AIR TRANSPORT

CHIRP FEEDBACK

Issue No: 93 Winter 2009/10

EDITORIAL

CHIRP - INDEPENDENT REVIEW

First, on behalf of the CHIRP Trustees and staff, may I thank all of you who took the time to submit your comments about the aviation programmes; it was pleasing to note that the overwhelming majority of the comments received from flight crew members, engineers and air traffic control officers were extremely positive and supportive of the concept of an independent confidential reporting programme.

Also, our thanks to those managers who responded to our invitation to complete the questionnaire on the aviation programmes. Analysis of the management responses to the questionnaire also showed an overall positive trend but confirmed that some managers valued the programme less than their professional staff. A number of useful suggestions as to how the perceived value of the programme to managers might be improved were received. All of the comments received were made available to the Review Board and included in the Board's deliberations.

Terms of Reference: The Review was conducted by a Board comprised of nominees from CAA (SRG), industry representatives and several independent members associated with aviation and other domains in which confidential, voluntary reporting systems operate. The Chairman of the Review Board was Captain Jock Lowe.

The terms of reference for the Review were agreed with the CAA to be as follows:

- Review an analysis of the reports received by the aviation programmes in the five-year period since the previous Review conducted in July 2004.
- Assess whether the CHIRP aviation programmes add value to safety in the UK commercial air transport and general aviation sectors, highlighting areas in which information would not otherwise be available.
- Assess whether the CHIRP aviation programmes form an effective part of the UK's aviation safety structure, complementing the roles of the Safety Regulator (CAA) and the Accident Investigator (AAIB).
- Assess whether the CHIRP aviation programmes are promoted and communicated effectively within the appropriate sectors of the UK aviation industry.
- Determine if there is a continuing need for a UK aviation confidential reporting system and, if so, what changes could be made to improve its effectiveness.
- Assess what level of future funding is necessary for the programmes to continue to provide a cost-effective contribution to aviation safety.

Conclusions: The Board concluded that the Review had provided evidence that a number of trends/issues raised through the Programmes either would not have become apparent through other reporting processes or most probably would not have been addressed in as timely a manner without the availability of CHIRP. The wide range of professional expertise available through the CHIRP Advisory Boards was a key contributory factor in the assessment of report issues. The Board noted the introduction of ICAO mandated Safety Management Systems; the effect, if any, of these on the reporting culture of the user groups should be assessed in three years time.

The Board concluded that the reports that continued to be submitted through the Programmes, the comments from user groups and the endorsements by the representative associations provided clear evidence that the programmes were widely perceived to be a trusted and valued process by the reporting groups. The perception of managements was not as clear and improved methods of communicating CHIRP issues to senior managers would further enhance the value of the Programmes.

The Trust's structure, processes and procedures met the ICAO and European requirements for a voluntary reporting scheme and had been adopted in principle by other ICAO States, the European Commission and other UK domains.

The present policy on the content of the newsletters was appropriate. The Trust should consider the issue of distribution method/cost for the FEEDBACK newsletters against the development of new technologies and the changes in IT use/expertise among the user populations. In view of the rapid pace of change of communications technology, this aspect of the Programmes should be reassessed in three years time.

The availability of a guaranteed funding mechanism permitted the Trust to develop a strategic plan to meet the changing needs of the UK commercial air transport industry and to invest in system/process improvements.

In view of the demonstrated success of the UK Maintenance Error Management System (MEMS) programme, Industry and the CAA should consider the merits of a similar concept for the sharing of company flight operations safety investigations/data.

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Recommendations:

1. The CHIRP Charitable Trust should continue to provide an independent confidential reporting programme for aviation, using the current structure, organisation, processes and procedures.
2. The aviation programmes should continue to be funded for a further five-year period at a level to permit the Programmes to continue to operate effectively on a long-term basis, subject to an assessment in three years time of what impact, if any, the implementation of SMS might have on the reporting culture of the user groups.
3. The Trust should review the methods of distribution/costs for the FEEDBACK newsletters against the development of new technologies and the changes in IT use/expertise among the user populations. This aspect of the Programmes should be subject to a further review in three years time.
4. The Trust should review the 'Objects', Memorandum and Articles of Association in relation to stakeholders and research into causal factors.
5. The Trust should consider improved methods of communicating CHIRP safety information to senior operational managers across the industry that would further enhance the value of the Programmes.
6. The Trust should review whether it would be possible to increase access to disidentified CHIRP data to benefit the wider professional communities.

Submission:

The Review Board Report was submitted to the CAA on 30 November 2009. The CAA (SRG) Policy Committee reviewed the report and the Trust's Business Proposal for FY2010-11 on 13 January 2010 and approved the continued funding of the aviation programmes on the basis of the proposal.

WHAT'S IN THIS ISSUE?

ATC REPORTS

Most Frequent ATC Issues Received 12 Months to December 2009



ATSA CONCERNS

Report Text: Air traffic service assistants (ATSAs) are currently working under considerable pressure at this Unit. Following the introduction of new working practices associated with new technology, a voluntary redundancy scheme has been in operation for some time; this has reduced the number of staff in the Operations Room. However, the introduction of the new technology has not gone smoothly and staffing has been reduced to a level that ATSAs are having to work significantly longer than their ATCO colleagues, on occasions in excess of three hours without a break, and as a result are feeling fatigued, stressed, and in a number of cases depressed. In some cases, sectors are not opening due to a lack of assistants.

As a result of staff shortages, Operations Room staff have been exposed to unreasonable pressure to report when sick. Firstly, Operations Room staff must phone in sick to the duty watch supervisor as soon as they know they will be sick, then they must phone in on their own watch and speak to their watch supervisor, then they get a 'duty of care' call to ascertain when they will be returning to work. On return to work after even one day's sickness staff must have an interview for being off sick, which basically points out the consequences of what it could lead to next time. The result is that people end up coming into work sick to avoid the hassle from management. Recently staff were advised that requests for days off were unlikely to be approved whatever the reason, including funerals of blood relatives.

The company I joined prided itself in stating that the employees were its biggest assets and we were treated accordingly. No-one I have spoken to recently actually feels valued or that the company cares about them in any way. I believe that the way we are being treated is a safety issue.

CHIRP Comment: **The two issues raised in this report were raised with the Unit. The management response included the following:**

'The maximum working time for ATSAs is normally 2.5hrs. Whenever this period is exceeded, it is logged and reviewed at the end of the day. There is no evidence of a significant number of exceedances.

Historically, on returning to work from a period of sickness, an individual would just fit back into the system with little or no discussion. From a 'duty of care' point of view, and following discussion with all stake holders, it is now policy that whenever any member of staff returns from a period of sickness, their line manager has a (normally short) chat with them to ensure that they are fit to return to work and whether any additional support, such as roster changes, counselling support or extra leave may be required. There is no pressure for someone to return to work if they are unfit.'

Notwithstanding the positive corporate objectives of sickness/absence schemes, the way in which return-to-work interviews are conducted by line managers is fundamental as to whether they are perceived by staff as being either supportive or coercive. Some of the detailed examples provided with this report (not published), if as stated, suggest that some return-to-work 'chats' conducted at this Unit were not perceived as being beneficial by the individuals directly concerned.

CO-ORDINATION OF POLICY CHANGES

Report Text: Until last week the Squawks (aircraft transponder codes) used by the Military Air Traffic Services Unit co-located with this Unit showed which controller was working the aircraft. e.g. 6101 indicated that controller 10 was working the aircraft.

