

CHIRP FEEDBACK

Issue No: 89

Winter 2008

EDITORIAL

From time to time we receive comments about the effectiveness of the **CHIRP** process; some thank us for actions that we have taken in response to a specific issue, others complain about our inability to change what reporters perceive as inappropriate/unsatisfactory practices reported through the Programme.

When we receive one or more reports detailing a safety concern we check with the reporter(s) what action they would wish us to take on their behalf, represent their concern accordingly and invite managements to review the reported concern(s). In addition, all significant issues are presented for discussion at the **CHIRP** Air Transport Advisory Board, which meets every three months. The Board has 26 members, nominated from all sectors of the Industry, including three CAA nominees, and an independent Chairman. The Board discusses many of the issues raised in reports in considerable detail; the principal points of the discussion are formally minuted and, where relevant, represented to the organisation concerned or the CAA/NAA/Regulator on behalf of the Board.

As many reporters know, the Board and I do try to influence organisations to implement changes sought by reporters; however, this Programme has no executive authority and, in the event that an organisation declines to accept the Board's recommendation, the role of this Programme is to communicate the issue and the company's response to the CAA, which holds the responsibility for overseeing aviation safety in the UK or, in the case of security, the DfT. If the relevant Regulator elects not to act solely on basis of the information that we make available, as has been the case with some issues, the Board and I do seek other ways to ensure that reporters' concerns are acknowledged and, where appropriate, addressed.

As an example, in the case of airport security we have held discussions with the Airport Operators Association, the BAA, several UK airports and most recently the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI); these discussions have focussed on the training of security staff with the objective of reducing the type of incidents experienced by flight crew/engineers/ATCOs and reported to us. In the past month, we have been advised that the new Group Director Safety Regulation, Captain David Chapman CAA (SRG), has also discussed the ongoing security concerns with the

Department for Transport; we very much welcome this initiative.

Similarly, we have also recently submitted a report to the CAA summarising the Duty/FTL related reports received in 2006, 2007 and 2008; the report provides an indication of those FTL concerns that would appear to have been resolved and those that continue to be reported. A summary of the report is published on Pages 6 & 7.

In some cases, regrettably, we are unable to achieve the changes sought by reporters. Whilst these cases are, understandably, extremely frustrating for those reporters affected, the basic question for all of you who read this newsletter regularly is to decide whether, on balance, although we are unable to resolve every issue raised through the Programme, the reports that we present and the actions that we take on behalf of reporters do make an overall positive contribution to flight safety? Also, if you think that we can improve what we do within the remit of the Programme, please let us know.

WHAT'S IN THIS ISSUE?	Page
EDITORIAL.....	1
SECURITY REPORTS.....	2-3
ENGINEER REPORTS	
Engineering Editorial.....	3
Magnetic Chip Detector Inspections.....	4
Contracted Staff - Shift Working.....	4
ATC REPORTS	
CAA Supp Instruction No. 2009/01 to MATS Pt 1.....	5
Headset Lead Hazard.....	5
A Human Centred Approach.....	5
CAA (SRG) ATSINS.....	6
DUTY/REST/FTL REPORTING TRENDS - 2006/07/08.....	6-8
FLIGHT CREW REPORTS	
Availability of GMC.....	8
Incorrect MEL Procedure.....	9
Sector Fuel (FB88) - A Comment.....	9
"Mayday/Pan" Prefixes - A Clarification.....	9
Did I Carry Out The Correct Procedure.....	10
New Style Charts.....	10
More on Three Pilot Operations.....	10-11
Is Your Fire Extinguisher Useable?.....	12
ATSOCAS - A Reminder.....	12
CABIN CREW REPORTS	
CRM and NITS.....	12
CAA (SRG) FODCOMS.....	12
CONTACT CHIRP / CHANGE OF ADDRESS NOTIFICATION DETAILS.....	13
REPORT FORMS.....	14-16

AIR TRANSPORT FEEDBACK is also available on the **CHIRP** website - www.chirp.co.uk

An Air Transport Safety Newsletter

from **CHIRP** the Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme

SECURITY REPORTS

CHIRP Narrative: As noted on Page 1, in December we were afforded the opportunity to discuss the concerns about security procedures with a senior CPNI official with the objective of gaining support for improving training standards at UK airports in those areas of concern to uniformed flight crew and other airport professional staff reported to us, such as the following:

SECURITY WIND-UP

Report Text: It had to happen, the ultimate anti-safety event; CHIRP FEEDBACK arrived through the post and went into the bin unopened. I was not prepared to have my day off ruined by being wound-up reading two pages of Security Reports which we, crew and general public, know happens every day at every UK airport.

It is not the reports that get to me but the replies from official individuals and organisations, 'official' they might be but 'professional' they are not, (individuals and organisations).

It is the nature of the business; as a flight crew member operating worldwide, I pass through many airports both as crew and passenger. Only in the UK at Immigration, Customs and every Security Point do we see notices about "Aggressive Language and Behaviour". I wonder where the problem lies!

P.S. Had to retrieve FEEDBACK for your address, so I read it anyway, I'll feel better tomorrow!

SIMILAR SENTIMENTS FROM AN ENGINEER

Report Text: I have had to bite my tongue like the cast of thousands on more than one occasion whilst being subject to what can only be described as unnecessary intimidation on the verge of bullying at the hands of airport security staff. All around ### airport, at security posts and even in their own ID unit we see signs reminding us of the consequences of verbal or physical abuse towards security staff.

Why do they need these signs? Simple, it's because their staff bring out the worst in people whilst enforcing what power that's bestowed upon them. It's about time they were stopped from hiding behind threatening words and be trained to carry out their duties in a sensible, polite and professional manner, then we can all 'clock in' or go flying in a happy relaxed state.

Spending the first two hours of your day recovering from being wound-up at the security post by small minded people flexing their muscles is definitely a safety hazard whether flying or engineering is involved. Some time ago I was escorting a couple of 'work experience' kids around for the week and so prevalent was this problem that when they finished they both commented they had a good week apart from dealing with security staff and were now put off working at an airport. They're not the first and probably won't be the last; well done ### Security!

ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL, BUT.....!

(1)

Report Text: I write concerning an incident at the domestic search area at a Scottish airport this week. I would be grateful if through the channels of "CHIRP" I could get some clarification and explanation of the security search policy. As I was waiting to proceed through the passenger search area on the way to the crew room (airside), a gentleman in front of me in a suit proceeded through the metal detector arch. The detector was triggered but no attempt was made to search him. On questioning the security staff about their actions they advised me he was "Special Branch".

Why are Special Branch Officers exempt from a search? I appreciate that some of these gentleman may well be carrying firearms but surely a hand search is still appropriate to ensure no other "items" are being carried.

I am at times exasperated at the futility of some of the restrictions placed on crews and the items they can and cannot carry, but I have always complied in the knowledge that even if there was a rogue or misguided crew member they would still get searched. Does the same logic not apply to the Police?

Surely the security of an airport is only as good as its weakest point. If we are to maintain a robust security cordon then everyone should be subject to the same search criteria, regardless of status.

(2)

Report Text: I reached the staff security checkpoint immediately behind two armed policemen. The police passed through the arch detector carrying weapons, wearing body armour and the plethora of other items carried by police. The weapons were prominently on display; the larger being hand-carried by both and another smaller weapon attached to a belt, holstered. Neither policeman was searched although their airport IDs were swiped.

When my turn came, I removed my pen, calculator and phone from my pockets, put my flight bag, coat and the other items in a tray through the x ray machine and walked through the scanner which beeped. I then had to remove my shoes and be hand searched - the pat down. The contents of my flight bag were examined and I was allowed then to go about my business.

Over a period of five days duty I was subjected to four "random or quota" searches. I find it absolutely incredible that armed police are allowed through security without being searched; the mere fact that they are police should not offer them some form of immunity. An aircraft commander is responsible for a lethal weapon, the aircraft, and the lives of up to 450 people but is not afforded the same immunity from search; on the contrary, he/she may find that their extremely dangerous bottle of sparkling water or fruit yoghurt is confiscated by security.

