

CHIRP FEEDBACK

Issue No: 37

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CHIRP - NEW ADDRESS

Please note that at the end of October 2010, CHIRP is moving to a new office in Farnborough.

Our new address is: **26 Hercules Way, Farnborough GU14 6UU**, our UK reporters can use our FREEPOST address below.

Our **Freefone** telephone number and e-mail address will remain unchanged.

EDITORIAL

EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION

A number of cabin crew reports submitted to CHIRP highlight the importance of maintaining effective communication between the cabin crew as a team and also between cabin crew and flight crew. Reporters from both communities, involving several operators, have expressed concerns that a breakdown in Crew Resource Management (CRM) can dissuade individuals from raising safety-related issues with their SCCM, the flight crew and, on some occasions, with their company. Also, of greater concern is that a lack of communication can adversely affect on-board safety. **Effective communication is a key part of good CRM.**

Here are some examples of concerns that have been raised by cabin crew in relation to poor communication:

- Cabin crew not seeing the flight crew until boarding the crew bus downroute.
- Crew - flight *and/or* cabin - not introducing themselves during pre-flight briefings, compounded by use of separate hotels downroute. One reporter commented that "It is possible to do a whole trip and have no idea what the flight crew look like."
- Cabin crew trying to get to the flight deck to introduce themselves before departure, however, "this is not always possible when fully involved in boarding the aircraft."

And finally:

- "The flight crew seemed to be a bit busy and went straight to the flight deck without introducing themselves or saying 'hello' ... When we landed and disembarked there was no goodbye from the flight crew. I know CRM goes both ways, but in this case we were at the aircraft doing our jobs when the flight crew arrived."

Whilst it is important to remember that effective communication is a 'two-way street'; positive CRM also

requires an understanding of each other's roles along with professional courtesy. Cabin crew often expect the flight crew to introduce themselves and to keep them fully informed; however, sometimes circumstances might preclude flight crew being able to do so and vice versa.

Everybody has a responsibility to keep their colleagues up-to-speed on situations within the cabin. Similarly, it is rarely the case that there is no opportunity to briefly introduce yourself to the flight crew, even if it is not possible during the pre-flight briefing process. It is often easier for arriving crew members (flight crew or cabin crew) to introduce themselves to those already present. Everybody should be encouraged to make a positive effort to contribute to good CRM.

In the event of an incident arising, effective communication is often the key to a successful and expeditious outcome

FLIGHT DECK ACCESS

Report Text: Full [longhaul] flight. All seats were occupied with revenue pax and so the Captain released all jump seats in the cabin to those on staff travel. Two jump seats are available in the premium cabin; a retired Captain and his wife were given these two jump seats. During the busy boarding process the operating Captain came out to meet the retired Captain and then escorted him onto the flight deck where he then remained until we arrived on stand in the UK.

On at least two occasions when the cabin crew visited the flight deck they discovered the retired Captain was using the flight crew bunks, within the flight deck for the duration of the cruise.

My concern is that of safety. We have procedures that need to be followed in the event of an emergency should crew rest areas be occupied ie. decompression etc. As cabin crew my understanding of all crew rest areas is that they can only be used by operating crew.

CHIRP Comment: **EU-OPS 1.100 (a) states that no person other than a flight crew member assigned to a flight is admitted to, or carried in, the flight deck unless**

CABIN CREW FEEDBACK is also available on the **CHIRP** website - www.chirp.co.uk

A Cabin Crew Safety Newsletter

from **CHIRP** the Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme

FREEPOST RSKS-KSCA-SSAT, The CHIRP Charitable Trust, 26 Hercules Way, Farnborough GU14 6UU

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that person is: 1. An operating crewmember; 2. A representative of the CAA or 3. A person permitted by, and carried in accordance with instructions contained in the Operations Manual. Whilst the final decision regarding the admission to the flight deck shall be the responsibility of the commander, EU-OPS 1.100 (c) permits the Captain to refuse travel to the categories stated in EU-OPS 1.100 (a). This requirement is not intended to allow the Captain to permit other categories of people admission to the flight deck. This is supported by the UK DfT Direction, which does not permit the Captain to permit additional categories of people admission to the flight deck. The use of crew rest areas should only be permitted in accordance with procedures in the operator's Operations Manual.