Without any warning military Squawk codes were allocated to another military Air Traffic Services Unit. Now most military Squawks allocated do not reflect which controller is working the aircraft and we have to use a look-up table stuck on the sector.

There are often circumstances when urgent calls need to be made to military controllers on safety grounds and the old data blocks made this easy and quick. I believe there are safety implications in this change and with the lack of consultation with other providers of ATC services.

CHIRP Comment: **The reporter's concerns were brought to the attention of the Unit management. The Management response stated that they had also become aware of the decision to change the basis for allocating military transponder codes very late. As a result, in addition to issuing a Supplementary Instruction to controllers, the look-up tables referenced in the report had been placed at all sector positions to assist controllers with the new contact arrangements.**

The CHIRP Air Transport Advisory Board (ATAB) reflected on the human factor implications of the changes; in particular, the possible need for urgent communication between civil and military controllers, as noted by the reporter. The Board concluded that the changes and the apparent lack of co-ordination in their introduction could have potential safety implications for civil controllers.

The MoD nominee to the ATAB undertook to review the military rationale/methodology for implementing the change and subsequently advised that the London Mil East controllers at Swanwick currently use a console that emulates the old system they were familiar with at West Drayton but are planned to use Swanwick equipment from September 2010; the Swanwick equipment automatically manages squawk allocation and unit identity. Transponder codes previously used by London Mil East were re-allocated to their new permanent home at the Scottish ATCC(Mil) as part of the move to the new Prestwick Centre (nPC).

The MOD response noted that the problems highlighted in the above report should only be short-term in nature, as once London Mil East controllers transfer to the Swanwick system the identity of the relevant consoles will become apparent. MOD acknowledged that, in the meantime, the situation is less than ideal but concluded that with 'change' on a scale of the nPC, there will always be some disruption.

From a CHIRP perspective, this is a good example of how within a major change process, a lack of detailed planning and prior communication, in this case with the other key player NATS, led to a highly unsatisfactory situation. The report should serve as a reminder that unannounced or unexplained change can easily create unease and/or confusion.

SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUCTIONS / ATSINS

The following CAA (SRG) ATS Standards Department ATSINS and Supplementary Instructions (SI) to CAP 493 MATS Part 1 have been issued since **16 October 2009**:

SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUCTIONS:

Number 2009/13 - Issued: 28 October 2009 - Effective: 19 November 2009

Emergency Descents

Number 2009/14 - Issued: 29 October 2009

Phraseology for Climb Clearances to Aircraft on Standard Instrument Departures

Number 2009/15 - Issued: 30 November 2009 - Effective: 11 March 2010

Surveillance Clutter Procedures

Number 2009/16 - Issued: 18 December 2009 - Effective: 15 January 2010

Crossing Inoperable Red Stop Bars

Number 2010/01 - Issued 14 January 2010

Rescue & Fire Fighting Service (RFFS) Categories

ATSINS:

Number 140 (Issue 2) - Issued 19 January 2010

Introduction of RNAV(GNSS) Instrument Approach Procedures

Number 167 - Issued 29 October 2009

Single European Sky (SES) - he Interoperability Regulation (EC) No 552/2004

Number 168 - Issued 10 November 2009

S-Band Primary Surveillance Radar - Co-existence Issues With 2.6GHz Transmissions

Number 169 - Issued 16 November 2009

Notification of a Consultation Regarding the Proposed Publication of CAA Safety Performance Indicators on the CAA Website

Number 170 - Superseded

Number 171 - Issued 11 December 2009

Mode S Ground Stations

Number 172 - Issued 8 January 2010

OFCOM Consultation - Administered Incentive Pricing (AIP)

Number 173 - Issued 14 January 2010

CAA Monthly Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR) Listing

Number 174 - Issued 25 January 2010

Publication of the Air Navigation Order 2009

CAA (SRG) ATS Information Notices are published on the CAA website - www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?categoryid=33 and click on the link 'Search for a CAA Publication'

ENGINEER REPORTS

Most Frequent Engineering Issues Received: 12 Months to December 2009



SAFETY CULTURE - THEORY AND PRACTICE

Report Text: Over the course of a couple of weeks, an aircraft had been worked by engineers. Some of the work included deferred defects and some component changes.

After the work had been completed, several of the Tech Log entries were incomplete (e.g. Aircraft Maintenance Manual references; details of spare parts removed and fitted). These errors had been picked up by Technical Records who then had raised the issue with the Line Maintenance Manager. Following this, the offending Tech Log pages were faxed across the company network, completely uncensored. My concern is that this does not constitute a 'No blame culture'.

Lessons Learned: I believe the manager's action was meant to highlight the error to other engineers; however, all it did was single out a couple of individuals. If errors are found then the point SHOULD be highlighted to the people involved in a more confidential manner and to the staff in a way that doesn't adversely affect morale.

CHIRP Comment: **The reporter's concern was raised with the engineering management of the organisation concerned. The management confirmed that their procedures included maintaining the confidentiality of individuals in cases such as that reported, and acknowledged that the matter had not been handled well or in accordance with company policy. The company advised that corrective action had been taken to avoid any recurrence.**

With regard to the reporter's reference to a 'No Blame Culture', this was a term widely used to describe a system for investigating and managing human errors when Human Factors was first introduced as a required subject in the training of engineers. More recently the phrase has been replaced by the term 'Just Culture'; this more correctly describes the balance of responsibilities shared by the organisation and the individual in the investigation and mitigation of human error incidents. Whilst investigations using the MEDA procedure focus on the causes of incidents and not the allocation of blame, responsible individuals must still be accountable for their actions. Thus, where, for example, a series of incidents involves persistent errors by an individual, the option of administrative action must be available to an organisation, but separate from the MEDA investigation process.

A 'Just Culture' should ensure that investigations involving error and, where relevant administrative procedures, are recognised as being transparent and workable. This ensures that anyone involved in the investigation of error is treated fairly and that the outcome is recognised as 'just' in the circumstances that pertain.

Properly managed, a 'Just Culture' should encourage the reporting of errors to reduce the risk of future similar occurrences and thus contribute to an improvement in safety standards. However, this report is a reminder of how easily individuals' confidence can be undermined and, when this occurs, the role of this Programme in highlighting these concerns.

LIMITED AND SIMPLE AUTHORISATIONS

Report Text: The Company has introduced EASA Part 66 'Cat A' licence qualified staff for self certification of some maintenance tasks. Initially the idea of licensed mechanics with limited and simple authorisations seemed all well and good; however, the practical

realities of it all have turned into something less acceptable.

Cabin and avionic technicians are tasked with engine oil/hydraulic oil servicing and wheel/brake unit replacements, whilst experienced mechanical technicians are tasked with cabin lighting and IFE screen replacements.

Also, technicians have gone straight from oil servicing tasks to carrying out oxygen replenishment and some 'Daily' check items were missed on several occasions. Flexibility may be the key to our future, but safety should not be compromised.

Discussions with managers have accomplished nothing; managers defending their stance 'robustly' would be something of an understatement.

This has led to a perceived underlying safety concern at the Cat B certifier level.