We are all subject to screening prior to the issue of a security pass; many of us are ex military personnel who have been subjected to even closer security screening in previous lives, yet we are now regarded as potential terrorists every day of our working lives.

There exists the probability, however small, that a rogue armed policemen could take over an aircraft or initiate absolute carnage in a crowded terminal with an automatic weapon but that risk is deemed acceptable by the DfT. The ongoing inconsistencies in the treatment of aircrew by the DfT (Security staff merely implement the DfT policy) is little more than a Jihad in its own right.

(3)

Report Text: At present there is a lot of building work going on this UK regional airport. This involves contract staff being allowed access airside to carry out the work. Whilst coming through security to start my 12-hour shift airside, I noticed that the building contractors were allowed to carry bottles of juice and liquids with them. When I queried the security staff about why the building contractors were allowed liquids through and the rest of the airport staff weren't I was told first of all that "as long as it is below 100ml it is okay". I pointed out that the bottles of juice were not below 100ml and was then told, "the contract staff work outside all day and therefore are allowed to bring in bottles of juice".

The reason for this report is not to stop the contract staff from being able to bring liquid refreshments onto the airport; it is to point out how ridiculous the whole situation is, and that the common sense that is being applied to the situation of the contract staff should be extended to the rest of the airport staff.

I am fed up of finishing shifts dehydrated, not being able to have a decent glass of juice, drink of milk or energy drink if and when I fancy it. Everyone knows that dehydration can affect concentration, and lack of concentration is surely a 'link in the chain' of a potential human factors incident.

I have no doubt whatsoever that this report, along with the rest of the CHIRP reports submitted, will have absolutely no effect whatsoever in changing what is a ludicrous situation dreamt up by supposedly educated individuals who, due to the current security situation, have free license to bolster their egos by making up ever increasing numbers of new rules, none of which makes any airport workers lives easier.

Lesson Learned: If common sense can be applied in the situation that we have with building contract staff being allowed liquids airside, then this should be extended to the airport workers. Airport staff are not the terrorists!!

ENGINEERING EDITORIAL

A NEW YEAR, A NEW CHALLENGE!

The start of the New Year brought in a new ICAO standard for a Safety Management System (SMS); all member States are required to adopt the new standard for SMS with full implementation by 1 January 2011. In the UK the CAA has recommended that companies carry out a gap analysis against the new standard and present an implementation plan to the Authority. Mr Simon Roberts, CAA Regional Manager Airworthiness

Stansted (SRG), has been given the task of co-ordinating implementation within the UK.

Relatively few UK companies currently have a fully functioning SMS. One of our greatest challenges is breaking down the historic barriers that exist between departments and personnel, both within organisations and between organisations, in order to develop effective communications and working relationships. Everyone has a role to play in SMS, whether they are the accountable manager, a pilot, an engineer or a cleaner.


From the maintenance perspective, one area that needs further consideration is the level of incident reporting by engineers. Traditionally, the reporting culture in the engineering community has not been good. This does not mean that engineers are any less committed to aviation safety than anyone else in the industry. However, the 'can do' culture, coupled with the less than open communication style that still exists in many companies, could inhibit the safety improvements that SMS is seeking to achieve.










If the principal objective of SMS, to provide an effective process for managing and mitigating safety risks, is to be achieved, a greater commitment will be required from all levels in an organisation, but particularly from senior Accountable Managers, to permit safety issues to be reported, discussed and addressed in an open and just manner.

The CAA has always held operators accountable for the safety of their operation through the terms of their Air Operator's Certificate/Engineering Approval. SMS is a new tool to assist operators/companies to establish and audit their safety policy, strategy and processes to demonstrate safe operation. However, SMS is not a panacea for managing all safety issues and, notwithstanding operators'/companies' responsibility for the safety of their operations, CAA (SRG) has and will retain a statutory responsibility for safety oversight of the UK air transport industry.

ENGINEER REPORTS

Most Frequent Engineering Issues Received: 12 Months to December 2008



	Security (Ground)
	Maintenance (Line, Base, Repairs)
	Regulation/Law (Compliance with)
	Procedures (Use by Others, Adequacy, Existence)
	Company Policies (Operational, Safety Reporting, Disciplinary/Grievance)
	Aircraft Technical (Systems)
	Documentation (Suitability/Adequacy)
	Environment (Visibility, Icing, Wind, Temperatures)
	Physiological (Illness, Injury)

MAGNETIC CHIP DETECTOR INSPECTIONS

Report Text: Reference FEEDBACK Issue No.88, 'Certification Of Safety Critical Tasks', I have to disagree with the CHIRP response regarding duplicate inspections of items such as magnetic chip detectors.

I will be very surprised if I'm the only person who comments on this subject! It is absolutely, 100% possible to carry out a duplicate inspection of items such as chip detectors from start to finish. It only takes two suitably qualified persons to be 'on the spot' - how hard can this be?

What is more, I'm gob smacked that CHIRP could even suggest otherwise - just take a look back through history & you will find several well documented occurrences of o-rings being omitted from the installation of MCD's. Since the introduction of 'ETOPS' my experience has always been to carry out the procedure by ensuring two suitably qualified persons observe the new o-rings are installed prior to the MCD being located in the engine followed by; checking the fitment &, if applicable, locking. This is regardless of whether or not the aircraft is under 'ETOPS' conditions.

I don't accept excuses that there are not enough suitably qualified persons to go around. If this is the case then the maintenance should be extended until such time as there are or, worst case, the aircraft is delayed.

Next you'll be telling us the human factors training we all have to comply with is a waste of time! Please tell me this is a 'typo'!!!

CHIRP Comment: A Duplicate (or Independent) Inspection is required to ensure that the 'fit, form and function' of critical control systems is not compromised by maintenance action, Part M refers; see M.A.402 & AMC M.A.402 (a); Para. 4 - Independent Inspections.

It would be more accurate to describe conducting a 'secondary check' to validate the non-complex task of an MCD change, as a function check is not carried out. However, the principles of the duplicate inspection process are used for certification purposes.

In the case of MCDs, the safety criticality of the installation is dependant on the modification state, as the majority have NRVs in the oil way to prevent fluid loss if a plug is dislodged and a number have an

interrupter device to prevent a plug being fitted without 'O' rings.

Of course not all MCD installations have both of these 'mods' and the criticality is decided by the organisation, the tasks status is then highlighted to the CAA when submitting the maintenance schedule for approval.

The procedure for ensuring the correct fitment of MCDs should be described in a company's multi-system safety maintenance policy, where the validation process is detailed.

The level of certification employed to issue a CRS is dependant on the organisation who decide on the criticality of the task. Some use Cat A mechanics, whilst others use Cat B technicians and without doubt, sufficient time/resources must be allocated. This varies from the policy for duplicate inspections outlined in BCAR Chapter A6-2.

CONTRACTED STAFF - SHIFT WORKING

Report Text: I am a contractor working for a UK based maintenance organisation. This report does not relate to a specific incident but my company's insistence on contract staff being rostered on shift for 21 days, with 7 days off.

I am currently employed on a seven-day on, seven-day off shift pattern, which I feel is no problem at all. However, the line engineering manager insists that new contractors must work 21 days on and rest for 7 days. I know of contractors who have attended interview for short-term contracts who have refused to be rostered for 21 days and have subsequently not been employed. The working day in the company can be a long one, typically anything from 12 to 18 hours a day!

The line station engineers within the company have voiced their concern over this working pattern with the line engineering manager, but he ignores them. Surely this contravenes all that is preached to us about human factors! Added to this, how can it be legal to roster someone to work for 21 days?

I believe that people are given a day off in the middle of their shift, but remain away from home in a hotel down route somewhere, so do not benefit from quality time.

Lesson Learned: The permanent staff work seven days on, seven days off; roster the contracting staff on the same pattern.

CHIRP Comment: With the reporter's consent, we contacted the CAA regarding the alleged acceptability of the above working pattern.

