presents this as âpossible,â but just because it can be done doesnât mean itâs safe â or fair.
I fully expect the standard reply â that âthe SCCM is responsible for ensuring checks are completed before boarding.â But I need to be clear:
Responsibility without adequate time or authority is meaningless. This statement ignores the power imbalance between frontline staff and a corporate machine demanding targets, with a structure designed to discourage reporting delays. It puts legal and procedural responsibility on SCCMs, without supporting them operationally.
If CHIRP or the CAA are serious about safety culture, this must be challenged at a procedural and policy level, not passed off as a âtraining issueâ or personal failing. Otherwise, the system is only encouraging silence and speed â not safety.
CHIRP Comment
While there is a clear operational need to keep flights on schedule, this must never come at the cost of safety.
This report highlights an ongoing concern as CHIRP continues to hear from crew who feel pressured to meet operational targets. Whether these pressures are real or perceived, cabin crew must not be put in the position where safety-critical procedures feel optional. If systemic pressures are contributing this mindset, they must be addressed.
When schedules are tight, it can feel like an environment where rushing becomes the norm. But it is essential that crew members do not feel compelled to cut corners in order to âmake it work.â Safety checks, briefings and preparation are not optional and should never be rushed. These arenât extras; theyâre essential to doing the job properly. If the timelines given donât allow crew to complete their duties safely and confidently, this must be raised internally with your operator.
Also keep reporting to CHIRP. One report may be perceived by airlines as an isolated viewpoint, but multiple reports 10, 20, 50 flags it as a concern, showing it affects more than just one sector or one crew member. Sometimes it takes both CHIRP and operators seeing multiple reports to drive meaningful change. Every report helps build a clearer picture of the operational reality.
Subtle pressures, shaped by workplace culture, expectations and unspoken norms can have an impact on crew behaviour. Feeling under scrutiny or fearing criticism for delays can make it harder to follow procedures with the time and attention they require, even when those delays result from doing the job correctly and safely. If you experience this kind of pressure or feel your actions are being unfairly judged, itâs important to report it.
When issues go unreported, organisations may remain unaware of the day-to-day challenges affecting frontline staff. Reporting helps build a complete and honest picture of operational realities, enabling safety teams to spot trends and advocate for meaningful change.
A report similar to this was received and published in CHIRP CC FEEDBACK Edition 85.
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CC7028
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Long duty period, with minimal fatigue mitigation in placeLong duty period, with minimal fatigue mitigation in placeInitial Report
We do seasonal flights from {airport A} to {airport B}. As these are a trip out of base for us last year this rotation included an evening in a hotel in the night before. This year, however, we ferry the aircraft in the morning before the scheduled flight.
The ferry flight up to {airport A} takes off at approximately HH:MM and arrives about an hour later, then we have to collect our bags, and wait on the jet bridge whilst the aircraft is prepared, then we get back onboard and board our passengers. We took off again from {airport A} almost 5 hours after most of us had been at the airport for our duty start time.
The pilots on this sector also get switched, with 2 pilots flying the aircraft up to {airport A} and then getting a night stop there before ferrying an empty aircraft back down to base, and 2 new pilots getting on at {airport A} with us, who had a hotel the night before the flight in {airport A}, which is the same arrangement us crew had last year.
It seems totally unfair that the flight crew continue on the same agreement that we were on last year, however we have an extended duty. I feel as though there is very little fatigue mitigation put in place for this trip pattern, as we only get 2 days off rostered both before and after, and they are still only one-night trips down route. I personally felt horrific after landing, and despite having over 12 hours sleep down route, I have woken up today feeling absolutely exhausted.
Company CommentThe rotation referenced includes a short positioning sector operated without passengers, followed by a long-haul commercial flight. Cabin crew are rostered to operate both sectors as a single duty period, with in-flight rest scheduled on the long-haul sector to extend the permitted duty period in line with flight time limitations. This pattern was reviewed by our Fatigue Risk Management (FRM) team prior to implementation and remains subject to ongoing monitoring.
The flight crew operate a different pairing to the cabin crew for a few reasons, due to operational constraints such as base size and rest requirements. Our cabin crew are qualified on all aircraft types out of the base this aircraft departs from, while only a small number of pilots are, therefore we need to roster the majority of them from our main base, which impacts the way we manage our trip pairings. Out of their main base, it is not feasible for them to position then operate both sectors in the same duty period, even with an augmented crew. Instead, they are rostered separately on each leg, with appropriate rest provided between duties. This approach allows greater flexibility in pilot resourcing, particularly where a smaller base limit their availability.
