

CABIN CREW FEEDBACK

Issue No: 26

Winter 2007

Number of Reports Received Since Last Issue: 46

Topics Have Included:

Management Pressure not to Report Sick
Being "Stood Down" From a Duty
Aircraft Departing with No In Charge
Duty Hours
Blocked Aisles/Emergency Exits In Flight
Security - Searches / Door Access Codes

access to emergency exits; the list includes "Children (whether accompanied or not) and infants."

Where permitted, should an operator allow a passenger to use a non-required cabin crew seat, the passenger must meet the requirements of an ABP and the procedure documented in the Operations Manual.

The operator concerned in this report is currently reviewing the wording of their SOPs in this regard.

WHAT'S IN THIS ISSUE?

	Page
Contacting CHIRP	Bottom of This Page
Young Child Seated in Jumpseat	1
Noisy Landing.....	1
Stood Down from Duty.....	1
Saturated on Landing	2
Exits Blocked During Flight.....	2
New Cabin Config - Risk of Injury to Crew in Galley	2
Ground Crew SOPs.....	2
Changes to SOPs Since Merger	3
Comments CCFB25 - Bird Strike Is It Safe to Continue .	3
Report Form	Outside Back Cover

NOISY LANDING

Report Text: On approach crew were warned that there may be some turbulence during landing. Once the aircraft had actually touched the runway it appeared from inside the cabin that the aircraft was travelling rather fast and that the engines were extremely noisy. All the crew noticed this and some became a little concerned, especially those at D#R and D#R, I was sitting at D#L.

Once we were able to talk to flight crew, it was explained that this was a normal full reverse thrust landing. The flight crew were surprised that the cabin crew were aware of the different feel of the landing. I think it would be useful to prevent crew from becoming anxious during these landings. This could be easily done if the flight crew notified the In Charge whenever possible if they know this type of landing is probable.

CHIRP Comment: Although some company SOPs specify the use of full reverse engine thrust only when necessary, it may be used on any landing if the Captain determines its use to be prudent. In such a case, it might not always be possible to warn cabin crew in advance, so there may be times when full reverse thrust could be used without prior warning. Its use, even when unexpected, should not cause undue concern.

REPORTS

YOUNG CHILD SEATED ON JUMPSEAT

Report Text: Aircraft full, staff on jumpseats and Captain authorised for one of the staff (also a Captain) to sit at D#L outboard (cabin crew member inboard) and his son to sit at D#R, also next to cabin crew member. The problem is that the child was only around 7-8 years old.

The crew member at D#R phoned the Captain to query the decision and to express concern about the child and possible consequences during an emergency evacuation. Captain replied that even though company SOPs state that no child under 12 years old can be sat adjacent to an emergency exit or cabin door, as the crew member would be sat next to the door and the child next to them, this in his eyes was ok. Crew member involved and rest of crew were very unhappy at this decision but Captain overruled us all.

CHIRP Comment: The explanatory material to JAR-OPS 1.280 lists the categories of passengers who should not be allocated, or directed to seats which permit direct

STOOD DOWN FROM DUTY

Report Text: Twice recently I have been stood-down after reporting for duty, once for an unserviceable aircraft and the second time as too many crew reported for the same flight.

On both occasions, I was told to go home and remain on home standby for a further 6+ hours.

I was under the impression that you could not report twice in one day if you had been stood-down, therefore making the home standby pointless.

I have queried this with Crewing who have said that "you can report twice but if you are unhappy to do so then we will, in future, keep you on airport standby to solve the problem of reporting twice."

A Cabin Crew Safety Newsletter

from **CHIRP** the Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme

I know this has been happening to other crew and we are all confused. Flight crew I have spoken to are just as unsure, although some believe if we were to report twice then our flight duty would commence at the original report.

CHIRP Comment: A crewmember's flying duty period (FDP) starts when that individual first reports for duty. Thereafter, it doesn't matter whether a crewmember operates a flight, stays at the airport or goes home - the FDP clock continues to run.

In this particular case, the operator would appear to have offered the reporter the chance to go home and sit out a standby duty there. If the reporter had gone home and was subsequently called out, necessitating a second journey to the airport, this would not breach the FTL guidelines and is permissible, providing that the reporter's FDP was based on their first report time.