Following an audit, the Authority assessed that insufficient controls were in place to ensure that safety considerations for maintenance were not being compromised by possible fatigue issues and required that additional controls be introduced; the company subsequently agreed to change rosters and procedures.

From a Human Factors perspective, it is difficult to understand how a work pattern such as that described in this report could be justified in any industrial setting, let alone a safety-critical environment such as aviation engineering. ICAO, EASA and the UK CAA have all highlighted the potential human performance issues through the requirements and companies are obliged to

have these reflected in their procedures. Given that the industry will continue to be faced with a difficult economic environment, acknowledgement of the unacceptability of working practices such as this in the UK air transport industry either by agreement or, if necessary, regulation is long overdue.

ATC REPORTS

**CAA SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUCTION No.2009/01
TO CAP 493 MATS PART 1**


A reminder that CAA (SRG) Air Traffic Standards Department issued Supplementary Instruction No. 2009/01 on 14 January 2009 - notifying withdrawal of SI No.2008/04 (Procedures and Phraseology Concerning Level Restrictions Associated With Standard Instrument Departures

assistants who are providing flight progress strips to the controllers. I know of at least 6 cases where people have tripped on the cables. Thankfully no-one has been seriously injured yet, but it is surely only a matter of time.

There is also the possibility that a headset could be pulled off a controller's head, potentially impacting the safety of aircraft under that ATCO's control. The headsets came supplied with an orange netting tube, which can be used to shorten the cable without impacting its available length; this keeps the cable off the floor and solves the problem. These should be made mandatory, and re-issued if they have been lost.

CHIRP Comment: The reporter's concerns were represented to the Unit management and subsequently investigated. The investigation confirmed the trip hazard; a locally-developed velcro tie modification has been trialled successfully and is in the process of being made available to individuals.

**Most Frequent ATC Issues Received
12 Months to December 2008**



- Communications - External**
(Pilots)
- Air Traffic Management**
(Seperation. Level of Service)
- Relationship Management**
(Planning, Managers)
- Security**
(Ground)
- Others/Undefined**
(Other)
- Airports**
(Runways, Bird Control, Infrastructure)
- Company Policies**
(Absence, Operational, Safety Reporting)
- Duty**
(Length, Rest)

A HUMAN CENTRED APPROACH?

Report Text: Recently an emergency situation was "simulated" at this Unit. This event was planned to test the response of this Unit and other agencies to the situation.

The exercise commenced just prior to a watch handover, a period when errors are proven to be more likely; however, a decision was taken by senior managers not to notify the team of controllers and assistants, who were controlling other traffic in the vicinity of the exercise .

As a result, for approximately 15 minutes the team of controllers and one assistant, who were operating in a moderately busy live environment, were under the impression that an aircraft had crashed.

Very few of us can be aware of the immense stress that witnessing such an event can cause - the fact that the team managed to continue as best they could should be totally applauded, but because of the inevitable distraction a more serious situation with other traffic almost developed.

I, and numerous colleagues, are absolutely outraged that such an event was allowed to happen. We undertake annual training in unusual circumstances and emergencies but this occurs in a totally simulated environment where there is never any danger to actual persons. The two scenarios, simulator and live, should never ever again be allowed to happen together.

The safety of aircraft is our number one concern and for a period of time on that date safety was most definitely compromised. I understand the managers concerned have apologised and have stated that a similar exercise would be handled differently in future - but are these assurances enough?

CHIRP Comment: The concerns expressed by this reporter and several others were represented to management. The circumstances associated with the simulation had been also reported by other means and were subsequently the subject of an independent investigation; the recommendations from this

HEADSET LEAD HAZARD

Report Text: The headsets issued to ATCOs at this unit have a necessarily long lead on them, to enable movement, and hence enhance communications between controllers. However, the leads are black (the old ones were light grey) and are often allowed to trail on the floor. This presents a trip hazard to the

investigation have been accepted, implemented and briefed to the Unit staff.

It is relevant to note that the Air Navigation Order proscribes the simulation of an emergency on a Public Transport flight. If an ATC simulation in a real-time scenario is deemed by the CAA to be essential, it should be required that controllers and supervisors must be briefed to an extent that the exercise can be terminated should any safety risk subsequently develop.

CAA (SRG) ATSINS

The following CAA (SRG) ATS Standards Department ATSINS and Supplementary Instructions (SI) to CAP 493 MATS Part 1 have been issued since October 2008:

Supplementary Instruction to MATS Part 1 (Number 2008/03) - Issued 17 December 2008, Effective 12 March 2009

Revised ATSOCAS - Impact on CAP 493 MATS Part 1
Supplementary Instruction to MATS Part 1 (Number 2008/04) - Issued 17 December 2008

~~Procedures and Phraseology Concerning Level Restrictions Associated with Standard Instrument Departures (SID) (See 2009/01 on Page 5).~~

Supplementary Instruction to MATS Part 1 (Number 2008/05) - Issued 19 December 2008, Effective 1 February 2009

SSR Procedures for Military Aircraft Conducting Autonomous High Energy Manoeuvres

Supplementary Instruction to MATS Part 1 (Number 2009/01) - Issued 14 January 2009, Effective Immediate

Withdrawal of Supplementary Instruction 2008/04 (Procedures and Phraseology Concerning Level Restrictions Associated with Standard Instrument Departures

Supplementary Instruction to MATS Part 1 (Number 2009/02) - Issued 20 January 2009, Effective 20 January 2009

Wake Turbulence Separation and Flight Planning Requirements for the Airbus A380-800

ATSINS:

Number 144 - Issued 31 October 2008-11-03

ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) Planned Audit of the United Kingdom, February 2009

Number 1 (Issue 2) - Issued 3 November 2008

Air Traffic Services Information Notices (ATSINs)

Number 145 - Issued 5 November 2008

Ultrasonic Wind Sensors

Number 146 - Issued 20 November 2008

Maintaining the Validity of an Air Traffic Controller Licence

Number 147 - Issued 21 November 2008

Winter Break 2008/09 (Christmas and New Year)

Number 148 - Issued 25 November 2008

Revision to CAP 774 - UK Flight Information Service

Number 149 - Issued 16 December 2008

Malicious Use of Lasers Against Aircraft In Flight

Number 150 - Issued 9 January 2009

S-Band Primary Surveillance Radar - Potential Co-existence Issues with 2.6GHz

CAA (SRG) ATS Information Notices are published on the CAA (SRG) website -

www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?categoryid=33 and click on the link 'Search for a CAA Publication'

DUTY/REST/FTL REPORTING TRENDS - 2006/2007/2008

Introduction:


Duty related issues are one of the topics most frequently reported by flight crew in confidential reports. In those cases where a report raises an individual issue, whenever possible the matter is brought to the attention of the relevant operator on behalf of the reporter or, in some cases is represented to CAA (SRG). In recent years, the reporting trends in duty related reports received from flight crew members have been assessed; the results have been made available to senior operational managers annually and have been submitted to the Head Flight Operations Inspectorate (Aeroplanes) department, CAA (SRG).

A similar exercise has been carried out for flight crew duty related reports received during the period from 1 January 2008 to 30 November 2008 and the results compared with those from 2006 and 2007.

2006:

During 2006 a total of 98 duty-related reports were received in which 179 roster/FTL issues were identified. As shown in the chart below, the three principal FTL issues raised in reports during 2006 were: Scheduling rest periods between 18 and 30 hours - 33% (32 reports); long duties 16% (16 reports) and allegedly fatiguing roster patterns 11% (11 reports). A fourth issue raised in a further 11% (11 reports) was the 5-2-5-4 roster sequence that had been introduced on a trial basis by one UK operator; in 9 reports in this group the roster pattern was the principal issue.

Flight Crew Duty Report Issues - 2006




Of the 98 duty-related reports received during 2006, 45% (44 reports) were sourced from one UK operator (Operator L), two other UK operators (Operator H,

Operator E) represented 13% (13 reports) and 9% (9 reports) respectively.