EXCESS CABIN BAGGAGE AND POSITIVE CRM

Report Text: I am writing to you as I feel that my company has little regard to safety when it comes to hand baggage on certain flights. This flight was completely full and with most passengers carrying at least 2 large trolley cases - we had nearly 200 pieces of baggage that needed to be stowed - as this was not possible, bags were stowed in "wrong" areas that are not really suitable for the stowage of bags.

The SCCM was excellent and warned the ground staff before boarding that they would not accept high volumes of cabin baggage. Once again this fell on deaf ears.

Whilst boarding, both aisles were full of baggage which we had no place to stow and any precautionary disembarkation would NOT have been possible!

The company constantly put timekeeping ahead of safety. When the SCCM asked the ground staff to stow bags in the hold, they were informed that the hold had been closed and this was not possible, then, without even asking the SCCM the door was closed and the jetty removed, without any consultation with cabin crew. At this point both aisles were still full with bags and passengers and the flight crew were ready to push the aircraft back! With luck and due to great communication between the SCCM and flight crew the flight crew delayed push back until all bags were stowed.

CHIRP Comment: This report confirms the importance of good communication between both the flight crew and cabin crew, as mentioned in the Editorial on Page 1, otherwise flight crew might be unaware of the situation within the cabin during boarding, particularly on short turnarounds and when subject to on time performance pressures which can dictate early hold closure procedures. Positive cabin management by the cabin crew can often recognise potential problems (such as particular routes) and advise all parties concerned, often before a situation occurs.

MANAGEMENT OF CABIN BAGGAGE

Report Text: We have been told to convince passengers to stow their luggage under seats, this consists of handbags, plastic bags, jackets, coats etc, with exception of passengers seated in the overwing exits.

We are 'encouraged' to remove bags from the hatbins and ask passengers to stow them under their seat and not to offload bags from the aircraft.

I fly a lot with other airlines and notice that they always request passengers to stow the bags in the overhead locker, and I indeed think that this is much safer.

Sometimes when securing the cabin before departure we find that passengers have their big trolleys between their legs, as the hatbins are completely full and there is no way they can fit in.

I think in case of an emergency, the evacuation will slow down, due to all these bags, and items under the seats, or even hinder passengers to escape from their seated position.

I am also wondering, how much weight our hatbins can resist? I assure you that none of the cabin baggage a passenger brings on board is less than 10kg!

I think it's much safer to stow all big bags and loose items in the overhead locker (that's why they are there), as in an emergency landing all these items will move around and could block exits.

CHIRP Comment: This operator has introduced a procedure to alleviate problems caused by excess cabin baggage. As long as a restraint bar is present under the passenger seat and the item being stowed does not protrude into the aisle/obstruct those seated in that row, this is an approved stowage (a stowage designed to prevent movement) - particularly for smaller heavy items. However, items such as large wheelie bags and oversized items which could cause an obstruction should not be stowed under a passenger seat; if such items do not fit in the overhead bin or have not been 'caught' by staff at the gate and no approved stowage can be found for them, then these items should be re-directed to the hold. Cabin baggage policies are operator specific but must remain compliant with regulatory requirements.

CONCERNS OF BOTTLENECK AT REAR EXIT

Report Text: We have recently acquired a number of aircraft. One aircraft in particular has caused a number of my colleagues many concerns with regard to its rear galley/door access should an emergency evacuation occur. We are also concerned with the number of cart stowages. Both rear doors are obstructed by cart stowages and both doors' 'dedicated assist space' areas are badly compromised.

The entrance from the aisle and cabin area into the galley also appears to be very narrow and would most definitely cause a 'bottleneck' to form during an evacuation. Cabin crew who work in this rear galley often voice their concerns regarding the lack of space and close proximity of their jump seats to that of the forward facing galley stowages.

This aircraft is catered with half carts, and in the majority of these stowages (designed predominantly for full carts) there appears to be no locking mechanism to hold the rear half cart in position whilst in its stowage (it is not unusual to remove the front cart and the second to follow rapidly!)

There are 'drop down' oven doors which cabin crew must reach across in order to obtain access to meal

racks inside, again totally inappropriate in the area provided.