While the pairings for cabin and flight crew differ, both are designed within the relevant regulatory frameworks and have undergone fatigue risk assessment. At this time, no concerns have been raised by the FRM team in relation to this pattern. We continue to monitor fatigue reports across all flying programmes, and any emerging concerns will be reviewed as part of our seasonal evaluation process. This ongoing dialogue ensures that we continue developing efficient and resilient pairings while prioritising the safety and wellbeing of our crew.
CHIRP Comment
Flight schedules are frequently adjusted, often with cost considerations as a limiting factor. While it may not always seem fair that flight crew receive hotel accommodation the night before a duty and the cabin crew do not, this is often due to operational requirements, such as the pairings of other trips or simply a matter of cost efficiency. For example, the company may be willing to fund accommodation for two crew members, when necessary, but not for ten.
All flights are planned in accordance with UK Flight Time Limitations (FTLs), and all UK operators are legally required to comply with these regulations. If hotel rooms arenât provided as part of a trip pattern, it is because they arenât necessary for the trip to be operated within regulatory limits.
It is essential that crew members make the most of rest opportunities, especially on demanding trip patterns involving long duty days and/or minimum rest. If you believe you are suffering with the effects of fatigue, please report your concerns internally. Cabin crew have a responsibility to inform their operator if they are unfit to perform their duties. Your feedback is essential in helping operators identify and address these issues, promoting safer and healthier working conditions for everyone.
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CC7043
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Not following SOPs causing confusion for the crewNot following SOPs causing confusion for the crewInitial Report
On a recent flight home from {airport} once boarding was completed and the aircraft door was closed, the SCCM made an announcement for the crew to prepare for the safety demo.
The usual procedure is to do this after we have placed the doors into automatic, we had not done this or pushed back so we were all very puzzled by this. The safety demo video was completed and we secured the cabin.
After this, the flight crew made their welcome PA which included that the crew will be completing a safety demonstration (which at this point had been done) so passengers were confused by this.
The SCCM then explained that she had chosen to do the demo first as it was a short taxi, this was not communicated beforehand.
Around 5 mins later we pushed back and the door call was made. We then were advised that there was a queue to take off by the captain, so we werenât sat down at this point. Around 20 mins later, we sat down in the cabin, several passengers were now not properly secure, so we took our own initiative to do this whilst going to our seats.
There was another long wait and then we suddenly took off. No double chimes were given by the flight crew this time.
I have never had a flight where we were not informed that take off was imminent by the double chimes, nor have I ever had to complete the safety demo before placing our doors to automatic.
Company CommentThis report shines a light on how vital communication, reporting, and CRM (Crew Resource Management) are in our day-to-day work as cabin crew. The routines we follow are built from risk assessments, past incidents, regulations, and airline-specific risks. Theyâre there to help keep everyone safe and reduce the chance of mistakes or injuries.
Sometimes, the Commander and SCCM might decide to change the usual routine, for example, doing the safety demo before arming the doors. If that happens, itâs important that the whole team is told clearly. If not, it can cause confusion for both crew and passengers, like when a flight crew PA doesnât match whatâs already happened.
CRM is all about working together with shared awareness, clear communication, and coordinated actions. When those things break down, itâs easier to miss step, like forgetting to arm doors, do the demo, or secure the cabin. In this case, the plan to change the order wasnât properly discussed or confirmed with the crew, which led to uncertainty. If something changes or doesnât feel right, crew should speak up and check with the SCCM. Our just culture encourages asking questions, so if something doesnât feel right, talking about it on the day can help everyone understand what is going on.
Any changes to routines or SOPs should be reported using a safety report. Make sure to include why the change was made and how it might affect the safety or security of the flight.
CAA CommentStandard operating procedures (SOPs) are intended to ensure all crew members have a common understanding of safety related duties that ensures a consistent application and reduces the risk of error. Repetitive deliberate deviation from published procedures in order to achieve a perceived âwork aroundâ creates a normalisation that introduces inconsistency, the potential for misunderstanding and an increased risk in an error occurring, an inadvertent slide deployment being one example. If it is felt SOPs could be improved this should be reported back to the company but current procedures should be followed until such time as they are amended.
CHIRP Comment
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are put in place to ensure consistency and safety during tasks such as arming aircraft doors. Having an SOP means every crew member understands the correct process and what to expect at each step.