In the case of Operators L and H, the principal area of concern was the frequency of the rostering of rest periods of between 18 and 30 hours; roster disruption was also reported in the case of Operator L. All of the reports received from operator E referenced the 5-2-5-4 roster pattern

Flight Crew Duty Reports - 2006




2007:

In 2007 a total of 48 duty-related reports were received, in which 69 roster/FTL related issues were identified; this represented a reduction in the number of reports submitted of approximately 50% in comparison with the total submitted in 2006.


The two predominant issues raised in reports during 2007 were allegedly fatiguing roster patterns - 39% (19 reports); scheduling of 18-30 hour rest periods was the principal issue in 35% (17 reports).

Flight Crew Duty Report Issues - 2007



Of the total of duty-related reports submitted in 2007, 44% (21 reports) involved Operator L, less than half the number received in 2006 but a similar percentage of the total as in the previous year. Only three reports (6%) were sourced from operator H during 2007, compared with 13 reports (13%) in 2006. In the case of operator E, only one FTL related report was submitted in 2007 and this was not related directly to the operator's 5-2-5-4 roster pattern, which had been modified prior to the 2007 summer season.

Flight Crew Duty Reports - 2007




2008:

In the 11-month period between January and November 2008, 41 reports relating to Duty/FTL were received from which 46 issues were identified. Within this total the two most prominent categories were the same as in 2007; nine reports (20%) concerned poor rostering practice and a further eight reports specifically cited scheduling of rest periods of between 18 and 30 hours. In those cases where a roster pattern was submitted, the roster was assessed using 'Safe - Version 4.2'; the levels of tiredness predicted by the 'Safe' model [Samn-Perelli values] were predominantly moderate, but none involved an S-P value in excess of 4.8 within a Flight Duty Period.

A new category emerged in 2008; seven reports involved the adaptation of the Level 2 FTL variation for use with two crews, with one crew operating the outbound leg and the second crew positioning outbound in the main passenger cabin in order to operate the return sector; in all cases this practice was employed to/from destinations where the extended FDP under the basic variation was insufficient. The principal concerns associated with this practice were whether the positioning crew in the main cabin of a charter/holiday flight were more rested than the operating crew and how this use of the variation in this way had been justified. Of the remaining issues, the most significant was the interpretation of the exemption to the FDP limit on two flight crew long range operations afforded by CAP371 - Section B; Para 14.2.

Flight Crew Duty Report Issues - 2008



As in the two previous years, the largest number of reports involved Operator L; although the total received (10 reports; 25%) from this operator was again reduced; the principal issues raised in eight reports received during the first half of 2008 remained the same as


those raised in 2006-07 (Poor rostering; use of 18-30hr rest periods). In the second half of the period, the two reports received from this operator have both involved the third FTL topic - use of the Level 2 variation.

Allegedly poor rostering was also the predominant issue in the 8 reports (20%) involving Operator E; however 6 of these reports were submitted by pilots affected by a significant change in working practices following a corporate take-over of another UK AOC holder by Operator E.

There was no significant trend in the FTL-related reports submitted by pilots employed by other UK operators apart from the above-mentioned use of the Level 2 Variation (Operator L, Operator W) and the use of a third pilot to gain exemption from the long range FDP limits for two-crew operations (Operator N, Operator F).


- Security**
(Ground)
- Duty**
(Rosters/Rostering, Rest, Length, Crewing, Disruption)
- Communications - External**
(ATC, Regulators/Government)
- Company Policies**
(Absence, Operational, Safety Reporting)
- Air Traffic Management**
(Separation)
- Procedures**
(Use by Others, Adequacy, Use by Reporter)
- Pressures**
(Commercial, Domestic)
- Relationship Management**
(Team/Shift, Management)
- Regulation/Law**
(Compliance with)
- Aircraft Technical**
(Systems, Propulsion, Structure)

Flight Crew Duty Reports - 2008



FLIGHT CREW REPORTS

**Most Frequent Flight Crew Issues Received:
12 Months to December 2008**



AVAILABILITY OF GMC

Report Text: The ATIS at ### (UK Regional Airport) always states, "Ground frequency is closed". However, I feel that the controllers are being overloaded and put under a huge amount of pressure. Today the Tower controller had a lot of circuit training (first reasonable flying day for weeks) in addition there were six aircraft taxiing or requesting taxi. Errors were being made.

This situation is further exacerbated when low visibility procedures are in force. On the first rotation of the day there are 25+ aircraft departing within a short period of time, with the TWR controller attempting to control Ground movement and runway movement. Safety is being compromised.

When ATC are contacted to advise them how we feel about the situation (and that we are supporting them) the controllers agree, but say that budgetary constraints are an issue from their management's perspective! Management paying lip service to safety - I think we've heard that before!

Safety is being compromised and it is all too obvious that having just one frequency to control the amount of traffic at ### is not acceptable. Conclusion - reinstate the ground control frequency before a serious incident occurs.

CHIRP Comment: The reporter's concerns were raised with CAA (SRG) Air Traffic Standards Department, who advised the following:

- The contract between the ATS Provider and the Airport Authority did not include the routine provision of GMC and, therefore, it is not available during normal operations.
- The VHF frequency allocation had been made on the basis that the GMC position was used for special events. A possible solution was to delete the reference to GMC in the UK AIP.
- The use of GMC had been trialled but had not been successful due to the very short distance between the apron and the runway holding point.

- The CAA was monitoring traffic loading in the Visual Control Room and would require the ATS provider to mitigate any safety risk identified.

Subsequently, the ATC provider agreed to review the wording of the UK AIP entry as suggested and advised that they were also monitoring traffic levels/VCR workload.

The Unit management also noted that they were not aware of any MORs/ASRs having been submitted. Any similar RTF difficulties experienced by pilots should be reported by MOR, as these would support any future case for a permanent GMC position.

INCORRECT MEL PROCEDURE

Report Text: On several recent occasions, the company has used what I believe to be an incorrect Minimum Equipment List (MEL) procedure to dispatch an aircraft. They have used the manufacturer's DDG (Dispatch Deviation Guide) for maintenance and operational procedures despite it being specifically labelled "For maintenance guidance only; this is NOT an MEL".

As I understand, the DDG is a manufacturer produced, non-amended, non-approved document. The MEL is CAA approved and is more restrictive than the DDG.

This is not the first occasion that this issue has been raised; I am aware that at least one MOR has been submitted to the company concerning the use of the DDG in similar circumstances.

CHIRP Comment: An enquiry to the CAA confirmed that no MORs on this topic had been received from this operator.

We contacted the company's senior engineering quality manager on the reporter's behalf; a subsequent company investigation established that the company's post-merger procedures did not permit the use of the DDG in the manner described and we have been advised that clarification of the post-merger procedures has been issued.

It should be noted that it is permissible in some specific circumstances to use a manufacturer's DDG document in conjunction with an MEL, provided that its use has been agreed formally with the CAA and is clearly stated in the Company Operations Manual.

Also, a reminder; although in many cases MORs are submitted through a company in the same manner as a company safety report; it is your report and your responsibility to report the matter, if you assess that the occurrence is within the scope of the MOR Scheme. You are perfectly entitled to submit a MOR directly to the CAA should you deem it to be appropriate.

SECTOR FUEL (FB88) - A COMMENT

Report Text: I saw in the latest issue of CHIRP (FEEDBACK 88) a comment not to tell ATC when fuel is running low, unless using a PAN or MAYDAY.

I know that officially only these words are responded to by ATC to give priority and it is right to let that be known. However, if one is running low on fuel, is it not a good idea to let ATC know for planning purposes? I have elected to give a space in the hold to another

company's aircraft in order to let us both arrive safely, rather than let them divert and arrive at the diversion with minimum fuel. Even if the response from ATC is "no chance" then an early diversion with a chance to hold at the diversion airfield is surely safer than waiting for a PAN to develop?

While I wouldn't expect ATC to give priority unless necessary, if ATC know you have only a certain time before diversion, surely it is better to be forewarned, especially at a busy airfield?

CHIRP Comment: A pilot may wish to advise ATC that he/she is approaching a low fuel situation but it must be clearly understood that in the UK this information will not change any ATC priority in the handling/sequencing of the aircraft; this will only occur in response to a PAN or MAYDAY call.