CHIRP Comment: **In principle, the mixing of mechanical/avionic disciplines is acceptable provided that the required knowledge and competences to undertake additional tasks are demonstrably met. In practice, the introduction of a scheme such as that described in this report poses a number of challenges for both managers and individuals.**

Good communications are essential in helping staff understand the new requirements. Following a visit to the company at their invitation to discuss the reported concerns, it was apparent that a comprehensive communication exercise had been conducted with staff at all levels and on all shifts, with the opportunity to provide feedback to management on where improvements could be made. In spite of this, areas of concern had arisen that were not perceived by engineers as being addressed by management in the ongoing development of the programme.

The report shows the importance of adequate supervision of the quality and scope of the training provided and particularly the quality of the experience gained by individuals, especially in the early stages of implementing such a scheme, to ensure that all staff receive the support necessary to meet their required range of competences.

From an engineer's perspective, it has to be acknowledged that the previous 'traded' system is now a thing of the past at mechanic level within Line Maintenance and it should be recognised that today's maintenance environment requires a greater level of flexibility to meet the range of operational demands.

EXCESSIVE NOISE LEVELS

Report Text: For the past six months the airport authority has continually tested fire alarms, duty free announcements and car park announcements, at times in excess of 3 hours at any time. Previously testing was only carried out one night each week for 1 hour from 00.01 till 01.00am. However, since terminal expansion has taken place, the systems have been tested continually, sometimes lasting up to 4 hours at full volume (i.e. in excess of 90DB).

On contacting the airport senior manager we were informed that it was mandatory testing and had to be done. We explained that during the testing it is impossible to concentrate on filling in Technical Logs, finding Part Numbers from office computers, or Maintenance Manual References; this basically impacted my ability to carry out my duties as a LAE in a safe manner and at a time (4am) - a known bad time for body function. On several occasions the senior manager's response has been, "I'm not inconveniencing passengers, you'll just have to lump it, the testing must be done". On asking why the tests could not be muted in our office area or only test for 15 minutes in any hour, again the airport response was "It's mandatory".

Please help; you are our last hope to get anything done. Even my company seems unable to get them to stop.

Lessons Learned: The Airport Authority can override any law it feels like and get away with it.

Effects of noise and distraction:

- Continual minor tech log mistakes
- Missing/doubling up numbers
- Fatigue caused by noise
- Hearing affected - ringing ears on leaving shift

CHIRP Comment: **After confirming the extent of the testing with the reporter's company, we highlighted the reported concerns about the impact of excessive noise on safety related maintenance tasks to the Director of Risk and Safety of the Airport Authority.**

Following a review of the testing arrangement by the Airport Authority, the Authority agreed to implement a new procedure of sequenced testing of the terminal PA system by selected areas, with airport tenants being advised in writing of the schedules for the new arrangements.

Subsequently, the engineering organisation confirmed that continued nightly testing had ceased and that the new procedure had resolved the reported concerns.

COLOUR DISCRIMINATION

Report Text: When I worked at ###, I learned that one of the Licensed Aircraft Engineers was colour blind.

Is it appropriate for an Aircraft Avionics Engineer to be allowed the B2 qualification when he is colour blind, due to the difficulty of reading wiring diagrams and the colour coding of electrical wires?

CHIRP Comment: **The CAA advises that there are no mandated standards related to colour discrimination for engineers/maintenance staff, although the CAA has published guidance on the subject; this was originally in Airworthiness Notice No 47 but is now incorporated in CAP 562 Leaflet 15-6.**

More generally, Occupational Health guidelines for employers have been issued by the Health & Safety Executive; these include colour matching trade tests.

CAA (SRG) AIRCOMS

The following CAA (SRG) ATS Airworthiness Communications (AIRCOMs) have been issued since **16 October 2009**

2009/12

Changes to CAP 747, Mandatory Requirements for Airworthiness

2009/14

Notification of Changes to the CAA Distribution of Mandatory Permit Directives (MPDs)

2009/15

Notification of a Consultation Regarding the Proposed Publication of CAA Safety Performance Indicators on the CAA Website

2009/16

Notification of Extension in the Transition Period for Chapter A8-21, 'Approval of Organisations for Design or Production'

2009/17

Withdrawal of Declaration of Flight Manual Standard (DFMS) Service

2009/18

Management of the Light Aircraft Maintenance Programme (LAMP) - CAP 766 and CAP 767

2009/19

CAA Monthly Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR) Listing

2010/01

Large Aircraft Hard Landing Reports and Organisational Responsibilities

CAA (SRG) AIRCOMS are published on the CAA website (www.caa.co.uk). Any queries can be addressed to Airworthiness Strategy and Policy Department (**requirements@caa.co.uk**)

FTL SUMMARY 2006-2009

Introduction

Duty related issues are one of the topics most frequently reported by flight crew. In those cases where a report raises an individual issue, if the reporter consents, the matter is either brought to the attention of the relevant operator on behalf of the reporter or, alternatively is represented to CAA (SRG).

In 2006 following a significant increase in the number of duty related reports submitted by flight crew, the reporting trends were analysed and the results made available to senior operational managers and CAA (SRG). A similar exercise was carried out for flight crew duty related reports received during 2007 and 2008.

In April 2009, the CAA issued Flight Operations Department Communication (FODCOM) 10/2009, which contained additional guidance on a number of aspects of FTL regulation. This paper compares the duty related reports received during 2009 with those submitted in 2006, 2007 and 2008.

Flight Crew Duty Reports - 2006

During 2006 a total of 98 duty-related reports were received in which 179 roster/FTL issues were identified. As shown in the chart below, the three principal FTL issues raised in reports during 2006 were: Scheduling rest periods between 18 and 30 hours - 33% (32 reports); long duties 16% (16 reports) and allegedly fatiguing roster patterns 11% (11 reports). A fourth issue raised in a further 11% (11 reports) was the 5-2-5-4 roster sequence that had been introduced on a trial basis by one UK operator; in 9 reports in this group the roster pattern was the principal issue.

Flight Crew Duty Report Issues - 2006



Of the 98 duty-related reports received during 2006, 45% (44 reports) were sourced from one UK operator (Operator L), two other UK operators (Operator H, Operator E) represented 13% (13 reports) and 9% (9 reports) respectively.

In the case of Operators L and H, the principal area of concern was the frequency of the rostering of rest periods of between 18 and 30 hours; roster disruption

Flight Crew Duty Reports - 2006



was also reported in the case of Operator L. All of the reports received from operator E referenced the 5-2-5-4 roster pattern.

Flight Crew Duty Reports - 2007

In 2007 a total of 48 duty-related reports were received, in which 69 roster/FTL related issues were identified; this represented a reduction in the number of reports submitted of approximately 50% in comparison with the total submitted in 2006.

The two predominant issues raised in reports during 2007 were allegedly fatiguing roster patterns - 39% (19 reports); scheduling of 18-30 hour rest periods was the principal issue in 35% (17 reports).

Flight Crew Duty Report Issues - 2007



Of the total of duty-related reports submitted in 2007, 44% (21 reports) involved Operator L, less than half the number received in 2006 but a similar percentage of the total as in the previous year. Only three reports (6%) were sourced from operator H during 2007, compared with 13 reports (13%) in 2006. In the case of operator E, only one FTL related report was submitted in 2007 and this was not related directly to the operator's 5-2-5-4 roster pattern, which had been modified prior to the 2007 summer season.

