CABIN CREW

CHIRP CC FEEDBACK

Issue No: 42

1/2012

Most Frequent Cabin Crew Issues Received 12 Months Ending November 2011



Duty
(Rosters/Rostering, Length, Rest, Discretion, Crewing)
Works Council Referral
(T&C/Industrial Relations, Health & Safety)
Company Policies
(Operational)
Procedures
(Application/Use Of, Knowledge, Incorrect/Conflicting, Inadequate)
Communications - Internal
(Team/Shift/Watch, Managers)
Regulation/Law
(Knowledge Of, Compliance With)
Aircraft Technical
(Cabin Equipment Deficiencies)
Training
(Inadequate Staff Training, Inadequate Spec/Reqs)
Pressure
(Commercial, From Management/Supervision, Time)
Fatigue
(Effects Of, Management Of)

EDITORIAL

SUSPICIOUS ITEMS: REMAIN VIGILANT

CHIRP has received several reports in the recent past where suspicious items have been discovered by cabin crew on board an aircraft. Whilst on closer inspection the items had been determined to be innocuous, it was in no small part due to the vigilance of the cabin crew and the speed and efficiency of their actions that these items were discovered quickly.

Our policy is not to publish any reports which relate to on board security for obvious reasons. Notwithstanding this it is important that cabin crew remain vigilant at all times; there is no room for complacency. It is also imperative that search and check procedures, as laid down by your company, are adhered to at all times.

It has been a long time since a major security incident has occurred on board a UK registered aircraft; by

remaining alert to all possibilities you can ensure that this remains the case for the foreseeable future.

PUSH-BACK 'WITH CARE'

Report Text: The dispatcher was rushing to close the door in order to meet punctuality targets and as soon as the door closed we started to push-back off stand. I had advised the flight crew that we were OK for baggage space but it was clear the pax were still standing, bags still had to be stowed and lockers were open when the flight deck door shut from the inside.

I called the Captain when push-back had started to tell him of the situation and his reply was that push-back would continue 'with care'. I had always assumed pushback was undertaken 'with care' as a matter of course.

CHIRP Comment: An aircraft must not taxi with passengers that are still standing. EU-OPS 1.320 (b) (1) states:

Before take-off and landing, and during taxiing, and whenever deemed necessary in the interest of safety, the commander shall ensure that each passenger on board occupies a seat or berth with his/her safety belt, or harness where provided, properly secured.

As regards the Captain's statement that push-back would continue with care, this may not always be possible, particularly when the aircraft is under the control of a tug driver. Whoever is in control of the aircraft during taxi cannot guarantee that an unforeseen event involving ramp personnel, a ground vehicle or another aircraft might cause the tug driver or pilot to brake without warning. In such a situation, the risk of injury to passengers who are still standing or from items falling from lockers that are still open is obvious.

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE DENIED

Report Text: A passenger asked for sick bags during boarding, as they were feeling unwell due to a reaction to an insect bite.

After take-off and once the seatbelt signs had been switched off, the passenger was moved to an empty row so they could rest. The passenger became violently sick and was unable to move to get to the toilet. The passenger continued to vomit for around 30 minutes, was very pale, shaking and appeared very weak.

The SCCM spoke to the Captain and it was decided to make a PA for a medically qualified person on board. A nurse made themselves known; they advised that no diversion was necessary as the passenger had now stopped vomiting but as they were still very weak further medical assistance should be provided on the ground.

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Accordingly, this was requested by the Captain 30 minutes prior to landing [UK regional airport].

After we landed and parked on stand the aircraft was met by the ground staff and the Fire Safety Duty Manager who advised that no ambulance would be sent as the medical situation was not of a high enough priority. The nurse advised that the passenger needed further medical assistance; the request was ignored by the Manager who insisted that the situation was not serious enough.

The Captain was informed of the situation and insisted that an ambulance be sent, the Manager was adamant that there would be no ambulance but eventually a call was made to the Control Centre and a medic finally arrived, approx 30 minutes after landing. The paramedics advised that the passenger should be taken to A&E to be seen by a doctor.

CHIRP Comment: The crew in this report should be praised for their actions and handling of the above incident.

It is not unusual for a representative of the Airport Fire Service to attend an on-board medical incident once an aircraft has landed, hence the Fire Safety Duty Manager's attendance. It is relevant to note that some members of the Fire Service also undergo training as paramedics. However, whilst a passenger is on board the aircraft, he/she is the responsibility of the airline. Consequently, it is not the decision of a member of the Fire Service or ground staff to determine whether a passenger should or should not receive medical attention. This responsibility is that of the aircraft commander as EU-OPS 1.085 (f) (1) clearly states:

The commander shall be responsible for the safety of all crew members, passengers and cargo on board, as soon as he/she arrives on board, until he/she leaves the aeroplane at the end of the flight.

In this particular incident, it was regrettable that the advice of the nurse was ignored; however, the Captain's subsequent request for medical assistance should have been complied with.

This incident has been referred to the airport authority concerned.

UNUSUAL NOISE PRIOR TO TAKE-OFF

Report Text: On push-back we commenced the safety briefing. The engines were started during the safety briefing and very soon afterwards they began emitting an unusually loud humming noise which was apparent on both sides but more pronounced on the right-hand-side of the aircraft. The noise was loud enough to cause one or two passengers to put their fingers in their ears and it was something which I had not experienced before. Another colleague at the rear of the aircraft also thought it was unusual and the noise continued when the aircraft was taxiing.

