


# CHIRP FEEDBACK

Issue No: 33

Autumn 2009

## Most Frequent Cabin Crew Issues Received 12 Months Ending August 2009



- Duty**  
(Rosters/Rostering - 47, Length - 29, Rest - 19, Crewing - 7, Discretion - 4, Disruption - 2)
- Procedures**  
(Use of by Other Party - 12, Inadequate - 9, Incorrect - 1, Knowledge - 1)
- Regulation/Law**  
(Knowledge of - 21, Compliance with - 4)
- Communications - Internal**  
(Team - 21, Managers - 4)
- Company Policies**  
(Operational - 19, Safety Reporting/Culture - 1)
- Pressures**  
(From Management/Supervision - 15, Commercial - 6, Time - 5)
- Works Council Referral**  
(Terms & Conditions/Industrial Relations - 31, Health & Safety - 5)
- Passengers**  
(Behaviour - 4, Compliance with Instructions - 1, Medical Condition - 1)
- Aircraft Technical**  
(Cabin Equipment Deficiencies - 11, Structure - 1, Systems - 1)
- Environment**  
(Extreme Temperature - 3, Air Quality - 2, Noise/Distracton - 2)

required to submit an FTL scheme for approval by the CAA; it is each company's approved FTL Scheme that determines whether a duty sequence can be undertaken. A copy of your company's scheme should be accessible to you.

The following general information is given to assist in understanding some of the FTL principles on which company approved FTL schemes are based; in all cases your company scheme, if different, should be adhered to.

### Approved FTL Schemes and Scheduling Agreements

Approved company FTL schemes detail the maximum flight duty periods (FDPs), duty sequences and minimum rest periods that may be worked without giving rise to an undue level of fatigue; schemes include provision for extending a FDP or reducing a rest period under specific conditions.

Scheduling Agreements (SAs) are industrial relations agreements between a company and a section of its workforce. Extending a SA work pattern has no safety significance provided the pattern is within a company's approved FTL scheme.

### Reporting Fit for Duty

It is every individual's responsibility to report fit to undertake a FDP. A common misunderstanding is that this relates just to the length of the rostered duty; this is not the case; you are responsible to report fit to undertake the maximum FDP permitted by your report time.

(We will continue this topic in the next issue)

## EDITORIAL

### FLIGHT TIME LIMITATIONS - AN EXPLANATION ...

A significant number of the reports we receive involve duty(ies)/Flight Time Limitations (FTLs). From these it is apparent that some cabin crew members do not possess a good understanding of their company FTL scheme.

The FTL Guidelines applicable to holders of Air Operators Certificates issued by the Civil Aviation Authority (Safety Regulation Group) are contained in a CAA publication - CAP 371 - The Avoidance of Fatigue in Aircrew - Guide to Requirements. CAP 371 includes guidelines for both flight crew and cabin crew. It is important to understand that each UK operator is

## REPORTS

**CHIRP Narrative:** We have received a number of reports from cabin crew querying the practice of flight crew rest/napping. Here are two such reports, along with an explanation as to the reasons for this.

### ADDITIONAL FLIGHT CREW REST (1)

**Report Text:** On the inbound flight from AAA (Far East) to BBB (UK) we had four flight crew members. The first two took approximately five hours rest in bunks for the first half of the flight and then the other two went into the crew bunks.

When the Senior Cabin Crew Member (SCCM) returned from their break, they were told by the Senior selected in the briefing to cover SCCMs absence that the flight crew were not to be contacted as they were on controlled rest. This meant that one of the pilots flying

CABIN CREW FEEDBACK is also available on the **CHIRP** website - [www.chirp.co.uk](http://www.chirp.co.uk)

A Cabin Crew Safety Newsletter

from **CHIRP** the Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme

the aircraft was having a sleep whilst the other monitored the flight.

The usual agreement between the flight crew and SCCM with our airline is that the SCCM contacts the pilots at an agreed time to confirm all is well in the cabin and also to confirm the pilots' wellbeing. The pilots are also contacted again some 30 minutes later to confirm the status of the cabins and to confirm any requests the pilots may have i.e. tea or coffee etc.