Flight Crew Duty Reports 2007



Flight Crew Duty Reports - 2008

In 2008, 43 reports relating to Duty/FTL were received from which 48 issues were identified. Within this total the two most prominent categories were the same as in 2007; nine reports (19%) concerned poor rostering practice and a further eight reports specifically cited scheduling of rest periods of between 18 and 30 hours. In those cases where a roster pattern was submitted, the roster was assessed using 'Safe - Version 4.2'; the levels of tiredness predicted by the 'Safe' model [Samn-Perelli values] were predominantly moderate, but none involved an S-P value in excess of 4.8 within a Flight Duty Period.

A new category emerged in 2008; seven reports involved the adaptation of the Level 2 FTL variation for use with two crews, with one crew operating the outbound leg and the second crew positioning outbound in the main passenger cabin in order to operate the return sector; in all cases this practice was employed to/from destinations where the extended FDP afforded by the basic variation was insufficient. The principal concerns associated with this practice were whether the positioning crew in the main cabin of a charter/holiday flight were more rested than the operating crew and how this use of the variation in this way had been justified. Of the remaining issues, the most significant was the interpretation of the exemption to the FDP limit on two flight crew long range operations afforded by CAP371 - Section B; Para 14.2; at least one UK operator was alleged to employ non-type rated pilots occupying the jump-seat as a means of exercising the benefits of the exemption.

Flight Crew Duty Report Issues - 2008



As in the two previous years, the largest number of reports involved Operator L; although the total received (10 reports; 25%) from this operator was again reduced; the principal issues raised in eight reports received during the first half of 2008 remained the same as those raised in 2006-07 (Poor rostering; use of 18-30hr rest periods). In the second half of the period, the two reports received from this operator have both involved the third FTL topic - use of the Level 2 variation.

Allegedly poor rostering was also the predominant issue in the 8 reports (20%) involving Operator E; however 6 of these reports were submitted by pilots affected by a change in working practices following a corporate take-over of another UK AOC holder by Operator E.

There was no significant trend in the FTL-related reports submitted by pilots employed by other UK operators apart from the above-mentioned use of the Level 2 Variation (Operator L, Operator W) and the use of a third pilot to gain exemption from the long range FDP limits for a two-crew operation.

Flight Crew Duty Reports 2008



Flight Crew Duty Reports - 2009

In 2009 the number of Duty/FTL related reports submitted by flight crew members was again less than the total received in the previous year; a total of 34 reports were received, involving 38 issues, compared with the previous total of 43 reports (48 issues). Within this total the largest category of reports was similar to previous years and involved allegedly poor rostering practices (13 reports; 37%); however, within this category, the specific concerns were different and in several cases company specific, as detailed below. As

previously, where a report alleged poor rostering, details of the roster were requested and the roster pattern was assessed using the levels of tiredness predicted by the Samn-Perelli scale within the 'Safe - Version 4.2' computer model. One of the more significant issues reported in previous years, the routine scheduling of rest periods between 18 and 30 hours, more latterly by one UK operator in particular (Operator L), appeared to have been resolved; only one report was received specifically on this topic in 2009.

The second most frequently reported topic involved the scheduling of rest (8 reports; 23%); however, within this total six reports were related to the practice of 'Controlled Rest', which had been the subject of considerable comment by cabin crew employed on long haul operations by one UK operator and published in FEEDBACK. Five of the flight crew reports justified the practice of augmented crews taking 'Controlled Rest' in addition to their allocated bunk/cabin rest, whereas one report expressed similar concerns as those expressed by cabin crew members, namely the increasing prevalence for one of the remaining operating crew to take 'Controlled Rest' on the flight deck at the same time as the third flight crew member was taking bunk rest.

Within the remaining categories, the publication of Flight Operations Department Communication (FODCOM) 10/2009 in April 2009 clarifying several rostering practices appeared to have been effective in addressing some of the innovative interpretations by some operators, such as the adaptation of standard FTL variations for use by more than one crew and extending the maximum Flight Duty Period by the use of additional flight crew members positioning in the main passenger cabin. No reports on these topics were received during the 2009 summer season. One issue referenced in FODCOM 10/2009, the adequacy of scheduled report times, has continued to be reported; five reports expressed concerns about changes associated with pre-flight duties that were not acknowledged in the report times, either due to the report location being moved airside or changes in the method of obtaining the relevant operational information (hardcopy replaced by downloading electronic data); four reports in this category were received in the final quarter of the period. Two reports, involving the same operator, concerned the company policy in respect of the duty allocation afforded to training.

Flight Crew Duty Report Issues - 2009



The largest number of reports (9) referenced Company Y and involved two separate concerns. The first was the introduction of an additional schedule to the Far East and Australia in which the stopover periods had been reduced. The reports alleged a significant increase in tiredness levels on the return sectors, particularly the inbound sector to the UK. The schedule was assessed using 'Safe 4.2'; interestingly, the S-P score was reduced for the second outbound sector due to the re-timing of the schedule; in contrast, the S-P score for the final sector was higher than the original schedule. It is understood that similar representations had been also made directly to the Company regarding the levels of tiredness. The matter was brought to the CAA's attention; however, shortly thereafter, the Company elected to discontinue the additional schedule. There is a possibility that the schedule will be reintroduced during 2010. The second issue was associated with the use of the two crew Florida 2 (F2) Variation to/from US destinations; the reports allege that an increase in the frequency of use of the variation leads to crew members being rostered for the maximum number of F2 schedules permitted, causing fatigue.

The predominant issues in reports related to Company N were the poor planning and management of some rosters/duties; several quoted unrealistic sector/ turnaround times associated with FDPs at or close to the maximum permitted. As noted above, all of the reports related to Company A were comments in response to cabin crew concerns about the frequency of use of Controlled Rest, as were the majority of reports in which the operator was not identified. Among the reports submitted by pilots employed by other UK operators there were two points of note; the first was the difficulty experienced by flight crew members in completing required pre-flight duties within the time afforded by the scheduled report time (Company E, T, Y); the second was no/insufficient duty allowance for ground training tasks (Company R).

Flight Crew Duty Reports - 2009



FLIGHT CREW REPORTS

Most Frequent Flight Crew Issues Received:
12 Months to December 2009



Company Policies
(Absence, Operational, Safety Reporting)
Duty
(Rosters/Rostering, Rest, Length, Crewing, Disruption)
Security
(Ground)
Airports
(Runways, Bird Control, Infrastructure)
Communications - External
(ATC, Regulators/Government)
Relationship Management
(Planning,Managers)
Pressure
(Commercial, From Management/Supervision, Time)
Communications - Internal
(Crew, Company/Managers)
Handling/Operation
(Aircraft Handling by Crew,Opeartion of Equipment)
Documentation
(Suitability/Adequacy)

TRANSITION ALTITUDES - STILL AN ISSUE

Report Text: A recent Flight International story on the possible change of Transition Altitudes was interesting. At present there is a whole range of transitions from 3,000' to 18,000'. Company SOPs say change altimeter settings at Transition Altitude, but there are so many to choose from that it is odds-on you will forget and bust an altitude (or flight level).

Being more pragmatic and safety conscious, most pilots just change settings when they are given (QNH is always on the standby to Minimum Sector Altitude anyway). But it is still sometimes confusing to me (at 4am) to be given FL35 or altitude 15,000' - did I hear that call right??

In short, the system is a mess, and asking for altitude busts. The solution is to set the Transition Altitude to 10,000' across Europe. All companies appear to have a 10,000' check anyway, and this would be an ideal level to reset the altimeters. Much safer and easier.