Also it should not be assumed from the reporter's comment regarding swapping priority in the approach sequence that this is easy from an ATC perspective. In the case of many UK airports changing priority in the approach sequence would only occur following a PAN/MAYDAY.

"MAYDAY/PAN" PREFIXES - A CLARIFICATION

CHIRP Narrative: Thanks to all of you who submitted your recollections/thoughts on this topic from both a civil and military perspective.

Several of you pointed out that the option of prefixing subsequent RTF messages with either MAYDAY or PAN is covered in ICAO Annex 10 and was also added in the latest amendment to CAP413 (Edition 17), issued in mid 2008, as detailed below:

(1)

Report Text: Further to your item on the above subject in CHIRP FEEDBACK 88; ICAO Annex 10 refers:

5.3.1.2 The radiotelephony distress signal MAYDAY and the radiotelephony urgency signal PAN PAN shall be used at the commencement of the first distress and urgency communication respectively.

5.3.1.2.1 At the commencement of any subsequent communication in distress and urgency traffic, it shall be permissible to use the radiotelephony distress and urgency signals.

(2)

Report Text: With regard to the use of using 'MAYDAY' or 'PAN' to pre-fix RT transmissions following the initial declaration of an emergency situation referred to on Page 8 of FEEDBACK issue 88. I suspect this will have been pointed out to you by now but CAP413 does cover the subject in Chapter 8 on page 3:

1.4.6 Following the initial distress or urgency message, it is permissible for pilots and controllers to use 'MAYDAY' and 'PAN' as a callsign prefix at their discretion, where it is judged that this would have a beneficial effect on the outcome.

Did I Carry Out The Correct Procedure?

Report Text: I was inbound to XXX (UK regional airport) in a helicopter and made my initial RTF call to XXX Approach at around 22 miles requesting a Flight Information Service. Shortly after making two-way contact, Approach passed me over to XXX Director. Two-way contact was made with Director and I was asked to report 3nm from the field and visual with the field.

Continuing towards the field I reported 3nm and visual with the field. Director asked me "Are you visual with the ### (twin jet type) 7 mile final and the other traffic 14 mile final?" Having responded "Affirmative, visual with both landing aircraft", I was asked to contact XXX Tower. On swapping frequencies to Tower I initially listened in prior to making my call and heard the Tower controller asking the twin jet whether he had visual with my aircraft; no response was heard from the twin jet crew. I transmitted my initial call to Tower but heard no response. I made a second call to Tower, checking that my VHF Box 2 had the TX symbology displayed as I transmitted, which it did. In the process of trying to establish two-way radio contact I continued towards the field with both landing aircraft in sight. I heard a second call by Tower to the twin jet pilot, "Are you visual with the helicopter ABC123?" The response came back as, "No".

At this point I turned away from the airfield and the active runway and re-established two-way radio contact with XXX Director. I explained that I had been unable to establish two-way radio contact with Tower and requested to stay with Director for the landing.

It was during the period when I was unable to establish two-way radio contact with Tower and had swapped back to the Director frequency that the Tower controller took the decision to instruct the twin jet to go around. The first I was made aware of this was on landing at XXX.

Did I carry out the correct procedure under the circumstances that arose, and was XXX ATC correct in getting the other traffic to go around even though I was visual and turning away from the airfield?

CHIRP Comment: The reporter's decision to turn away having failed to establish two-way contact with Tower was the safe option; although had the pilot been cleared by the Director controller to a defined limit as part of a VFR clearance, he could have continued to that limit point.

The Tower controller would probably have been unaware that the helicopter had turned away from the airfield until subsequently notified by the Director controller. In view of this, the Tower controller also acted correctly in instructing the twin jet to execute a go-around, since there would have been the possibility of a conflict between both aircraft if the helicopter had continued towards the airfield.

NEW STYLE CHARTS

Report Text: My company has recently changed to new style Departure/Approach charts. While there will always be a period of "bedding in" when new things

arrive, these plates are clearly substandard and in some cases perhaps potentially dangerous.

It is very difficult to read the text as it is now so small, beacons have all been replaced with a single symbol and some items that were clear have been made difficult to understand.

The main problem is text size - I cannot read the text without holding the plate close and illuminating it well. A few days ago it looked like we would go around from an approach and an attempt to refresh my memory by reading the plate yielded nothing as I could not read the plate. This is despite having good eyesight. The approach was at night and the plate was illuminated. Not wanting to take my hands off the controls (I was manually flying), I relied on memory as the other pilot was busy on the radio - hardly worth having a plate at all in that case.

Standardisation is good, but only when the standards are high. There are many other complaints about the new style, too many to list here. I fear without pressure from many sides the manufacturer is unlikely to change. They did after all produce the plates in the first place, after a long period of work and in the process made many obvious mistakes and errors that have been hard learnt in the past.

CHIRP Comment: The CAA Medical Department confirmed that there are specific requirements for text size; their advice on the charts referenced in this report is being sought.

In some cases, chart style and presentation can be influenced by your airline; therefore, if you have any serious concern about a particular feature/aspect of chart design, submit a company report requesting that the matter be reviewed. For similar reasons, we would be interested to learn if the reporter's concerns are shared more widely.

MORE ON THREE PILOT OPERATIONS (1)

Report Text: In Issue 88, you carried a report about "heavy crew" operations (those where a third pilot is carried on the flight deck to avoid factoring the number of sectors flown and thus achieve a longer FDP, without providing actual "in-flight relief"). The reporter's main point was that, since no role or duties are specified for the third pilot, and no facility is provided for proper in-flight rest, this practice appears to have no safety benefit and the lengthening of the FDP no valid justification.

As I understand it, the alleviation dates from the time when a third, required flight crew member was routinely carried on many aircraft - the flight engineer. If no third, qualified pair of eyes was on the flight deck, the FDP had to be reduced to mitigate the effects of fatigue. The alleviation appears to apply to any third crewmember, pilot or otherwise, but presumably the intention was that he/she should be qualified on type and therefore of some use in monitoring the safety of the flight.

In my company a neat little twist is added to this practice. The rating page in a pilot's licence appears to qualify him/her to fly both the B### and B### when he has completed training on either type. In fact, since one

of the two types is some 70% heavier, has totally different hydraulic, pneumatic and cargo fire suppression systems, a differences course and simulator and line training are required to fly the larger aircraft. However, and apparently with the blessing of the CAA, it is routine for pilots to be rostered as the heavy crewmember on the heavier type when they have received no differences training and know little or nothing of the type.

Some years ago, it was even normal (and may still be allowed by some captains) for the unfamiliar pilot to occupy the seat of another pilot who is taking an extended break in the cabin. This seems to be bending the rules way too far, and completely ignoring the original intent of the alleviation.

The CHIRP comment after the report in FEEDBACK 88 was exactly right; the alleviation seems designed to produce three tired pilots, one of whom is likely to have back ache from spending up to eleven hours on a dreadfully uncomfortable jump seat and still not know much about the aircraft he is crewing.

Lessons Learned: It should be required by the Authority that any third pilot is fully qualified to occupy a pilot's seat on this type and model of aircraft on a public transport flight.

It should be required by the Authority that some facility for proper in-flight rest be provided, before the "heavy flight crew" alleviation may be applied to lengthen an FDP beyond that stipulated for a two-pilot crew.

It should be stipulated by the Authority exactly what duties may be delegated to any third pilot and explicitly whether or not he or she may occupy a seat at the controls at any time in flight.

CHIRP Comment: CAP 371 Section B; Para 14.2 requires that the additional crew member is a "current, type rated pilot".

As we have previously commented, the question as to whether the issue of a common type rating for the two types quoted in this report with no requirement for any differences training on the heavier type meets the intent of CAP 371, has not been clarified by the CAA. It is a matter of record that when this same issue was raised through this Programme several years ago, at least one UK operator subsequently elected to discontinue the practice of rostering a third pilot after discussions with the CAA.