If, for safety reasons, it is necessary to deviate from an SOP it is important to clearly communicate this to all crew onboard, including the flight crew. Effective communication ensures shared awareness and reduces the risk of error. Any deviations must be reported through your operatorâs official reporting system, if SOPs are consistently being bypassed or ignored, that signals the need for review or intervention by an operator. Allowing such deviations to become the ânew normalâ can gradually undermine safety standards.
Sometimes there are valid reasons why commands or procedures may not be followed exactly on a particular day, or it may be that a crew member doesnât understand an SOP and requires additional support or training. The operator is best placed to provide that support, which is why it is vital to report any safety concerns internally as well as to CHIRP. For example, if the safety demonstration is carried out before doors are armed, the messaging around emergency evacuation is no longer accurate and could confuse passengers. While there is scope to be flexible any non-standard procedure must still be handled carefully.
A similar report to this was published in CHIRP Cabin Crew FEEDBACK Edition 81.
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CC7053
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Lack of crew rest area on long haul aircraftLack of crew rest area on long haul aircraftInitial Report
During the flight, I experienced significant difficulty obtaining adequate rest during my allocated break due to the location and conditions of the designated rest area. Breaks are currently taken on the jump seats at the aircraft doors, which are not only ergonomically uncomfortable but also situated in high-traffic areas adjacent to the galley.
This area is frequently accessed by passengers, particularly when queues form for the lavatories. As a result, there is constant noise, disruption, and frequent movement of the privacy curtain, all of which severely hinder any meaningful rest or recovery. The issue is further exacerbated by the close proximity of the Attendant Panels, which are frequently accessed by crew members to reset IFE systems or manage other in-flight issuesâcausing additional interruptions during rest breaks.
Additionally, crew members who are not on break have no designated seating area, creating serious safety concerns during unexpected turbulence, as they are often left in standing unsecured positions.
These rest conditions, when combined with extended flight durations and significant time zone shifts, intensify fatigue and hinder proper recovery. Without a proper rest environment, the bodyâs ability to adjust to circadian disruptions is compromised. This increases the risk of cumulative fatigue, negatively impacting alertness, performance, and ultimately, operational safety.
I strongly recommend that crew rest be allocated to the last row of passenger seats, as is on the other aircraft. This would provide a quieter, more secure, and more comfortable environment for crew to rest, improving alertness and performance.
In consideration of the demanding nature of long-haul flights operated without a designated crew rest area, it is recommended that the minimum number of days off following such flights be increased to three (3) consecutive days, rather than the current allocation of only two (2) days. This adjustment is essential to ensure adequate rest and recovery, maintain operational safety, and support the overall well-being of the crew.
Company CommentWhen Class 1 rest is not required, cabin crew who report for duty are confirming they are sufficiently rested for the flight ahead. For duties longer than three hours, refreshment breaks are provided, with break times increasing by 20 minutes as duty length extends, full details can be found in the OMA manual. On aircraft without dedicated crew rest facilities, some cabin door areas are equipped with reclining seats and footrests for breaks. These spaces, separated from passengers with curtains, allow crew to eat, rest, read, use personal devices (with headphones), or simply close their eyes (long haul only). These breaks are intended to provide short rest periods but do not extend the FDP, as they are not classed as Class 1 rest.
On certain flights, Class 1 rest is required to extend the maximum flight duty period (FDP). This provides cabin crew with the opportunity to lie down and rest in a designated, curtained rest area away from the passenger cabin. The duration of Class 1 rest depends on several factors but is designed to ensure crew can safely complete extended duties, take a proper break from operational tasks, and return to duty rested and alert.
Turbulence procedures have been updated to reflect the practical challenges faced by cabin crew on longer flights, particularly when breaks are taking place, and only 50% of the crew are on duty. During these periods, the available crew are performing essential tasks such as cabin and toilet checks, attending to customer needs, and delivering service items. If unexpected turbulence occurs during this time, updated procedures, developed from both industry standards and internal operational experience, now provide guidance on how crew can secure themselves within the cabin. This includes using an available passenger seat, remaining low to the floor while holding on securely, or in the galley, using built-in handles and securing themselves to the floor area. Even when the full crew is on duty, there are not always enough designated crew seats in the galley area to accommodate everyone, particularly at the start of service when trolleys/carts are being prepared and collected. In the case of forecast or planned turbulence, if a crew member is on break at a curtained door area where two crew seats are located, it may be necessary to interrupt their break so that on-duty crew can use the spare seat for safety. In such cases, a cabin safety report should be completed to document that refreshment breaks were disturbed due to in-flight safety conditions. Once the turbulence has passed, the SCCM may be able to reorganise or reschedule breaks where possible.