The only problem is the CAA, who seem to be more interested in tradition than safety.

CHIRP Comment: **This Programme, along with a number of professional organisations including BALPA, GAPAN, GATCO and NATS, has promoted a higher single Transition Altitude (TA) within Controlled Airspace within the UK FIR for more than ten years. More recently, a single Transition Altitude of 10,000ft throughout Europe has been suggested. The principal benefit of a single TA would be to reduce the opportunity for altimeter setting errors at times of high flight crew workload during climb and descent.**

Several years ago the CAA (Directorate of Airspace Policy) stated an intention to rationalise the TA within UK Controlled Airspace at 6,000ft; the Air Transport Advisory Board noted that regrettably this has not been achieved, although the Board was advised that work is still ongoing to resolve a number of airspace issues associated with this rationalisation. In view of this CAA (Directorate of Airspace Policy) was invited to comment and provided the following response:

"The CAA has a stated policy to harmonise on a Transition Altitude of 6,000 ft inside controlled airspace and progress is being made towards achieving this with 12 out of the 17 CTR/CTAs listed in the AIP having a common Transition Altitude of 6,000 ft; indeed, two further areas are likely to adopt it later this year.

However, the CAA also recognises that this issue needs to be addressed in a more fundamental matter looking at all of the potential options for both inside and outside controlled airspace and from a national and a European perspective.

The arrival of a new Head of Section within the Controlled Airspace Section of the Directorate of Airspace Policy in November, together with work on a Future Airspace Strategy have provided the twin sparks to re-ignite this work, from a totally fresh perspective, and this is now underway. Furthermore, work on common Single European Rules of the Air (SERA), emanating from the SES legislation, may force us to amend our current arrangements.

So we are keen to hear airspace users views on what the appropriate altitude should be. Formal consultation through all of the appropriate fora and representative bodies will occur in due course. In the interim, please send any comments you may have to Head CAS, K6, CAA House, Kingsway, London WC2B 6TE or e-mail them to: controlled.airspace@caa.co.uk."

EMERGENCY TURN PROCEDURES

Report Text: The Emergency Turn Procedures (ETP), as published in my Company Operations Manual, very often refer to a position that does not appear on the Instrument Departure plate and thus the position has to be found by other means. Some pilots use the Flight Management System (FMS); however, when below the Minimum Sector Altitude (MSA) we still have to back this up using conventional aids. Is it wise to use fixes that are hard to find when dealing with an emergency? Why not publish simple procedures that work?

As an example, I was recently operating a schedule from a European destination when the First Officer, having recently joined the company, pointed out that his previous company's ETP at the same destination was to simply to intercept a VOR radial fly to a given DME and then turn right direct to the next VOR. In comparison, our company procedure has the same initial turn but thereafter tells us to route to a waypoint that is published only on the Arrival charts and not described in any company paperwork, so one has to find it by looking

through the Arrival charts, making a note of the position, then brief how to rearrange the navigation aids/flight guidance system in order to fly to it in the event of an emergency turn.

My thrust is to explore the thinking behind how these more complicated procedures have been allowed to get out onto the line when, at a time of very high work load, we need simple procedures that give us confidence in our position, particularly given the Minimum Sector Altitude (MSA) constraints and traffic conditions at such places.

Lessons Learned: The aim must be to keep all Emergency Turn Procedures as simple as possible; this same principle should apply to Missed Approach procedures where they are over complicated.

CHIRP Comment: **The development of Engine-out Emergency Turn Procedures, at destinations where the surrounding terrain requires an ETP, is the responsibility of each operator. The design of an ETP is dependent on several factors, including aircraft type (engine-out climb performance) and required maximum payload. The ETP routing will also depend on company policy, such as providing the optimum obstacle clearance or only that required by regulation.**

There is no requirement for an operator to discuss an ETP with the local ATC; however, some company processes for establishing emergency turn procedures include, where practicable, seeking local ATC advice as to the optimum ETP routing.

As regards Missed Approach Procedures (MAPs), the design of these is the responsibility of each airport authority and, like SIDs/STARs, may be subject to an Environmental Impact Assessment. If you believe that the complexity of a MAP constitutes a safety risk, report it to your company to permit the matter to be raised with the relevant airport authority.

As the reporter notes, in the absence of other overriding constraints, it is obviously good practice that the design of ETPs and MAPs, both being non-normal procedures, should be as simple as possible, and the required information easy to find.

LIGHTNING ENCOUNTERS

Report Text: I have just retired as a commercial pilot having flown first in the military and then worldwide on B737, B757 and B767s. As a parting shot I would like to instigate a discussion on operations in lightning conditions.

In more than 35 years I was either statistically very lucky to have never been hit by lightning, (I can say that now without tempting fate) or just very careful. I know many colleagues who have been struck on numerous occasions.

I have always given Mother Nature the greatest respect. Consequently, I gave electric storms a very wide berth. I pressed ATC to vector me well clear. I often flew very slow departures and on occasions slowed down to facilitate the safe interaction with ATC to let them help me. In short, I went to any lengths to circumnavigate what I perceived to be a serious danger to me and my passengers. However, I have frequently seen pilots scrape the inside wing (a 40' lightning pole) through the edge of massive thunderstorms; this I considered to be irresponsible. Even the UK ATC, for whom I have the highest regard, have tried to pressure me to go into weather in order to pass us on to the next sector at the SOP altitudes and position.

One gripe I had was being expected to line up and take off immediately without the opportunity to assess the weather ahead and negotiate an alternative departure procedure through Approach Control. Contrary to popular belief, my RADAR did not have a look backward facility on the taxiway! Had I taken off and crashed, I would have been culpable for taking my aircraft into unacceptable conditions. With an aircraft behind you on finals, this is a very pressured situation and one where little allowance is made by local controllers, especially at the very busy airports.

The training of pilots in dealing with adverse weather is scant at best. Most knowledge is passed on by watching others. I do believe that individuals' attitude to weather and its avoidance is very variable and contributes much to the number of strikes they suffer. Some of the strikes are caused by trying to be expeditious and trying to follow normal arrival patterns. What is a 40-mile or so detour during an arrival if it means a safe flight and a serviceable aircraft? I believe many strikes are caused by pilots and the, "It won't happen to me" attitude. It takes a very stubborn attitude to get what you think is the best transition, but you have to be in this mind-set in the first place. The mind-set needs to include the option to hold off to let weather go through instead of pressing on.

Operations, who in many airlines do all flight planning, are often so far removed from the pilot that weather avoidance was being done by a clerk and not the pilot who has to deal with it. The recent Air France accident was initially thought to have been due to weather. How many flights delay departure for mid-sector weather or plan to circumnavigate it by alternative routing? Too few I suggest - leaving pilots to battle their way through it.

I would like to suggest that some research, perhaps including a survey, is done to find out just how many times pilots have been hit, where in the world, why they were hit and whether they think, on reflection, that they might have avoided it by alternate planning or taking alternative routing.

Is it not time that pilots started sharing their expertise and developing their personal attitude of respect for weather, based on collective experience and encounters? It is time one of the aeronautical bodies did a survey and study into how we can best avoid these dangerous situations, especially when the world is relying more and more on computer fly-by-wire which I feel are more prone to a stray billion volts.

Time to get off my box and back to retirement!

CHIRP Comment: **The adequacy of current training standards related to weather avoidance, the risks associated with a severe weather encounter, such as aircraft upset or airframe damage, and the correct interpretation of weather radar information is a topic**

worthy of serious consideration both by operators and regulators.