A second and separate issue is whether the additional crew member's qualifications permit them to act in the same capacity as an 'In flight relief' crew member, when one of the primary crew members is absent from the flight deck for a significant period of time, a practice that the next report appears to confirm.

(2)

Report Text: I wish to add my pennyworth to the latest reports on three-pilot operations and in-flight crew rest. Some of our long haul aircraft also have the same fixed 3rd flight deck seat that is non-adjustable and so only fit for a training captain to use on a short haul line check. It is totally unsuitable for in-flight rest purposes. A pilot would then have to use a passenger seat in the

cabin. How on earth can we get any rest amongst passengers who are in an opposite state of being? You know, still on their holidays and feeling rather jolly – drinking, laughing and chatting to their mates. There is also no guarantee that there will not be any screaming babies within 30 rows of earshot. The lights may be on full intensity and the cabin crew may be making regular PA's as part of their routine work of looking after the passengers. How on earth am I supposed to "get some rest?" On top of all this there are the usual observations from the passengers along the lines of – "what's the pilot doing sitting in the cabin with us? Who is flying the aeroplane?" Often the only way to have a snooze is to sit with a blanket over my head to keep the light levels down. I have thought of using earplugs to lower the noise.

This sort of "acceptable" alleviation granted by the CAA makes pilots wonder who on earth are these guys who can sit in judgement on aviation and come up with solutions to problems that I doubt they have ever experienced? Do any of the regulators have commercial experience, or are most of them ex Royal Air Force with a bit of air taxi flying under their belt? I have to admit that this is the image that springs to my mind. I hope I am wrong, but perhaps CHIRP could give us a run down of the people employed at the CAA who make these sorts of decisions about our working lives.

Failing which, please could CHIRP find someone at the CAA who can explain to us all exactly what quality of "rest" I am supposed to be achieving by sitting with the passengers who still think it is 2300hrs and time to move on to the next drinking hole but my body clock says it is 0400hrs and hoping I stay awake enough to land the aeroplane.

On top of all this I have noticed how all our LH flights arrive back in the UK about 0800hrs. Before we had the big merger my previous airline had all LH flights arriving back home typically about 3 to 4 hours earlier. It was then possible to stave off getting really tired by just having a short nap and a change of environment but now I need to have some quality sleep, which just is not possible.

CHIRP Comment: It is important not to confuse two entirely separate provisions of CAP371:

First, the alleviation to the Limits on Two Crew Long Range Operations afforded by CAP 371; Section B; Para 14.2, as discussed in the previous report.

Second, the extension of an FDP by the provision of In-flight Relief (CAP 371; Section B; Para 15 refers), which contains specific requirements related to the screening and separation of resting crew members from passengers.

The reporter's concerns regarding the quality of 'rest' that is available in the main cabin of a holiday charter are not relevant to the first case above as the three-pilot alleviation contains no provision/requirement for in-flight rest. However, we have previously represented similar concerns in relation to the practice of positioning a crew in similar circumstances under a long haul Level 1/2 Variation that has been 'adapted' to apply to more than one crew.

The primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with the CAA Approved FTL scheme is that of the Air Operator's Certificate holder. Notwithstanding this, in a small number of cases, including the two quoted above, the current wording of CAP 371 and operators' Approved schemes, if the wording is the same, have permitted operators to interpret the provisions significantly differently.

Whilst accepting that operators should be free to negotiate specific FTL variations within their own scheme; the consensus view of the Air Transport Advisory Board is that in the two cases described above, the CAA has an obligation to ensure that all operators are afforded the opportunity to operate to the same standard; clarifying the intent of CAP 371 would discharge that obligation.

IS YOUR FIRE EXTINGUISHER USEABLE?

Report Text: A recent pre-flight check revealed that the safety pin of the fire extinguisher on the flight deck had been replaced with locking wire.

Imagine the scenario; a flight deck fire with thick smoke, a PBE is donned, the fire extinguisher is released from its bracket and you try to pull a pin that does not exist. If you do manage to find out that it has been replaced with locking wire you then have a 50/50 chance of turning it in the correct direction. Time passes and the fire gets worse. Get the picture.

In our case, fortunately there was no fire and the locking wire was found during the pre-flight check. The engineers were called and I asked them if this job/mod has been properly documented? Who was the engineer responsible? Had the fire extinguisher been partly discharged? You can well imagine the type of vague answers that were given. Above all can anyone understand the mentality of the engineer who did it, I certainly cannot.

A company report was submitted but I wonder if the culprit will ever be found. Was it just an engineer trying to save the company the cost of a pin and keep the aircraft flying, or did the engineer not consider the possible outcome of his actions?

This happened to us; please check your fire extinguisher pins before it is missed in a pre-flight check and then needed to fight an in-flight fire.

ATSOCAS - A REMINDER

AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES OUTSIDE CONTROLLED AIRSPACE (ATSOCAS) ARE SHORTLY TO CHANGE. WITH EFFECT FROM 12 MARCH 2009, THESE SERVICES WILL CHANGE, NOT ONLY IN NAME BUT ALSO IN THE TYPE OF SERVICE AND HOW IT IS PROVIDED.

DETAILS OF THE NEW SERVICES HAVE BEEN DISSEMINATED AND ARE ALSO AVAILABLE AT:

<http://www.airspacesafety.com/content>

CABIN CREW REPORTS

CRM AND NITS

Report Text: The seatbelt sign was cycled indicating that I could commence in-flight duties; I did the obligatory PAs, went to the rear, took the bar cart out and started to set up for the service. A PA was then made from the flight deck informing us that there was a problem with the aircraft and we would be returning to AAA. This was followed by, "Cabin crew prepare cabin for landing as quick as you can".

A non-operating positioning crew member asked me what was going on. I didn't know and advised them that I would secure the cabin then call the flight deck for information. With the cabin secured for landing, I called the flight deck to inform them; I followed this by, "Can I ask.....?" I was then cut off by the Captain saying, "Thank you", and then he hung up.

I took my seat for landing, feeling somewhat confused about the whole situation. CRM is probably the most important aspect to have on board, particularly in a single cabin crew operation. We landed, turned off the runway onto the taxi way, where outside you could see fire engines. The passengers looked scared and I tried to reassure them, yet it was quite unnerving, as I had no idea of the situation. I thought as we were on the ground the flight deck would inform me of the situation; they didn't. We pulled up on stand, again over the PA the Captain instructed me to open the door but that the passengers were to remain on board, it was at this moment that I knew it couldn't have been a major technical issue.

An engineer got on and went into the flight deck, the ground staff asked me what had happened, and I looked incompetent by saying that I had no idea. The Captain then gave another PA and said the problem had been resolved and they were going to send a ready message to the tower. I still had not been advised of the situation!

I went into the flight deck, shut the door and asked if they cared to tell me what the problem was, as they didn't think it was necessary to do so whilst we were airborne, taxiing, on stand etc.

I was then informed that the nose pin had not been removed before flight therefore the landing gear would not retract; however, at the time they were not aware that the nose pin was still in place. It seemed that the nose pin did not have the red "Remove before flight" tag on it. I explained to them that CRM and a NITS (Nature-Intention-Time-Security) briefing was vital in these situations. The passengers were scared and had I been informed of the situation, I could have reassured them more effectively had I been given a NITS briefing.

CHIRP Comment: In some emergency situations, the flight crew workload in assuring the safety of the aircraft might preclude the aircraft commander from briefing the cabin crew at the time, but a briefing should be accomplished as soon as practical, if necessary in an abbreviated form or as stated in the Operations Manual.

The situation described in this report, whilst perhaps a trifle embarrassing for the flight crew, should not have prevented the captain from issuing a NITS briefing to the cabin crew.