While suggestions to manage fatigue are always helpful, it is essential that any concerns or fatigue-related occurrences are reported through the companyâs safety management system. This enables the Fatigue Safety Action Group and safety teams to monitor trip patterns and identify trends. Thanks to crew reports, certain roster patterns are already being reviewed, with recommendations for improvement due to be discussed at an upcoming meeting.
CAA CommentThere are no cabin crew inflight rest facilities on this type of aircraft so FDP cannot be extended as cabin crew will be the limiting factor. This type can only be used for nonaugmented crew. The flight would be able to be operated using the maximum daily FDP table under ORO.FTL.205 (b). Regarding accommodation for crew nutrition breaks, the operator is only required to comply with UK Regulation ORO.FTL. 240 (a) & (b), AMC1 ORO.FTL.240 which states that during the FDP, there shall be the opportunity for a meal and drink to avoid any detriment to a crew members performance especially when the FDP exceeds 6 hours.
The operator is required to specify how a crew memberâs nutrition during an FDP is ensured and to specify the minimum duration of the meal opportunity, but there is no requirement in the regulations for accommodation, comfy seats for these breaks (they are fitted on this type). These seats are an âextraâ and they are not used to increase FDP.
CHIRP Comment
While some duties can be lengthy and demanding, given the length of this flight (>9hrs), inflight rest is not a requirement for operating this sector. The minimum break required during this duty is a nutritional / meal break and it is essential that crew members take this opportunity to have a meal and drink to maintain their performance and avoid any negative impact on their fatigue levels. Confusion can arise when different aircraft types operate the same route or when flight times vary, leading to differing crew expectations particularly regarding inflight rest.
There are two main types of rest: a nutritional break and inflight rest.
- In accordance with UK Retained Regulation ORO.FTL.240 Nutrition, a meal opportunity is required (although the provision of food is not).
ORO.FTL.240 Nutrition
(a)Â Â During the FDP there shall be the opportunity for a meal and drink in order to avoid any detriment to a crew memberâs performance, especially when the FDP exceeds 6 hours.
(b)Â Â An operator shall specify in its operations manual how the crew memberâs nutrition during FDP is ensured.
For some operators, this meal opportunity may be a set period of time, whereas other operators state that crew must take regular breaks and take nutrition as required throughout the duty (no set time is specified).
- Inflight rest – If the maximum FDP needs to be extended, then âinflight restâ is required. If the FDP does not need to be extended, then inflight rest is not required.
If the operator permits the cabin crew to take a longer rest period, then access to interphones, cabin attendant panels etc can still be gained and used discreetly as to minimise the impact on the crew member if they are taking the opportunity to use the curtained off areas at the aircraft doors. Of course, during any break or rest, safety must remain the priority and if an emergency or abnormal situation arises all crew may be required to assist.
Turbulence events are on the increase, so crew should remain aware that turbulence procedures need to be considered even whilst on a break. This may include occupying spare passenger seats or, if necessary, securing oneself on the floor to ensure immediate safety.
A similar report to this was published in CHIRP Cabin Crew FEEDBACK Edition 76.Â
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CC7059
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FatigueFatigueInitial Report
Main concern Iâm being âinvestigatedâ for misuse of fatigue when all have been genuine and this could be a safety issue that people like myself now will be frightened to not go fatigued as managers are accusing me of misuse when all have been accepted yet now being pulled and investigated over 12 months after. Managers do not attend SEP courses and therefore have a lack of knowledge or have even read my personal fatigue reports. Which should be confidential. Disciplinary crew for reporting fatigue is against guidance. Iâm now in fear of my job which they are asking me to do by making me worry to not report fatigue. Fatigue is often out of the individualâs control.
Even with good sleep hygiene, factors like shift patterns, workload, stress, and personal health can lead to fatigue. Reporting it shows responsibility, not negligence.