With regard to the reporter's comments relating to ATC, two points should be noted. First, UK controllers almost exclusively use processed radar information, which suppresses all weather returns. Thus, UK controllers have no indication of the location of storm cells and are unable to assist with weather avoidance in the same way as their counterparts in the USA and elsewhere. The second point is that an ATC controller's ability to approve/agree to a non-standard departure routing prior to take-off cannot be assumed.

The reporter's suggestion for the sharing of experience/expertise has considerable merit. If you have had a weather-related experience that can be shared more widely for the benefit of other pilots/ATCOs, we would be pleased to hear of it.

TYPE 2 DE-ICING FLUID

Report Text: We had an early morning departure scheduled. It had been below zero overnight and we ordered de-icing to be done, through the handling agent. We did not specifiy, but had expected Type 1 fluid to be used. In the event, the aircraft was de-iced with Type 2 fluid which is Viscous and actually an anti-icing fluid.

Having been cleared for takeoff, much of the anti-ice fluid present on the nose of the aircraft, suddenly flew up onto the windshield at around 80 knots, causing a total loss of outside vision. We took the decision to continue the takeoff, as we were only 1-2 seconds from V_R which was the same speed as V_1. Further runway guidance was continued by use of the HSI/Flight Director, which was set on heading mode with the runway heading previously set.

An uneventful takeoff resulted, and the windshield gradually cleared during the climb, and was completely clear by around FL050. Subsequently we discussed whether an aborted takeoff might have been appropriate, but felt that loss of control and departure from the runway might have resulted.

CHIRP Comment: A good reminder that the viscosity of Type 2 (and Type 4) anti-icing fluids is such that the fluid may remain on airframe surfaces until the aircraft has accelerated to 80-100kts on take-off.

PRE-FLIGHT REPORT TIMES

(1)

Report Text: I am sure I am not the only flight deck crew member in the company to be concerned about the flight safety aspects of its latest move to extend our duty by getting us to check in our bags prior to our official report time for the flight.

The implicit acceptance by the company of this is apparent from the new company bus timetable to provide time before 'report' to drop our bags. While there is a nominal bus transit time, we are now being positioned up to 50 min before our official report time in some cases. (To then operate a two-crew Florida 2 Variation flight).

The flight safety implications are considerable in my opinion. I am sure you will have received 'chapter and verse' from other correspondents, but I would like to individually voice my fears.

Lessons Learned: Ask the regulatory authorities to intervene and reflect the actual report time.

(2)

Report Text: The Company has recently moved the crewroom to a new airside location. The crew report time is when a crew member checks-in to the computerised crewing system in the new crewroom. However, crew have to now to complete some flight related duties before getting to the crewroom. Crew first have to check-in their nightstop bags at a terminal baggage desk (if bag is not 100ml compliant or over-size etc), then get through the airport staff security search to get airside and then walk through the terminal to get to the crewroom. All of that takes time and is at present not part of the FDP, as that doesn't start until a crew member arrives and checks-in at the crewroom.

CAA FODCOM 10/2009 published in April and before this crewroom move reminds operators that "....the CAA occasionally receives reports that indicate that operators are very reluctant to change report times even if there has been a considerable change in circumstances at the report location (e.g. in security or crew baggage handling requirements)." In this case there appears to have been "a considerable change in circumstances" relating to security and baggage handling requirements but the company has made no allowance for it within our FDP and required report time.

Previously security/crew baggage issues were handled after the FDP had started after checking-in at a landside crewroom. Moreover, if a crew member elects to include these pre-flight actions within the stipulated FDP and arrives at the crewroom to check in ten or so minutes later, then that crew member risks being marked down as being late. At present possible redundancy criteria are being considered by the company including attendance performance. This new and unsatisfactory situation puts crew members under unnecessary pressure.

Given the recent clarification by the CAA, can the CAA Flight Ops Dept tell us what should be happening? Shouldn't the FDP start on checking in crew bags/going through security and not afterwards?

CHIRP Comment: As noted above the most recent guidance issued by the CAA in April 2009 (FODCOM 10/2009) is unequivocal. The relevant paragraph also states:

"FOIs will expect operators to demonstrate that report times will allow all required duties to be accomplished within the specified times under normal circumstances.....

We have received criticism from some reporters that we have not been able to resolve this issue in response to the more recent reports that we have received. As can be seen from the FTL Summary for 2009, the total number of reports that we received on this topic in the past year is relatively small, particularly when related to individual operators. Thus, although all of the report time issues have been represented to the CAA, in some

cases the number of reports received has not been sufficient for us to raise this matter as a serious concern, except where a report has related to a specific change in pre-flight tasks/procedures required by the company.

PLANNED INTO DISCRETION?

Report Text: My original rostered duty was a two-sector Flight Duty Period (FDP) of 11hr with a calculated Maximum FDP of 12hr 15mins. On completion of the second sector I was scheduled to position by road, giving a total planned duty period of 14hrs 55mins.

On contacting the company prior to leaving home, I was informed that my departure had been delayed and an intermediate technical stop added. There was no mention of Commander's Discretion. I calculated, incorrectly while still half asleep, that if we could achieve a 35-minute turnround for the technical stopover, the duty could be achieved without discretion in the revised, 3-sector max FDP of 11:30. At report, it emerged that we were required to stop en-route to our destination.

As usual, pre-flight planning was hectic and there was limited time to take in considerable detail, given that a prompt departure was necessary. Only in the cruise did close examination reveal that the times to which the company was working were a complete work of fiction!

Their revised plan was as follows:

Although my report time had been delayed, the first sector had been scheduled to depart as previously (i.e. depart 20min after report)

The intermediate stop had been scheduled for a 10min turnround and the block-block time for the second sector was 20min less than the computer flight plan airborne time.

The third sector was unchanged from the original schedule by again reducing the original turnround time. However, the timing for the positioning had been delayed revealing a more realistic expectation of final on-block time/end of FDP). This was reflected in the increase in the planned duty period.

In short, the flight crew had been planned into discretion and fictitious planned times had been entered into the record, presumably in an attempt to deceive the Regulator (and the captain?) that this was not so. This is, at best, dishonest and, at worst, a potential danger to flight safety and a possible breach of the law.

I am aware that the same stunt has been pulled several times in the recent past, each time in response to one-off events such as delayed arrivals, unserviceable aircraft or re-routing via an intermediate stop for company reasons. In each case, it has been taken for granted that the aircraft commander would exercise the maximum discretion allowed to extend the FDP. If challenged as to the accuracy of their figures, a typical company response has been: "We reckon you can do it: we've re-planned both sectors at high speed". On more than one occasion, I ended up pushing back just after the "2-hour maximum discretion on any but the final sector" cut-off time, and rescuing things by cruising and descending at very high speed. That's not the way to run a railway!

If the company is honest with me and ask me to "go the extra mile", I invariably agree and will do my utmost within the law and the dictates of safety to get the job done. CAP371 and the Company Ops manual are quite clear that duties must be rostered in accordance with the rules, i.e. without the use of Commander's discretion to increase FDP or reduce rest. Despite the oft stated belief to the contrary, there is no prohibition of "planning" into discretion, after the roster has been published. The practice I have described is clearly not in keeping with the intention of the regulations. I believe I am far from alone in having been subjected to undue pressure and even mild deception to get me to go into discretion like this.