CAA (SRG) FODCOMS

The following CAA (SRG) FODCOMS have been issued since October 2008

38/2008

Aircraft Leasing - The Implementation of the European Union 'Third Package' Regulation 2008

39/2008

ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Programme (USOAP)

40/2008

Cabin Crew - Crew Resource Management (CRM) Forum - 2009

41/2008

Requirements for the Wales Rally GB Event and Ireland Rally Event

42/2008

Winter Operations - Helicopters

43/2008

Passenger Briefings - Demonstrations of Oxygen Equipment and Lifejackets on Smaller Aircraft

44/2008

Commercial Air Transport Outside Controlled Airspace

45/2008

Transport of Battery-Powered Wheelchairs

46/2008

~~CAA Winter Break 2008/09 - Provision of Emergency Service to AOC Holders~~

47/2008

Contamination of Jet Aviation Fuel by Fatty Acid and Methyl Ester (FAME)

48/2008

EASA Workshop on the Future European Implementing Rules on Operations

49/2008

Regulation (EC) No. 1107/2006 - Concerning the Rights of Disabled Persons and Persons of Reduced Mobility When Travelling by Air

50/2008

Contamination of Jet Aviation Fuel by Fatty Acid Methyl Ester (FAME) - Further Advice

01/2009 (See 02/2009 below)

Standard Instrument Departure (SID) and Standard Arrival (STAR) Climb and Descent Procedures and Phraseology

02/2009

Standard Instrument Departure (SID) and Standard Arrival (STAR) Climb and Descent Procedures and Phraseology - **Withdrawal of FODCOM 01/2009**

CAA (SRG) Flight Operations Department Communications are published on the CAA (SRG) website - www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?categoryid=33 and click on the link 'Search for a CAA Publication'

Contact the CAA Flt Ops Inspectorate/Report safety matters which are outside the scope of the MOR Scheme: flightoperationssafety@caa.co.uk

CHANGED YOUR ADDRESS?

If you receive FEEDBACK as a licensed pilot/ATCO/maintenance engineer please **notify Personnel Licensing at the CAA of your change of address and not CHIRP**. Please complete a change of address form which is available to download from the CAA website and fax/post to:

Civil Aviation Authority
Personnel Licensing Department
Licensing Operations
Aviation House
Gatwick Airport South
West Sussex RH6 0YR
Fax: 01293 573996

The Change of address form is available from:
www.caa.co.uk/docs/175/srg_fcl_changeofaddress.pdf

Alternatively, you can e-mail your change of address to the following relevant department (**please remember to include your licence number**):

Flight Crew..... fclweb@caa.co.uk

ATCO/FISO..... ats.licensing@caa.co.uk

Maintenance Engineer eldweb@caa.co.uk

CONTACT US

Peter Tait Director
Flight Crew/ATC Reports

Mick Skinner Deputy Director (Engineering)
Maintenance/Engineer Reports

Kirsty Arnold Administration Manager
Circulation/Administration
Cabin Crew Reports

--oOo--

CHIRP

FREEPOST (G13439) [no stamp required]

Building Y20E, Room G15

Cody Technology Park

Ively Road

Farnborough GU14 0BR, UK

Freephone (UK only): 0800 214645 or

Telephone: +44 (0) 1252 395013

Fax: +44 (0) 1252 394290 (secure)

E-mail: confidential@chirp.co.uk

REPRODUCTION OF FEEDBACK

CHIRP® reports are published as a contribution to safety in the aviation industry. Extracts may be published without specific permission, providing that the source is duly acknowledged.

FEEDBACK is published quarterly and is circulated to UK licensed pilots, air traffic control officers and maintenance engineers.

CHIRP

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL REPORT FORM

CHIRP is totally independent of the Civil Aviation Authority and any Company

Name: <input style="width: 90%;" type="text"/>	1. Your personal details are required only to enable us to contact you for further details about any part of your report. Please do not submit anonymous reports. 2. On closing, this Report Form will be returned to you. NO RECORD OF YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS WILL BE KEPT 3. CHIRP is a reporting programme for safety-related issues. We regret we are unable to accept reports that relate to industrial relations issues.
Address: <input style="width: 90%;" type="text"/>	
Post Code <input style="width: 20%;" type="text"/> Tel: <input style="width: 70%;" type="text"/>	
e-mail: <input style="width: 80%;" type="text"/> <input style="width: 10%; border-left: 1px solid black;" type="checkbox"/> Indicates Mandatory Fields	

It is CHIRP policy to acknowledge a report on receipt and then to provide a comprehensive closing response. If you do not require a closing response please tick the box:	No. I do not require a response from CHIRP <input type="checkbox"/>
--	--

PLEASE COMPLETE RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVENT/SITUATION

YOURSELF		THE EVENT/SITUATION			
TOTAL EXPERIENCE	YRS	DATE		WEATHER:	
EXPERIENCE PRESENT UNIT	YRS	LOCAL TIME		VMC	<input type="checkbox"/> IMC <input type="checkbox"/>
VALIDATED PRESENT POSITION	YRS	LOCATION OF AIRCRAFT		RAIN	<input type="checkbox"/> FOG <input type="checkbox"/>
ACTING AS INSTRUCTOR	<input type="checkbox"/>	NEAREST REPORTING POINT		ICE	<input type="checkbox"/> SNOW <input type="checkbox"/>
UNDER TRAINING	<input type="checkbox"/>	DAY <input type="checkbox"/> NIGHT <input type="checkbox"/>		OTHER:	
UNIT/SERVICE		FLIGHT PHASE		1ST AIRCRAFT	2ND AIRCRAFT
NATS <input type="checkbox"/> NON- NATS <input type="checkbox"/>		TAXI <input type="checkbox"/> TAKE-OFF <input type="checkbox"/>		TYPE/SERIES	TYPE/SERIES
ATC SERVICE(S) BEING PROVIDED		CLIMB <input type="checkbox"/> CRUISE <input type="checkbox"/>		OPERATOR	OPERATOR
TYPE(S) OF AIRSPACE		DESCENT <input type="checkbox"/> APPROACH <input type="checkbox"/>		PAX <input type="checkbox"/> FREIGHT <input type="checkbox"/>	PAX <input type="checkbox"/> FREIGHT <input type="checkbox"/>
TYPE OF RADAR		LANDING <input type="checkbox"/> GO AROUND <input type="checkbox"/>		OTHER:	OTHER:
SHIFT WORKED		OTHER:		IFR <input type="checkbox"/> VFR <input type="checkbox"/>	IFR <input type="checkbox"/> VFR <input type="checkbox"/>
HOURS ON DUTY	HRS			OTHER:	OTHER:
LOCATION		My MAIN POINTS ARE:			
NAME OF UNIT/AIRFIELD:		A:			
REPORT TOPIC		B:			
MY REPORT RELATES TO:		C:			

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT - PHOTOGRAPHS, DIAGRAMS ON A CD ARE WELCOME:

Your narrative will be reviewed by a member of the **CHIRP** staff who will remove all information such as dates/locations/names that might identify you. Bear in mind the following topics when preparing your narrative:

Chain of events • Communication • Decision Making • Equipment • Situational Awareness • Weather • Task Allocation • Teamwork • Training • Sleep Patterns

continue on a separate piece of paper, if necessary

PLEASE PLACE THE COMPLETED REPORT FORM, WITH ADDITIONAL PAGES IF REQUIRED, IN A SEALED ENVELOPE (no stamp required) AND SEND TO:
CHIRP • FREEPOST (G13439) • Building Y20E • Room G15 • Cody Technology Park • Ively Road • Farnborough • GU14 0BR • UK
 Confidential Tel (24 hrs): +44 (0) 1252 395013 or **Freefone** (UK only) 0800 214645 and Confidential Fax: +44 (0) 1252 394290
 Report forms are also available on the **CHIRP** website: www.chirp.co.uk

CHIRP

ENGINEER REPORT FORM

CHIRP is totally independent of the Civil Aviation Authority and any Company/Airline

Name: <input type="checkbox"/>	<p>1. Your personal details are required only to enable us to contact you for further details about any part of your report. Please do not submit anonymous reports.</p> <p>2. On closing, this Report Form will be returned to you.</p> <p>NO RECORD OF YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS WILL BE KEPT</p> <p>3. CHIRP is a reporting programme for safety-related issues. We regret we are unable to accept reports that relate to industrial relations issues.</p>
Address: <input type="checkbox"/>	
Post Code: <input type="checkbox"/> Tel: <input type="checkbox"/>	
e-mail: <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Indicates Mandatory Fields	