Company CommentThe changes to the Unfit for Duty (Fatigue) handling processes have been made with the full co-operation and support of the Cabin Crew Union representatives who had strongly urged for more Base Management involvement. The overarching policy is to provide support to CCMs who are struggling to achieve adequate pre-flight rest. Fatigue is a whole life issue, home life and health are all very important factors and early intervention is seen as wholly appropriate for crew members who may be struggling. The argument by BASSA that some crew members with disproportionately high levels of Unfit Reports may be misusing the fatigue process is acknowledged but the fatigue team and the cabin crew management team have stressed that this is a safety process and is managed in accordance with the Airlines Just Culture. No crew member has or will face disciplinary action based upon fatigue reporting alone. It has however been agreed that disproportionately high levels of Unfit Reports can be considered where a crew member is already being managed under the absenteeism policy, i.e., there are other high levels of absenteeism. Previously, even high levels of absenteeism due to fatigue were not managed.
CAA CommentFatigue management is intended to identify roster-induced fatigue and enable action to be taken to address potentially fatiguing roster patterns. An investigation may not identify the cause as being a result of a duty or pattern of duties and the outcome may be identified as an individual crew member being unrested. Whilst operators have a responsibility for rostering required rest periods, crew members have a responsibility to ensure they are properly rested before reporting for a duty. Where personal health is a contributory factor, fitness to undertake a duty and sickness absence reporting should be considered. Where a crew member has repeated absence whether as a result of fatigue or sickness, an operator may wish to hold discussions with the crew member concerned in order to identify whether there are any underlying casual factors that may require further support, such as a referral to an employee assistance programme or occupational health.
CHIRP Comment
Investigating reports months after submission â sometimes even a year later – can be challenging. Memories fade, records may be incomplete, and crew can understandably feel anxious about being accused of âmisuse,â even when their concerns are genuine. For reporting to work well, investigations need to be timely and focused on learning and support, not blame. Getting this right helps build trust and encourages crew to raise safety concerns openly.
ICAO defines fatigue as: âA physiological state of reduced mental or physical performance capability resulting from sleep loss, extended wakefulness, circadian phase and/or workload (mental/physical activity) that can impair a personâs alertness and ability to perform safety-related operational duties.â
Fatigue is highly individual and what affects one crew member may not affect another in the same way. Reporting safety-related concerns, including fatigue, is a professional act and shows commitment to both your own well-being and safe operations. When organisations respond with support rather than punishment, everyone benefits. A âJust Cultureâ encourages open reporting, continuous learning and safer aviation for all.
Management has a duty of care to carefully consider repeated fatigue reports to support crew welfare and maintain operational safety. While a single report may indicate a short-term issue, repeated reports could point to a more serious, long-term problem. Responsible management involves identifying potential underlying issues while ensuring that crew receive appropriate support.
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CC7076
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900 Hours900 HoursInitial Report
I am concerned and wanted to know what the rule is for 900 hours with EASA. I am currently Cabin Crew with {operator}, I am on high hours which currently stand at 857. I have a {airport} coming up on DDMMYY and then have a {airport} on the DDMMYY and I have a reserve block also on DDMMYY. I have no hours to drop from last year as I know they work on rolling hours. Currently stands I have had to make adjustments to my own schedule to reduce my hours.
Crewing have said that it is ok to do over 900 hours which I think is illegal. There words were âits ok because itâs in the month.â I know for a fact that this is incorrect, over 28 days my hours are 41.00 so thatâs all good.
Company CommentThe FTL scheme in our Operations Manual Part A states:
The total flight time of the sectors on which an individual crewmember is assigned as an operating crewmember shall not exceed:
- a) 100 hours of flight time in any 28 consecutive days;
- b) 900 hours of flight time in any 12 consecutive calendar months.
This rule aligns with the UK Civil Aviation Working Time Regulations, which is more restrictive than UK CAAâs retained version of Regulation 965/2012.
The 900 hours LimitÂ
This is a rolling window, not tied to a calendar year or the current calendar month. Every day, you must look back at the preceding 12 full calendar months (e.g. if today is 13 June 2025, the period is 1 June 2024 to 31 May 2025). Your total actual flight time in that period must not exceed 900 hours. If it does, you must not be rostered for any more flights until it drops below 900 in that rolling window.
If Crewing says, “Itâs okay because itâs in the month,â ask:
- âWhich month?â
- âHave you calculated the rolling 12-month total?â
- âHave you confirmed that the actual flight time in the previous 12 full calendar months are under 900 hours?â
A common misconception is confusing 12 consecutive calendar months with a rolling 365-day period, which is what they may be referring to as “in the month”.
The rule is 900 hours of flight time in any 12 consecutive calendar months. That means, you total up full calendar months, not individual days. If today is 13 June 2025, you count from 1 June 2024 to 31 May 2025 (not 14 June 2024 to 13 June 2025).