I recognise that the ultimate decision lies with the aircraft commander and that, if I am not happy I must just call "STOP!" If this continues, it may only be a matter of time before I decline to exercise any discretion and ground the aircraft down-route, while the crew take adequate rest.

CHIRP Comment: **The situation where a crewing department seeks to accommodate a disruption to the regular schedule such as that described in this report is not new and will often require a crew to work longer than their original roster. Employing 'innovative' interpretations of the company's Approved FTL scheme to construct a revised schedule that is unachievable is a doubtful practice from a Regulatory perspective as it could be interpreted as effectively planning a crew into discretion. Such a practice is also intellectually dishonest and does little to encourage an individual to 'go the extra mile' for the company's benefit on a future occasion.**

EXERCISING DISCRETION

Report Text: Under our company SOPs, it is usually impossible for the Commander to consult the cabin crew as to their individual work/rest history and fitness to operate an extended FDP until he arrives at the aircraft, by which time the passengers may even be boarding. To do so during boarding is clearly impossible, given the cabin crew's duties at this time. It takes considerable moral courage to stand cabin crew down and delay the departure by up to an hour-and-a-half at this late stage.

CHIRP Comment: **One of an operator's responsibilities is to ensure that an effective procedure is in place to enable aircraft commanders to satisfy themselves that flight crew/cabin crew members are fit to operate into discretion.**

We have emphasised in Cabin Crew FEEDBACK that where the Senior Cabin Crew Member is aware of circumstances that might influence a cabin crew member's ability to operate into discretion, the information should be reported to the aircraft commander at the earliest opportunity.

The reporter's concern has been represented to the company.

SECURITY REPORTS

Although we have not published any reports related to airport security procedures in the recent past, we continue to receive reports of similar concerns to those previously published and continue our efforts to bring these issues to the attention of the relevant agencies. The following two reports are typical of the continuing concerns.

MORE ON SECURITY

Report Text: I am a captain based at a major London airport. The following report relates to the staff security check point at XXX and YYY airports.

Staff security checks at XXX have been a contentious issue for a while but have recently reached a new level of absurdity.

We now find ourselves in a situation where we undergo more stringent checks than passengers. It has been decided 50% of bags are now hand searched when passing through the staff area in ### House.

Also the speed and depth of checks varies hugely with the staff. My bag was recently searched by a woman who appeared to be going deliberately slowly whilst thumbing through every page of my books, folders etc.

We are expected to stand patiently biting our tongues whilst they make what could be a relatively straight forward procedure, a painful experience that leaves people fuming. On this occasion I vented my spleen on the crew bus where the crew were equally irate about the treatment they had endured. We all felt better afterwards but it's not a good way to start a days flying. Something needs to be done about ### House. I have recently travelled as a passenger out of base and security was a breeze compared to our staff search.

Secondly, crew treatment at YYY.

We now go through with passengers. If you set off the metal detector you have to sit down, remove shoes and lift your feet up so they can pass the wand under your feet. I said to one of the staff it was the most ridiculous check I have ever encountered (for Flight Crew) to which he agreed but said they were on camera so we had to oblige.

The security experience for Flight Crew is not improving in the UK. In fact it seems things are getting stricter. Many security staff agree but say they have to carry out the checks as they are "on camera", but a significant amount still try to make it as painful as possible. Many still get away with inappropriate rigour (body search) and dialogue, whilst the majority of crew just endure it to be on their way as soon as possible.

The answer has to be separate staff areas where we undergo reasonable and appropriate checks with a little bit of respect thrown in. Not because I'm a captain, because I'm a human being

Lessons Learned: More needs to be done.

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(2)

Report Text: Whilst passing through security and having been asked to remove my shoes and to repeat the metal detector archway, I noticed that two armed police were waiting their turn to pass through. I watched to see what happened and they were asked to show their ID and were then waved through the archway, which of course, set off the alarm as they were laden with metal (automatic weapon, cuffs, radio, etc).

Why am we treated differently? The incident occurred at XXX but I have seen it happen at other airports too.

CHIRP Comment: **The argument has often been made that individuals may be subjected to some form of coercion; are our police colleagues deemed to be less vulnerable?**

CABIN CREW REPORTS

CREW COMMUNICATIONS

(1)

Report Text: Since we have moved to our new crew report centre, it is now often the case that we may not even see the flight crew until we get to the crew bus. Many do not come and introduce themselves during our briefing as was the plan before the move.

When the flight crew stay at a different hotel to the cabin crew, it is possible to do a whole trip and have no idea what the flight crew look like.

I sometimes try to get up to the flight deck to introduce myself personally before departure but this is not always possible when fully involved in boarding the aircraft.

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(2)

Report Text: Long haul duty with a number of days downroute. The SCCM conducted the briefing and once they had finished they went to call the flight crew to come and say hello to us. The flight crew seemed to be a bit busy and after waiting a couple of minutes we elected to make our way to the aircraft. The flight crew arrived at the aircraft and went straight to the flight deck (the flight was not late and there was plenty of time) without introducing themselves or saying 'hello'.

With the exception of the cabin crew in the premium cabin, the flight crew have not seen any of the cabin crew and vice versa. As on this trip the flight crew stayed in a different hotel to the cabin crew downroute, we did not see them for the whole time we are downroute. For our journey home, we get picked up from the hotel, get to the aircraft and the same thing happened. No 'hello', nothing. The flight crew went straight to the flight deck, again.

During the flight one of the flight crew appeared in the premium galley and then went straight back into the flight deck ignoring those of us that were present. The SCCM was then informed that that the flight crew was on controlled rest. The flight crew failed to call the SCCM at the designated time, the SCCM waited an additional 5 minutes and called the flight crew who then informed the SCCM that they were no longer on controlled rest (I think they expected the SCCM to guess that).

When we landed and disembarked there was no goodbye from the flight crew. We did a five-day trip without knowing who was on the flight deck and the flight crew not knowing who the cabin crew were. I

know CRM goes both ways, but in this case we were at the aircraft doing our jobs when the flight crew arrived.

CHIRP Comment: **The precise reasons for the lack of communication on the above occasions are not clear and there might have been valid reasons for the flight crew not being able to introduce themselves.**

However, these reports are a reminder that the locked flight deck door policy has had an impact on some elements of Crew Resource Management (CRM) and communications between flight deck/cabin crew members. It is not often the case that there is no opportunity to make a brief introduction to the cabin crew members, even if it is not possible during the pre-flight briefing process; everybody should be encouraged to make a positive effort to contribute to good CRM.