I phoned the SCCM and advised them of the noise and was advised that they could not phone the flight deck at this time. I suggested that it might be prudent to do so immediately, and called again after a minute or so as the noise was still there. I was advised that my information was passed to the flight crew and they commented that they could also hear a slight noise at the front of the aircraft. However they did not have any indications on their controls that anything was amiss.

After the safety briefing had finished the noise was still very audible so I called the SCCM again to tell them. The SCCM said that the flight crew were not too worried but would monitor the situation and that I should let either the SCCM or flight crew know if the noise was still there after take-off. At no point did the flight crew come down to the back of the aircraft or call me on my interphone to talk things through with me. The SCCM did not come down to the rear of the aircraft either. The noise continued for virtually all of the taxiing.

During the flight I chatted to the SCCM and the First Officer about the incident and this helped to allay my concerns. The SCCM told me exactly what had been said by the flight crew and why they had not been concerned. The First Officer explained that the technical nature of this aircraft type enables engineering back at Base to know in advance when an engine may be about to have a problem - another reason why they were not concerned. I did ask if the flight crew would ever consider coming down to listen to the noise but I was informed that, in this instance, they probably wouldn't.

I was reassured by some of the First Officer's comments on the technical explanations but I did think three hours into the flight and not prior to take-off may have been a little late!

Suggestion for the future would be to request that the flight crew, as a bare minimum, call the person who has reported the incident to ask them more direct questions, particularly when the incident is occurring at the rear of the aircraft. To be fair this has always happened in the past and I believe this is another reason why I became so frustrated on this occasion.

CHIRP Comment: One of the elements of CRM training is to gather as much information as possible as part of the problem-solving process. The SCCM plays an important part in this process, both in ensuring that accurate information is passed to the flight crew and in disseminating information from the flight crew to all members of their team.

There are a variety of noises - such as door seal leaks, changes in engine bleed off-takes, standby hydraulic pumps etc., with which flight crew members are familiar but which might not be known to all cabin crew members. Therefore, it is important that concerns raised by cabin crew about 'strange noises' are acknowledged and, when appropriate, investigated. Appropriate feedback is also important to alleviate any fears that an individual might have.

In this particular case, the noise concerned is a known characteristic of the engines when starting in some ambient conditions. It is important to remember that the flight crew have many engine parameters/warnings available through their instrument displays which are monitored carefully at all times. On this occasion, all the indications were normal but, unfortunately, it would appear that the reporter was not informed of this.

Cabin crew should be encouraged to report any unusual noises to the SCCM, who may be able to assist directly or report the matter to the flight crew.

CHIRP CABIN CREW REPORT FORM

CHIRP is totally independent of the Civil Aviation Authority and any Airline

Name: Address:	Indicates Mandatory Fields	 Your personal details are required only to enable us to contact you for further details about any part of your report. Please do not submit anonymous reports. On closing, this Report Form will be returned to you. No Record OF Your NAME AND ADDRESS WILL BE KEPT
Post Code	Tel:	3. CHIRP is a reporting programme for safety-related issues. We regret we are unable to accept reports that
e-mail:		relate to industrial relations issues.

It is *CHIRP* policy to acknowledge a report on receipt and then to provide a comprehensive closing response, if required. If you do not require a closing response please tick the box:

No. I do not require a response from *CHIRP*

PLEASE COMPLETE RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVENT/SITUATION

YOURSELF - CREW POSITION					THE FLIGHT/EVENT		CABIN ACTIVITY		
SCCM		CABIN	CREW		DATE OF INCIDENT		BOARDING	□ INFLIGHT SERVICE □	
SUPERNUMERARY					Тіме	LOCAL/GMT	DISEMBARKING	□ OTHER:	
OTHER:					AIRCRAFT LOCATION		FL	IGHT PHASE	
EXPERIENCE/QUALIFICATION					THE AIRCRAFT		PRE-DEPARTURE		
TOTAL YEARS	TOTAL YEARS YEARS WITH CURRENT AIRLINE		TYPE/SERIES		TAKE-OFF/CLIMB				
CURRENT /	CURRENT AIRCRAFT TYPES QUALIFIED ON:			NUMBER OF CABIN CREW		STAND/GATE ARRIVAL DOTHER:			
1.	2.		3.		NUMBER OF PAX ON BOARD)	TYPE OF OPERATION		
Pas	SSENGER(S)/	'INJURY(IES)		NUMBER OF EXITS		Scheduled Charter		
PASSENGER(S) INVOLVED? YES NO				WEATHER (IF RELEVANT)		CORPORATE	□ OTHER:		
INJURY TO PASSENGER INJURY TO CREW			TURBULENCE T		MY MAIN POINTS ARE:				
THE COMPANY			Other: A:						
NAME OF COMPANY:				REPORT TOPIC / MY R	MY REPORT RELATES TO: B:				
							C:		

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

Your narrative will be reviewed by a member of the CHIRP staff who will remove all information such as dates/locations/names that might identify you. Bear in mind the following topics when preparing your narrative:

Chain of events • Communication • Decision Making • Equipment • Situational Awareness • Weather • Task Allocation • Teamwork • Training

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PLEASE PLACE THE COMPLETED REPORT FORM, WITH ADDITIONAL PAGES IF REQUIRED, IN A SEALED ENVELOPE TO:

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LESSONS LEARNED

Describe the lessons learned as a result of the incident. Do you have any suggestions to prevent a similar event?

The UK Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme

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