It was disappointing that the pilots had decided to have a second break as this reduced the pilot cover to 1 out of 4 - it was also not communicated to the SCCM prior to them going on break, had they known this they would have questioned these intentions.

Is it accepted policy that even after having such an extensive break and knowing the extra pilots are carried to allow such extended breaks, that a second break is required leaving minimal cover on such a long sector?

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## (2)

**Report Text:** On a recent long range sector between UK and Far East with four flight crew, the heavy crew returned from their break and the operating crew then went on theirs. Within half an hour the heavy crew who were then on duty advised that they were going onto "controlled rest" and that they would contact us every half an hour.

Whilst I don't want to deprive anyone of a little additional rest, surely this is the reason that we carry four pilots on these flights, so that the two remaining pilots are on duty?

Please let me know if this is allowed since I wouldn't wish to appear mean spirited!

P.S. I realise that controlled rest is allowed on flights with two operating pilots, my query only relates to long range operations with additional pilots.

**CHIRP Comment:** Although bunk rest is scheduled on many long-haul sectors, the significant time zone changes and the effect of these on an individual's normal circadian rhythm (day/night alertness) can prevent some pilots from obtaining good quality rest in a bunk. Some long haul operators roster the 'heavy crew member(s)' in order that those individuals can plan for their period of bunk rest in advance of reporting for duty but others do not.

In either case, if a situation should arise where a pilot is not able to gain adequate rest during their assigned period of bunk rest or an operating pilot feels unduly tired, the pilot-in-command may decide that an individual may take an additional period of Controlled Rest while occupying a flight deck seat as a fatigue management measure. A decision to take Controlled Rest should be communicated to the Senior Cabin Crew Member.

Most, if not all UK operators' SOPs include a flight deck alerting procedure. When Controlled Rest is taken, the alerting procedure remains important. Therefore, if the pilot-in-command elects not to be contacted during Controlled Rest and your company SOPs normally require the cabin crew to contact the flight crew periodically, the pilot-in-command should arrange that the operating pilot contacts a member of the cabin crew

at your company's recommended intervals. If the operating pilot fails to make contact when a call is due, the cabin crew should call the flight crew to confirm that all is well.

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## IMPORTANCE OF DE-ICING ...

**Report Text:** I was flying as a passenger on another (Non-UK EU) airline. My company has a policy that if it is snowing, all aircraft must be de-iced prior to departure.

On the outbound flight we were boarding during a light snow shower and no snow had accumulated on the wings yet the Captain informed us that we would have a delayed departure while we were waiting to be de-iced. However, on the inbound flight the aircraft arrived during a heavy snow flurry which continued whilst we boarded. It continued to snow and ceased shortly before the front and rear doors were closed. We then started to taxi with the snow on the wings.

I was 3 rows behind the overwing exit and noticed that the LHS wing surfaces were covered in snow.



I presumed that based on my experiences with my company and also on the outbound flight that there would be a delay while we were de-iced. After the safety demonstration, I asked the SCCM if it was normal to leave without being de-iced whilst there was snow on the wings?, to which he/she immediately replied without looking at the wing, "The Captain says it's OK" (or words to that effect).

We shortly afterwards entered the runway, accelerated and took-off with the vast majority of the snow remaining coated to the wing. The flight proceeded with no problems although ice remained on the wing in certain areas (see photograph taken 20 mins into flight). The wing was visibly not clear of snow/ice with approximately 10 mins to landing.

I was concerned that the SCCM did not respond to a flight safety observation from a passenger.

It might also be worth noting that the inbound flight was early and we pushed-back approx 10-15 mins early, this meant that sufficient time was available to de-ice without picking-up a delay.

**CHIRP Comment:** This report and accompanying photographs were passed to the operator concerned who confirmed that they operate a 'clear wing' policy and expressed concern that the flight departed with

visible contamination on the wing. The reported response from the SCCM did not appear to take the concerns of a passenger seriously and raises the question as to whether the flight crew were informed of the contamination. It is imperative that if cabin crew see or are advised of any form of contamination on the wing this information is passed to the Captain as soon as possible.