CAA (SRG) FODCOMS

The following CAA (SRG) FODCOMS have been issued since **16 October 2009**

31/2009

Winter Operations

32/2009

Boeing 737 Cabin Altitude Warning Horn Confusion

33/2009

Guidance on Safety Risk Assessments for Commercial Air Transport Flights Outside Controlled Airspace

34/2009

Notification of a Consultation Regarding the Proposed Publication of CAA Safety Performance Indicators on the CAA Website

35/2009

Dangerous Goods: Operational Manual Requirements

01/2010

CAA Monthly Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR) Listing

02/2010

Accountable Manager and Nominated Postholder Training Courses

03/2010

Flight Crew Standards - Crew Resource Management Instructor Examiner (CRMIE) (Ground) Forum - 2010

CAA (SRG) Flight Operations Department Communications are published on the CAA website - www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?categoryid=33 and click on the link 'Search for a CAA Publication'

If you wish to contact the CAA Flight Operations Inspectorate or to report any safety matter which is outside the scope of the MOR Scheme please e-mail the CAA at:

flightoperationssafety@caa.co.uk

ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY CONFERENCES

The RAeS will be holding two conferences on 28 and 29 April 2010 at British Airways, Waterside (LHR), Middlesex

28 April 2010 - Emergency Response and Human Factors in Safety Management Systems

29 April 2010 - Human Factors in Aviation

For further information on these events, see the *Upcoming Conferences* notices at:
www.raes-hfg.com/forum/forum.asp?FORUM_ID=13 or e-mail:
emergencyresp@raes-hfg.com

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If you receive FEEDBACK as a licensed pilot/ATCO/maintenance engineer please **notify Personnel Licensing at the CAA of your change of address and not *CHIRP***. Please complete a change of address form which is available to download from the CAA website and fax/post to:

Civil Aviation Authority
Personnel Licensing Department
Licensing Operations
Aviation House
Gatwick Airport South
West Sussex RH6 0YR

Fax: 01293 573996

The Change of address form is available from: www.caa.co.uk/docs/175/srg_fcl_changeofaddress.pdf

Alternatively, you can e-mail your change of address to the following relevant department (**please remember to include your licence number**):

Flight Crew .....fclweb@caa.co.uk
ATCO/FISO .....ats.licensing@caa.co.uk
Maintenance Engineer .....eldweb@caa.co.uk

CONTACT US

Peter Tait — **Director**
Flight Crew/ATC Reports

Mick Skinner — **Deputy Director (Engineering)**
Maintenance/Engineer Reports

Kirsty Arnold — **Administration Manager**
Circulation/Administration
Cabin Crew Reports

--oOo--

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2. On closing, this Report Form will be returned to you.
   NO RECORD OF YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS WILL BE KEPT
3. ***CHIRP*** is a reporting programme for safety-related issues. We regret we are unable to accept reports that relate to industrial relations issues.

It is *CHIRP* policy to acknowledge a report on receipt and then to provide a comprehensive closing response. If you do not require a closing response please tick the box:

No. I do not require a response from *CHIRP* ☐

PLEASE COMPLETE RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVENT/SITUATION

YOURSELF				THE EVENT		DOCUMENTARY			
CERTIFYING ENGINEER	☐	TECHNICAL SUPPORT	☐	DATE OF OCCURRENCE		PROCEDURES	☐	MANUALS	☐
QUALITY	☐	MECHANIC	☐	TIME OF OCCURRENCE	AM/PM	DOCUMENTATION	☐	REGULATION	☐
EXPERTISE				**THE AIRCRAFT**		**HARDWARE**			
A&C	☐	AVIONICS	☐	AIRCRAFT/ENGINE TYPE		MATERIALS	☐	SPARES	☐
OTHER:				SYSTEM/COMPONENT		TOOLS	☐		
EXPERIENCE				AIRCRAFT REG	G-	**EXTERNAL**			
YEARS IN MAINTENANCE IND		YRS		**REPORTED TO**		COMMUNICATIONS	☐	WEATHER	☐
YEARS AT PRESENT COMPANY		YRS		LINE MANAGER	☐ QUALITY ☐	TIME PRESSURE	☐	OTHER:	
WORK AREA/DUTY				TECH SUPPORT	☐ CAA - MOR ☐	**ITEMS THAT WERE INVOLVED IN EVENT** (TICK ALL THAT APPLY)			
LINE	☐	BASE	☐	OTHER:		INSPECTION	☐	FAULT ISOLATION	☐
WORKSHOP	☐	OFFICE	☐	**FACTORS**		TESTING	☐	INSTALLATION	☐
SHIFT WORKED				MANPOWER LEVELS	☐ SKILLS ☐	REPAIR	☐	SCHEDULED MAIN	☐
HOURS ON DUTY PRIOR TO INCIDENT		HRS		TRAINING	☐ MEDICAL STATE ☐	LOGBOOK ENTRY	☐	MEL	☐

THE COMPANY	MY MAIN POINTS ARE:
NAME OF COMPANY:	A:
REPORT TOPIC	B:
MY REPORT RELATES TO:	C:

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT - PHOTOGRAPHS, DIAGRAMS ON A CD ARE WELCOME:

Your narrative will be reviewed by a member of the ***CHIRP*** staff who will remove all information such as dates/locations/names that might identify you. Bear in mind the following topics when preparing your narrative:

Chain of events • Communication • Decision Making • Equipment • Situational Awareness • Weather • Task Allocation • Teamwork • Training • Sleep Patterns

continue on a separate piece of paper, if necessary

PLEASE PLACE THE COMPLETED REPORT FORM, WITH ADDITIONAL PAGES IF REQUIRED, IN A SEALED ENVELOPE (no stamp required) AND SEND TO:

CHIRP • FREEPOST (GI3439) • Building Y20E • Room G15 • Cody Technology Park • Ively Road • Farnborough • GU14 0BR • UK

Confidential Tel (24 hrs): +44 (0) 1252 395013 or Free*fone* (UK only) 0800 214645 and Confidential Fax: +44 (0) 1252 394290

Report forms are also available on the ***CHIRP*** website: **www.chirp.co.uk**

CHIRP

PILOT/FLIGHT CREW REPORT FORM

CHIRP is totally independent of the Civil Aviation Authority and any Company/Airline

Name:

Address:

Post Code Tel:

e-mail:

◣ Indicates Mandatory Fields

1. Your personal details are required only to enable us to contact you for further details about any part of your report. Please do not submit anonymous reports.
2. On closing, this Report Form will be returned to you.
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No. I do not require a response from CHIRP ☐

PLEASE COMPLETE RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVENT/SITUATION

YOURSELF - CREW POSITION				THE FLIGHT/EVENT			
CAPTAIN	☐	FIRST OFFICER	☐	DATE OF OCCURRENCE		TIME	(LOCAL/GMT)
PILOT FLYING	☐	PILOT NOT FLYING	☐	LOCATION		HEIGHT/ALT/FL	
FLIGHT ENGINEER	☐	OTHER CREW MEMBER	☐	TYPE OF ATC SERVICE		DAY ☐	NIGHT ☐

THE AIRCRAFT		TYPE OF FLIGHT				TYPE OF OPERATION			
TYPE/SERIES		IFR	☐	VFR	☐	PASSENGER	☐	TRAINING	☐
NUMBER OF CREW		OTHER:	☐			FREIGHT	☐	OTHER:	

EXPERIENCE/QUALIFICATION						WEATHER				FLIGHT PHASE			
TOTAL HOURS		HRS				VMC	☐	IMC	☐	TAXI	☐	TAKE-OFF	☐
HOURS ON TYPE		HRS				RAIN	☐	FOG	☐	CLIMB	☐	CRUISE	☐
TRG CAPT	☐	TRE	☐	IRE	☐	ICE	☐	SNOW	☐	DESCENT	☐	APPROACH	☐
OTHER QUALIFICATIONS:						OTHER:				LANDING	☐	GO AROUND	☐

THE COMPANY	MY MAIN POINTS ARE:
NAME OF COMPANY:	A:
REPORT TOPIC	B:
MY REPORT RELATES TO:	C:

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT - PHOTOGRAPHS, DIAGRAMS ON A CD ARE WELCOME:

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