If at all possible I would appreciate your views on these items.

CHIRP Comment: When an aircraft interior is configured or modified, it is approved by the CAA. The aircraft referred to in this report had a different galley layout to others in the fleet. The operator's Quality Department has confirmed that the galley layout of this aircraft, including access to exits and assist space meets regulatory requirements. However, all stowages should be marked both with their maximum weight allowance and the type of equipment to be stowed within. It is unlikely that it is acceptable to stow two half carts in a stowage designed only for a full cart and the operator should ensure that all catering equipment is stowed in accordance with placarded instructions.

USE OF EXTENSION BELTS ON CREW SEATS AND AT OVERWING EXITS

Report Text: I was wondering if you would be able to assist with a query I have regarding crew seats.

On one of our aircraft's double crew seats located at D#R, the seatbelt consists of a lap belt and shoulder harness and appears to be shorter than other seats on the aircraft.

What is the policy regarding wearing extension seatbelts as crew in those seats? Also my company allows passengers to wear the extension seatbelts which are located in an emergency exit row, providing they are fit and able bodied.

With this in mind, are there any regulations in place from the CAA preventing crew to do this?

CHIRP Comment: Whilst there is no specific regulation that bars the use of an extension seat belt on a crew seat, there has been no research or testing to determine its compatibility with a full harness. In addition, an extension seat belt would not be compatible with a full harness on all aircraft types. It is the view of the CAA that extension seat belts should not be used on crew seats. Whilst there is no CAA guidance on the use of extension seat belts at an overwing exit, the CHIRP Cabin Crew Advisory Board discussed the matter in detail. It was suggested that the use of extension seat belts at an overwing exit should be discouraged as their use could result in a trip hazard should a non-routine disembarkation be required. In addition, obese passengers are one of the categories of passengers who are not permitted to occupy seats that permit direct access to an exit. Some operators therefore consider that if a passenger requires an extension seat belt, they are not suitable to sit in an exit row seat.

MISSING DOOR PIN

Report Text: We took over the aircraft downroute at AAA(Eu). The previous crew had reported that they had left base missing the pin from D#R. We have always been taught the arming procedure is PIN LEVER PIN.

The Captain told us the pin was missing ex base and the crew did not realise until they pushed back. However

this pin provides reassurances that the slide will not be inadvertently deployed, as it is easy to knock the arming lever to automatic from manual without the arming pin being in place.

Why was this aircraft ever allowed to leave base without this.... surely it is a no go item?

Lessons Learned: Should the aircraft not have returned to stand ex base to have another arming pin bought up by engineering?

CHIRP Comment: Whilst a missing door pin is not likely to be an airworthiness issue that would prevent an aircraft's dispatch, it should be recorded in the Cabin Defects Log. By recording the issue in the Cabin Defects Log it will permit the SCCM to be aware and determine/agree alternative procedures with the cabin crew. All crew should be made aware of the missing pin and be particularly careful when arming/disarming the door.

THAT TIME OF YEAR IS APPROACHING

Report Text: Our flight to AAA(Eu) was already an hour late when we boarded at BBB(UK). The flight crew met us on the jetty and said, "Let's just get there and get back". They had been hanging around to finish their day and appeared worried that adverse weather at BBB and AAA would delay us further.

I was working at the rear and was getting in the cleaners' way so stepped off the plane and very quickly noticed what to me seemed like a rather severe amount of ice on the horizontal stabiliser. It was on the leading edges, thick and covered the whole length of it. I notified the SCCM on the PA and requested that a pilot to come and inspect this.

The First Officer returned from the walk around and was asked by the Captain to come and look at it. The First Officer came to the rear galley looking flustered and briefly looked out onto the stabiliser. They quickly dismissed the ice saying it was "plus six degrees and it will melt before we get airborne" and walked off. Concerned with this I said I thought they should look at the other side but that was it.

It started to snow again outside for a few minutes, then stopped. We departed after a short taxi. It was not snowing on landing but the Captain did the walk around and felt we had picked up a lot of ice during the flight and requested de-icing ...

My main concern here is the lack of attention being paid to a genuine and serious concern because of what seemed like an obsession not to get further delayed and just get home.