SATURATED ON LANDING

Report Text: On landing the ice drawer and both brewers were leaking considerable amounts of water which soaked me, my colleague and the whole galley area. Luckily we disembarked via the air bridge so no pax had to walk on the floor which was saturated. If disembarkation had been via steps, or even an evacuation, there could have been serious injuries.

It has been reported numerous times but nothing seems to be done. It just isn't a small amount but is like a waterfall on landing!!!

CHIRP Comment: Whilst discussing this report, the consensus view of the CHIRP Cabin Crew Advisory Board was that this is not an unusual occurrence and is usually caused by a build-up of tea leaves/coffee grounds, milk, juice and other similar items being poured down the galley sink.

Design parameters related to aircraft pressurisation require that the sink drain pipes are relatively small; they are also often interconnected with the ice tray/bev maker drains. Thus, a blockage to the sink may also cause the ice tray/bev maker drains to overflow. Some operators SOPs contain guidance on the disposal of liquids etc. to avoid drain blockages.

If you still experience problems then report the matter, using your own company procedures. If your company has no formal method of transferring relevant cabin defects to the aircraft Technical Log, ensure that the Captain is aware to enable Engineering to rectify the matter.

EXITS BLOCKED DURING FLIGHT

Report Text: I was travelling as a passenger recently and I am concerned regarding onboard safety practices.

We were sitting in row 1 and I therefore noticed that after take off, the crew removed their flight bags from the forward toilet and placed them on the crew jumpseats, next to the emergency exit. I thought that maybe this was a temporary position for the bags to be, however a large bin liner was then placed next to the emergency exit also. This had the effect of completely blocking it. These bags and the rubbish bin remained in this position until the aircraft was secured for landing.

I understand that there are issues with storage, especially on smaller aircraft, but I was very unimpressed that this practice was being adopted as a solution, putting the safety of all passengers at risk.

I do not believe that this is an isolated incident, however do not want to blame the cabin crew, the company needs to be informed of the issue and resolve it accordingly. The situation onboard on the flight in question was not acceptable. In my opinion it will at some point lead to an incident or accident. I take safety very seriously and expect that when I board an aircraft the professionalism and experience of the cabin crew will ensure my safety in the event of an incident.

CHIRP Comment: There is no safety requirement for emergency exits to be kept clear once the aircraft is in the air. However, it is good practice to keep loose items to a minimum, preferably with restraint to prevent movement should the aircraft encounter turbulence. Anything other than very light items should be placed in an approved stowage.

The toilet is not an approved stowage and only waste bags containing low density waste may be stowed in toilet compartments during the final phases of flight.

NEW CABIN CONFIGURATION, RISK OF INJURY TO CREW IN GALLEY

Report Text: On some of our larger aircraft it is necessary for passengers to walk through a galley to access the toilet. They do so apparently unaware of the dangers and regularly push past crew who are working with the ovens open. There have been several crew members, myself included, who have narrowly escaped burns and scalding as passengers force their way through.

This is a working galley area not a walk through. The operator should provide a means of access through to the toilet on the LHS from RHS without walking through this busy and dangerous area. Either by providing access behind the last row of seats in that cabin, or by installing a toilet on the RHS, thus avoiding the necessity to pass through the galley.

I can not emphasise strongly enough the potential for injury in this very confined area.

CHIRP Comment: This matter was brought to the attention of the operator who confirmed that the cabin service department was conducting a further review.

Good practice would suggest that a formal Risk Assessment should precede a change of configuration such as that described. This should identify whether risks associated with passengers transiting the galley can be mitigated by restricting passengers from passing through the galley at busy times and/or directing them to use other toilets. At other times, it should be possible to ensure that drop down doors and other galley equipment that might impede access are opened only when necessary and closed and secured when not in use.

GROUND CREW - SOPs

Report Text: Arrived on stand and pax were disembarking. There were two knocks on D2R, I went to

the door, checked the outside conditions and saw it was the catering company. While I was checking the outside conditions the catering man opened the door without waiting for the 10 seconds or allowing me to open it, if I had not jumped out the way in time I would have been hit in the face by the operating handle. I challenged the catering who confirmed that he had seen me and was new and didn't realise that he had to wait the required 10 seconds.