It is **CHIRP** policy to acknowledge a report on receipt and then to provide a comprehensive closing response. If you do not require a closing response please tick the box:

No. I do not require a response from **CHIRP**

PLEASE COMPLETE RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVENT/SITUATION

YOURSELF		THE EVENT		DOCUMENTARY	
CERTIFYING ENGINEER <input type="checkbox"/>	TECHNICAL SUPPORT <input type="checkbox"/>	DATE OF OCCURRENCE		PROCEDURES <input type="checkbox"/>	MANUALS <input type="checkbox"/>
QUALITY <input type="checkbox"/>	MECHANIC <input type="checkbox"/>	TIME OF OCCURRENCE	AM/PM	DOCUMENTATION <input type="checkbox"/>	REGULATION <input type="checkbox"/>
EXPERTISE		THE AIRCRAFT		HARDWARE	
A&C <input type="checkbox"/>	AVIONICS <input type="checkbox"/>	AIRCRAFT/ENGINE TYPE		MATERIALS <input type="checkbox"/>	SPARES <input type="checkbox"/>
OTHER:		SYSTEM/COMPONENT		TOOLS <input type="checkbox"/>	
EXPERIENCE		AIRCRAFT REG	G-	EXTERNAL	
YEARS IN MAINTENANCE IND	YRS	REPORTED TO		COMMUNICATIONS <input type="checkbox"/>	WEATHER <input type="checkbox"/>
YEARS AT PRESENT COMPANY	YRS	LINE MANAGER <input type="checkbox"/>	QUALITY <input type="checkbox"/>	TIME PRESSURE <input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER:
WORK AREA/DUTY		TECH SUPPORT <input type="checkbox"/>	CAA - MOR <input type="checkbox"/>	ITEMS THAT WERE INVOLVED IN EVENT (TICK ALL THAT APPLY)	
LINE <input type="checkbox"/>	BASE <input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER:		INSPECTION <input type="checkbox"/>	FAULT ISOLATION <input type="checkbox"/>
WORKSHOP <input type="checkbox"/>	OFFICE <input type="checkbox"/>	FACTORS		TESTING <input type="checkbox"/>	INSTALLATION <input type="checkbox"/>
SHIFT WORKED		MANPOWER LEVELS <input type="checkbox"/>	SKILLS <input type="checkbox"/>	REPAIR <input type="checkbox"/>	SCHEDULED MAIN <input type="checkbox"/>
HOURS ON DUTY PRIOR TO INCIDENT	HRS	TRAINING <input type="checkbox"/>	MEDICAL STATE <input type="checkbox"/>	LOGBOOK ENTRY <input type="checkbox"/>	MEL <input type="checkbox"/>
THE COMPANY		My MAIN POINTS ARE:			
NAME OF COMPANY:		A:			
REPORT TOPIC		B:			
MY REPORT RELATES TO:		C:			

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT - PHOTOGRAPHS, DIAGRAMS ON A CD ARE WELCOME:

Your narrative will be reviewed by a member of the **CHIRP** staff who will remove all information such as dates/locations/names that might identify you. Bear in mind the following topics when preparing your narrative:

Chain of events • Communication • Decision Making • Equipment • Situational Awareness • Weather • Task Allocation • Teamwork • Training • Sleep Patterns

continue on a separate piece of paper, if necessary

 PLEASE PLACE THE COMPLETED REPORT FORM, WITH ADDITIONAL PAGES IF REQUIRED, IN A SEALED ENVELOPE (no stamp required) AND SEND TO:

CHIRP • FREEPOST (G13439) • Building Y20E • Room G15 • Cody Technology Park • Ively Road • Farnborough • GU14 0BR • UK
Confidential Tel (24 hrs): +44 (0) 1252 395013 or **Freefone** (UK only) 0800 214645 and Confidential Fax: +44 (0) 1252 394290

Report forms are also available on the **CHIRP** website: www.chirp.co.uk

CHIRP

PILOT/FLIGHT CREW REPORT FORM

CHIRP is totally independent of the Civil Aviation Authority and any Company/Airline

Name: <input type="checkbox"/>	1. Your personal details are required only to enable us to contact you for further details about any part of your report. Please do not submit anonymous reports. 2. On closing, this Report Form will be returned to you. NO RECORD OF YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS WILL BE KEPT 3. CHIRP is a reporting programme for safety-related issues. We regret we are unable to accept reports that relate to industrial relations issues.
Address: <input type="checkbox"/>	
Post Code <input type="checkbox"/> Tel: <input type="checkbox"/>	
e-mail: <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Indicates Mandatory Fields	

It is **CHIRP** policy to acknowledge a report on receipt and then to provide a comprehensive closing response. If you do not require a closing response please tick the box: No. I do not require a response from **CHIRP**

PLEASE COMPLETE RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVENT/SITUATION


YOURSELF - CREW POSITION				THE FLIGHT/EVENT			
CAPTAIN <input type="checkbox"/>	FIRST OFFICER <input type="checkbox"/>	DATE OF OCCURRENCE	TIME			(LOCAL/GMT)	
PILOT FLYING <input type="checkbox"/>	PILOT NOT FLYING <input type="checkbox"/>	LOCATION	HEIGHT/ALT/FL				
FLIGHT ENGINEER <input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER CREW MEMBER <input type="checkbox"/>	TYPE OF ATC SERVICE	DAY <input type="checkbox"/>	NIGHT <input type="checkbox"/>			
THE AIRCRAFT		TYPE OF FLIGHT		TYPE OF OPERATION			
TYPE/SERIES		IFR <input type="checkbox"/>	VFR <input type="checkbox"/>	PASSENGER <input type="checkbox"/>	TRAINING <input type="checkbox"/>		
NUMBER OF CREW		OTHER: <input type="checkbox"/>		FREIGHT <input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER: <input type="checkbox"/>		
EXPERIENCE/QUALIFICATION		WEATHER		FLIGHT PHASE			
TOTAL HOURS	HRS	VMC <input type="checkbox"/>	IMC <input type="checkbox"/>	TAXI <input type="checkbox"/>	TAKE-OFF <input type="checkbox"/>		
HOURS ON TYPE	HRS	RAIN <input type="checkbox"/>	FOG <input type="checkbox"/>	CLIMB <input type="checkbox"/>	CRUISE <input type="checkbox"/>		
TRG CAPT <input type="checkbox"/>	TRE <input type="checkbox"/>	ICE <input type="checkbox"/>	SNOW <input type="checkbox"/>	DESCENT <input type="checkbox"/>	APPROACH <input type="checkbox"/>		
OTHER QUALIFICATIONS:		OTHER:		LANDING <input type="checkbox"/>	GO AROUND <input type="checkbox"/>		
THE COMPANY		MY MAIN POINTS ARE:					
NAME OF COMPANY:		A:					
REPORT TOPIC		B:					
MY REPORT RELATES TO:		C:					

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT - PHOTOGRAPHS, DIAGRAMS ON A CD ARE WELCOME:

Your narrative will be reviewed by a member of the **CHIRP** staff who will remove all information such as dates/locations/names that might identify you. Bear in mind the following topics when preparing your narrative:

Chain of events • Communication • Decision Making • Equipment • Situational Awareness • Weather • Task Allocation • Teamwork • Training • Sleep Patterns

continue on a separate piece of paper, if necessary

 PLEASE PLACE THE COMPLETED REPORT FORM, WITH ADDITIONAL PAGES IF REQUIRED, IN A SEALED ENVELOPE (no stamp required) AND SEND TO:
CHIRP • FREEPOST (G13439) • Building Y20E • Room G15 • Cody Technology Park • Ively Road • Farnborough • GU14 0BR • UK
 Confidential Tel (24 hrs): +44 (0) 1252 395013 or **Freefone** (UK only) 0800 214645 and Confidential Fax: +44 (0) 1252 394290
 Report forms are also available on the **CHIRP** website: www.chirp.co.uk