CHIRP Comment: It is the aircraft commander's responsibility to ensure that the aircraft is clear of ice/snow before flight, except in those defined areas of the wing where the aircraft manufacturer permits frost to be present due to cold-soaked fuel.

No contaminant is permitted on the tail and flying control surfaces.

The reporter is to be congratulated for acting correctly on noticing the ice, which should have been removed before departure.

CHIRP

CABIN CREW REPORT FORM

CHIRP is totally independent of the Civil Aviation Authority and any Airline

Name: <input type="checkbox"/> Indicates Mandatory Fields	1. Your personal details are required only to enable us to contact you for further details about any part of your report. Please do not submit anonymous reports. 2. On closing, this Report Form will be returned to you. NO RECORD OF YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS WILL BE KEPT 3. CHIRP is a reporting programme for safety-related issues. We regret we are unable to accept reports that relate to industrial relations issues.
Address: <input type="checkbox"/>	
Post Code <input type="checkbox"/> Tel: <input type="checkbox"/>	
e-mail: <input type="checkbox"/>	

It is **CHIRP** policy to acknowledge a report on receipt and then to provide a comprehensive closing response, if required. If you do not require a closing response please tick the box: No. I do not require a response from **CHIRP**

PLEASE COMPLETE RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVENT/SITUATION

YOURSELF - CREW POSITION			THE FLIGHT/EVENT		CABIN ACTIVITY	
SCCM <input type="checkbox"/>	CABIN CREW <input type="checkbox"/>		DATE OF INCIDENT		BOARDING <input type="checkbox"/>	INFLIGHT SERVICE <input type="checkbox"/>
SUPERNUMERARY <input type="checkbox"/>			TIME	LOCAL/GMT	DISEMBARKING <input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER: <input type="checkbox"/>
OTHER:			AIRCRAFT LOCATION		FLIGHT PHASE	
EXPERIENCE/QUALIFICATION			THE AIRCRAFT		PRE-DEPARTURE <input type="checkbox"/>	TAXI <input type="checkbox"/>
TOTAL YEARS	YEARS WITH CURRENT AIRLINE		TYPE/SERIES		TAKE-OFF/CLIMB <input type="checkbox"/>	DESCENT/LANDING <input type="checkbox"/>
CURRENT AIRCRAFT TYPES QUALIFIED ON:			NUMBER OF CABIN CREW		STAND/GATE ARRIVAL <input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER: <input type="checkbox"/>
1.	2.	3.	NUMBER OF PAX ON BOARD		TYPE OF OPERATION	
PASSENGER(S)/INJURY(IES)			NUMBER OF EXITS		SCHEDULED <input type="checkbox"/>	CHARTER <input type="checkbox"/>
PASSENGER(S) INVOLVED? YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>		WEATHER (IF RELEVANT)		CORPORATE <input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER: <input type="checkbox"/>
INJURY TO PASSENGER <input type="checkbox"/>	INJURY TO CREW <input type="checkbox"/>		TURBULENCE <input type="checkbox"/>	THUNDERSTORM <input type="checkbox"/>	My MAIN POINTS ARE:	
THE COMPANY			OTHER:		A:	
NAME OF COMPANY:			REPORT TOPIC / MY REPORT RELATES TO:		B:	
					C:	

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

Your narrative will be reviewed by a member of the **CHIRP** staff who will remove all information such as dates/locations/names that might identify you. Bear in mind the following topics when preparing your narrative:

Chain of events • Communication • Decision Making • Equipment • Situational Awareness • Weather • Task Allocation • Teamwork • Training

continue on a separate piece of paper, if necessary



PLEASE PLACE THE COMPLETED REPORT FORM, WITH ADDITIONAL PAGES IF REQUIRED, IN A SEALED ENVELOPE TO:

FREEPOST RSKS-KSCA-SSAT • The CHIRP Charitable Trust • 26 Hercules Way • Farnborough • GU14 6UU • UK (no stamp required if posted in the UK)

Confidential Tel: +44 (0) 1252 378947 or **Freefone** (UK only) 0800 214645 and Confidential Fax: +44 (0) 1252 378940

Report forms are also available on the **CHIRP** website: www.chirp.co.uk