Clearly this is a concern if people are not being trained in aircraft door operation.

The man apologised however it caused me concern in case this happens again or if other new people come online and are not trained by the catering company.

CHIRP Comment: As we have said previously, reports of this nature are not unusual. If you are involved in a similar situation, report the matter through your company's internal reporting system so that corrective action can be taken. In the case of this report, the operator concerned has been advised of this incident.

CHANGES TO SOPs SINCE MERGER

Report Text: SOPs have changed since our company's merger. As far as I was aware upon arrival the FO makes the PA message, "Cabin crew prepare doors for arrival", the In Charge receives the checks then phones the flight deck to ask for permission to open doors on knocks.

The FO, after using this procedure outbound, told the In Charge they no longer need to ask permission; that the seatbelt sign being switched off is now the permission needed and that the In Charge needn't phone the flight deck. For crew who are part-time this is a concern due to the changes between flights.

Upon arrival the doors were put to manual, and the In Charge received checks and awaited the seatbelt sign being switched off. The interphone rang and the In Charge was notified by the flight deck that the doors could be opened and enquiring why the In Charge had not called to request permission to open.

It would appear that the FO was incorrect. On checking new SOPs back in the crew room it would seem that the In Charge still has to phone flight deck!

CHIRP Comment: Reports of this nature have become more frequent following a number of company mergers. However, all crew members must ensure that they are up-to-date with their SOPs before reporting for duty; this is even more important for those crew members who work on a part-time basis. Should the need arise cabin crew always have easy access to an Operations Manual for reference.

If you have any safety concerns about changes to your company's SOPs that you are unable to resolve, report the matter through the usual company channels.

COMMENTS RE: 'BIRD STRIKE, IS IT SAFE TO CONTINUE?' - CCFB25

Report Text: I would like to respond to a query and answer published in Issue 25 of the CABIN CREW FEEDBACK newsletter, titled 'Bird strike, is it safe to continue?'

The conclusion I took from your response was that despite the crew failing to be reassured by the captain regarding a distressing situation, the crew should have blindly accepted the captain's explanation and continued regardless of their instincts or judgments.

This response has concerned me on two levels:

Firstly, it assumes that cabin crew have no knowledge of aircraft technical workings, should place a blind faith in their flight crew and should have the ability to 'switch off' their instincts when any situation occurs with which they are unhappy.

My second concern with your response is that it assumes flight deck crew should be considered to be correct at all times. Cabin crew are also highly-trained professionals and as human beings we make mistakes - as do flight crew. CRM courses have detailed how poor judgments and lack of professionalism on the side of flight crews have resulted in major incidents involving commercial aircraft. CRM is an essential part of day-to-day life as a crew member (whether in the cabin or on the flight deck) and if we were to ignore it and accept all explanations given by flight crew without voicing our concerns, the consequences would be grave.

Within the cabin crew community, CHIRP is highly regarded and is often of invaluable support that complements our SEP training very well. I do hope that this will continue into the future and that my concerns can be taken into consideration.

CHIRP Comment: The report published in the last issue described a situation in which an aircraft had rejected a take-off following a birdstrike. After an engineering inspection, the aircraft was cleared to operate. On the subsequent take-off, cabin crew members were concerned about a smell of burning detected in the cabin. At the end of the sector, despite a 20-minute discussion with the Captain to reassure the cabin crew that the aircraft was fully serviceable to continue, the reporter felt unduly pressurised to operate a further sector.

The basis of effective Crew Resource Management is maintaining good two-way communications between the flight crew and the cabin crew; this relies on dialogue and interaction between both groups, particularly in a non-normal situation, such as that described in the original report.

The Captain, who held the accountability for the safe operation of the flight, discussed the background with the cabin crew in some detail and explained the basis for his decision to continue, after becoming aware of the cabin crew's concerns. With the benefit of hindsight, alerting the cabin crew after the rejected take-off to the possibility that a birdstrike could cause a smell in the cabin might have ameliorated the crew's subsequent concern.