**EU-OPS states that that:**

"cabin crew must be trained in the awareness of the effects of surface contamination; and the need to inform the flight crew of any observed surface contamination"

**The CAA also publishes guidance on Winter Operations for UK operators; which states:**

'To ensure the aerodynamic integrity of an aircraft, the wing, tailplane and other surfaces need to be kept free of frost, snow and ice...'

**CHIRP** has distributed copies of this photograph to a number of UK operators who will be using it in their forthcoming Winter Operations Training and for use in their cabin safety newsletters. If your company would like to use the photograph in training, they may do so, acknowledging **CHIRP** as the source.

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### DOOR ARMING/DISARMING

**Report Text:** My employer has recently undergone a merger and inherited the A### aircraft type. The exit configuration on these aircraft is different to the company's other types in that it has four pairs of floor level exits. One crewmember is responsible for each opposite pair of doors, with the extra crewmember having no door responsibility.

My issue is with the current procedure for placing the doors to manual mode/disarming. Previously, the doors were placed into automatic mode when the aircraft began to move and, similarly, they were placed into manual mode just before the aircraft stopped, on the command of the flight crew.

The revised procedure is as follows:

- 1) Doors armed as soon as the airbridge/steps are removed. This is achieved by the SCCM calling all stations and giving the instruction to "Arm doors for departure."
- 2) The SCCM places another all-station call, at which each station in turn responds "Doors X are armed."
- 3) The SCCM confirms that Doors 1 are armed and the forward attendant panel confirms that all doors are armed.
- 4) Disarming is triggered by the seatbelt sign being extinguished on arrival at a parking stand. Once the sign is extinguished, the SCCM makes the PA: "Disarm doors for arrival."
- 5) The reporting procedure for disarming is the same as for arming.

My concerns are as follows:

- 1) There is no confirmation that all crew members have answered the all-station call where the arming command is issued.
- 2) On disarming, the passengers seated next to the mid-cabin doors (2 & 3) will often stand as soon as the

seatbelt signs are switched off. This creates difficulty in reaching the door which is to be disarmed, and causes quite a distraction as passengers will often speak with you or use their mobile telephones etc.

While we are often reminded of the importance of concentrating on this task, it is easy to see how one's mind could wander. On the A### family, it is very easy to open a door and deploy the slide inadvertently as the opening lever moves in the same direction as the mode selection lever moves to go into disarmed mode.

Lessons Learned: I believe, in the interests of safety, for crew, passengers and ground staff, that the procedure for door mode selection should be revised to minimise any distractions and allow crew the space to carry out this task.

**CHIRP** Comment: The revised procedures are in accordance with CAA Guidance Material to Operators (CAP 768) which states:

"Evacuation slides should be armed as soon as obstructions to their deployment (steps, jetties etc) are removed and clear. Slides should remain armed after landing until arrival 'on stand'. Cabin crew should be aware of the dangers of accidental deployment.

This report was raised with the operator concerned who confirmed that the matter had been discussed at length. In order to minimise the risk of inadvertent slide deployment, it was decided to adopt a standard procedure across all fleets. Also, acknowledging the dangers associated with inadvertent slide deployment the operator conducted a safety campaign to highlight the problem to cabin crew.

Finally, if passengers are blocking the exits when the doors are required to be disarmed, cabin crew must be proactive in managing the situation. Often instructing passengers to remain seated immediately prior to door disarming via the PA proves to be beneficial.

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### PASSENGERS PLEASE REMAIN SEATED

**Report Text:** After every flight, we are required to place our doors to manual just as the aircraft is making its final turn onto stand. The pilot makes the call "cabin crew doors to manual". The SCCM then makes the attendant call allowing a 'ding ding' sound throughout our aircraft. I understand the SCCM needs to know the doors have been placed in manual but as soon as passengers hear the 'ding ding' they assume that the seat belt signs have been switched off and thus rush to stand-up, open overhead lockers and take their bags down. The aircraft brakes are then engaged and throw pax and their bags around. This is dangerous and potentially a safety risk for those passengers still seated.