You could exceed 900 hours over any rolling 365-day period, but still be within the 900-hour limit for 12 consecutive calendar months.
CAA CommentAs indicated in the company comment, the limit of 900 flying hours is calculated to the end of the preceding month. Operators should ensure that rosters are managed so as to identify crew members who are close to the 900-hour flying duty limit and prevent any exceedance.
CHIRP Comment
All UK operators are required to comply with to UK flight time regulations (FTLs). Some operators also have industrial agreements that define additional rest requirements, whilst operators may choose to schedule rest periods that exceed the minimum requirements set out in the FTLs, they must never be shorter than the minimum rest period that is required.
If you have a query about your roster, please contact the relevant department as soon as possible. CHIRP is aware that some operators are more difficult to reach than others, which makes it all the more important to raise any concerns promptly.
ORO.FTL.210 Flight times and duty periods
(a)Â The total duty periods to which a crew member may be assigned shall not exceed:
(1)Â 60 duty hours in any 7 consecutive days;
(2)Â 110 duty hours in any 14 consecutive days; and
(3)Â 190 duty hours in any 28 consecutive days, spread as evenly as practicable throughout that period.
(b)Â The total flight time of the sectors on which an individual crew member is assigned as an operating crew member shall not exceed:
(1)Â 100 hours of flight time in any 28 consecutive days;
(2)Â 900 hours of flight time in any calendar year; and
(3)Â 1000 hours of flight time in any 12 consecutive calendar months.
(c)Â Post-flight duty shall count as duty period. The operator shall specify in its operations manual the minimum time period for post-flight duties.
The Civil Aviation Working Time Regulations 2004, are the UKâs application of the EU Civil Aviation Workers Directive ec 2000/79, which limits aircrew to 900 flight hours in a calendar year. Itâs an upper limit, so there isnât any jurisdiction for pro rata contracts, these can be as part of an operatorâs collective labour agreements. The slight difference in how the UK regulation amended the overall directive was to additionally include a caveat to regulate the 900 hours over a rolling 12-month period. The wording does permit the exceedance of 900 hours, but not when counted from the end of the month.
Civil Aviation Working Time Regulations 2004
Maximum annual working time
- An employer shall ensure that in any monthâ
(a) no person employed by the employer shall act as a crew member during the course of their* working time, if during the period of 12 months expiring at the end of the month
before the month in question the aggregate block flying time of that person exceeds
900 hours; and
(b) no crew member employed by the employer shall have a total annual working time of more than 2,000 hours during the period of 12 months expiring at the end of the month before the month in question.
Thank you for taking the time to provide feedback and would like to offer further context to reassure you that safety remains our top priority.
The times allocated for pre-flight duties, including briefings, security searches, and safety equipment checks, have been rigorously trialled before implementation to ensure they are sufficient. We maintain a robust safety culture where these operational practices are genuinely prioritised and integrated into every aspect of our operation.
While we strive to meet our customers’ expectations for timely departures, we do not compromise on safety. Our culture recognises that there may be occasions when crew need more time to complete pre-flight duties due to various reasons such as awaiting a standby crew member, additional security requirements, or cabin defects. In such cases, our SCCMs are empowered to delay boarding by liaising with the ground crew if necessary.
If a boarding delay occurs, it may prompt a transparent discussion with the base management team. However, this is intended to help us understand the reasons for the delay so we can identify areas for improvement. It is not a punitive measure, and our commitment to a ‘just’ culture remains at the heart of what we do.
Feedback from our crew is invaluable, as it not only helps us enhance our safety practices but also supports our crew by ensuring they can perform their duties without undue pressure. This leads to better outcomes for everyone involved.
Our SCCMs play a crucial role in managing cabin safety and are encouraged to report any operational issues through channels such as duty report or feedback forms, and any safety issues must be reported via a safety report. We actively encourage using these channels as they are vital for making informed operational decisions.
We take the concerns raised in your report seriously and will continue to review at both a procedural and policy level, any opportunities to review and revise our practices, ensuring that safety is not just prioritised but that our crew are operationally supported to maintain our high safety standards.
Cabin crew should not feel pressured to start passenger boarding or close the aircraft doors until they are satisfied all required safety activities have been achieved. There should be no deviation from published standard operating procedures (SOPs) in order to facilitate an on-time departure. If cabin crew feel they are being pressured to achieve an unrealistic passenger boarding time it is essential that this is reported using the company reporting scheme. Such reporting should be managed in accordance with the principles of just culture.