Given the Captain's assessment that the engineering check had been completed correctly and the aircraft was serviceable to continue, having taken account of the cabin crew's experience on the previous flight, his decision to operate the further sector was not unreasonable.

CHIRP

CABIN CREW REPORT FORM

CHIRP is totally independent of the Civil Aviation Authority and any Airline

Name: <input type="checkbox"/>	<p>1. Your personal details are required only to enable us to contact you for further details about any part of your report. Please do not submit anonymous reports.</p> <p>2. On closing, this Report Form will be returned to you.</p> <p>NO RECORD OF YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS WILL BE KEPT</p> <p>3. CHIRP is a reporting programme for safety-related issues. We regret we are unable to accept reports that relate to industrial relations issues.</p>
Address: <input type="checkbox"/>	
Tel: _____ Post Code: <input type="checkbox"/>	
e-mail: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Indicates Mandatory Fields	

It is **CHIRP** policy to acknowledge a report on receipt and then to provide a comprehensive closing response. If you do not require a closing response please tick the box. No I do not require a response from **CHIRP**

PLEASE COMPLETE RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVENT/SITUATION

YOURSELF - CREW POSITION		THE FLIGHT/EVENT		CABIN ACTIVITY	
CABIN CREW IN-CHARGE <input type="checkbox"/>	SENIOR CABIN CREW <input type="checkbox"/>	DATE OF INCIDENT		BOARDING <input type="checkbox"/>	INFLIGHT SERVICE <input type="checkbox"/>
CABIN CREW <input type="checkbox"/>	SUPERNUMERARY <input type="checkbox"/>	TIME	LOCAL/GMT	DISEMBARKING <input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER: <input type="checkbox"/>
OTHER:		AIRCRAFT LOCATION		FLIGHT PHASE	
EXPERIENCE/QUALIFICATION		THE AIRCRAFT		PRE-DEPARTURE <input type="checkbox"/>	TAXI <input type="checkbox"/>
TOTAL YEARS	YEARS WITH CURRENT AIRLINE	TYPE/SERIES		TAKE-OFF/CLIMB <input type="checkbox"/>	DESCENT/LANDING <input type="checkbox"/>
CURRENT AIRCRAFT TYPES QUALIFIED ON:		NUMBER OF CABIN CREW		STAND/GATE ARRIVAL <input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER: <input type="checkbox"/>
1.	2.	3.		TYPE OF OPERATION	
PASSENGER(S)/INJURY(IES)		NUMBER OF PAX ON BOARD		SCHEDULED <input type="checkbox"/>	CHARTER <input type="checkbox"/>
PASSENGER(S) INVOLVED? YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>	NUMBER OF EXITS		CORPORATE <input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER: <input type="checkbox"/>
INJURY TO PASSENGER <input type="checkbox"/>	INJURY TO CREW <input type="checkbox"/>	WEATHER (IF RELEVANT)		REPORT TOPIC	
THE COMPANY		TURBULENCE <input type="checkbox"/>	THUNDERSTORM <input type="checkbox"/>	MY REPORT RELATES TO:	
NAME OF COMPANY:		OTHER:			
		MY MAIN POINTS ARE:			
		A.	B.		

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

Your narrative will be reviewed by a member of the **CHIRP** staff who will remove all information such as dates/locations/names that might identify you. Bear in mind the following topics when preparing your narrative:

Chain of events • Communication • Decision Making • Equipment • Situational Awareness • Weather • Task Allocation • Teamwork • Training

The UK Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme

 PLEASE PLACE THE COMPLETED REPORT FORM, WITH ADDITIONAL PAGES IF REQUIRED, IN A SEALED ENVELOPE (no stamp required) AND SEND TO:

CHIRP • FREEPOST (G13439) • Building Y20E • Room G15 • Cody Technology Park • Ively Road • Farnborough • GU14 0BR • UK
 Confidential Tel (24 hrs): +44 (0) 1252 395013 or **Freefone** (UK only) 0800 214645 and Confidential Fax: +44 (0) 1252 394290

Report forms are also available on the **CHIRP** website: www.chirp.co.uk