Can we amend our policy to do the door checks only once the aircraft has finally stopped?

**CHIRP** Comment: The CAA permits operators the flexibility to develop their own arming/disarming procedures (CAP 768 Guidance to Operators refers). All procedures will have been observed and accepted by the CAA, as is the case in this report. Again, good passenger management by the cabin crew is essential when carrying out this critical safety duty.

# CHIRP

## CABIN CREW REPORT FORM

**CHIRP** is totally independent of the Civil Aviation Authority and any Airline

Name: <input type="checkbox"/> Indicates Mandatory Fields	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Your personal details are required only to enable us to contact you for further details about any part of your report. Please do not submit anonymous reports.</li> <li>2. On closing, this Report Form will be returned to you. <b>NO RECORD OF YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS WILL BE KEPT</b></li> <li>3. <b>CHIRP</b> is a reporting programme for safety-related issues. We regret we are unable to accept reports that relate to industrial relations issues.</li> </ol>
Address: <input type="checkbox"/>	
Post Code <input type="checkbox"/> Tel: <input type="checkbox"/>	
e-mail: <input type="checkbox"/>	

<b>It is CHIRP policy to acknowledge a report on receipt and then to provide a comprehensive closing response, if required. If you do not require a closing response please tick the box:</b>	No. I do not require a response from <b>CHIRP</b> <input type="checkbox"/>
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**PLEASE COMPLETE RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVENT/SITUATION**

YOURSELF - CREW POSITION	THE FLIGHT/EVENT	CABIN ACTIVITY
CABIN CREW IN-CHARGE <input type="checkbox"/> SENIOR CABIN CREW <input type="checkbox"/> CABIN CREW <input type="checkbox"/> SUPERNUMERARY <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER:	DATE OF INCIDENT TIME LOCAL/GMT AIRCRAFT LOCATION	BOARDING <input type="checkbox"/> INFLIGHT SERVICE <input type="checkbox"/> DISEMBARKING <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER:
<b>EXPERIENCE/QUALIFICATION</b>	<b>THE AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>FLIGHT PHASE</b>
TOTAL YEARS      YEARS WITH CURRENT AIRLINE <b>CURRENT AIRCRAFT TYPES QUALIFIED ON:</b> 1.                      2.                      3.	TYPE/SERIES NUMBER OF CABIN CREW NUMBER OF PAX ON BOARD NUMBER OF EXITS	PRE-DEPARTURE <input type="checkbox"/> TAXI <input type="checkbox"/> TAKE-OFF/CLIMB <input type="checkbox"/> DESCENT/LANDING <input type="checkbox"/> STAND/GATE ARRIVAL <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER:
<b>PASSENGER(S)/INJURY(IES)</b>	<b>WEATHER (IF RELEVANT)</b>	<b>TYPE OF OPERATION</b>
PASSENGER(S) INVOLVED? YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> INJURY TO PASSENGER <input type="checkbox"/> INJURY TO CREW	TURBULENCE <input type="checkbox"/> THUNDERSTORM <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER:	SCHEDULED <input type="checkbox"/> CHARTER <input type="checkbox"/> CORPORATE <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER:
<b>THE COMPANY</b>	<b>REPORT TOPIC / MY REPORT RELATES TO:</b>	<b>MY MAIN POINTS ARE:</b>
NAME OF COMPANY:		A:
		B:
		C:

**DESCRIPTION OF EVENT**

Your narrative will be reviewed by a member of the **CHIRP** staff who will remove all information such as dates/locations/names that might identify you. Bear in mind the following topics when preparing your narrative:

Chain of events • Communication • Decision Making • Equipment • Situational Awareness • Weather • Task Allocation • Teamwork • Training

**continue on a separate piece of paper, if necessary**