




SUBMIT A REPORT

CHIRP always protects the identity of our reporters. All personal details are deleted from our system once a report is completed.

ONLINE

Reports can be submitted easily through our encrypted online form www.chirp.co.uk/aviation/submit-a-report



Report it, to sort it

Report your concerns to CHIRP

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Jennifer Curran
Cabin Crew Programme Manager

In July 2001, the CHIRP (Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme) cabin crew programme was launched. Among the initial reports received was one titled 'Pressure to Operate', alongside others such as 'Long Duty Day', 'Sickness in Cabin Crew', and 'Intimidation by Management'. Twenty-three years later, has anything changed in aviation?

We are human, and the challenges faced by cabin crew persist; shift working, eating at irregular times, resting in unfamiliar hotel rooms etc. remain; as humans we are susceptible to things such as stress, fatigue, pressure, and distraction —

just four of the most recognised twelve elements that contribute to human errors and can act as precursors to accidents or incidents.

So what can we do to help ourselves and being human? How can we prevent the holes in James Reason's Swiss Cheese Model from lining up? We can submit safety-related reports! Report your concerns, whether it's something that has happened or may happen report it, CHIRPs motto is 'You report it, we help sort it' but that also goes for reporting internally to your company. How can an operator know of a potential safety concern if no-one is telling them about it? Absence

management programmes, temporary contracts, probation periods, and pay deductions are often cited as reasons why cabin crew members hesitate to report their safety concerns as well as illness and/or fatigue. Without reporting safety concerns, mishaps, and near-misses, nothing is likely to change. Operators rely on safety reports for their safety management systems (SMS) to function effectively, it lets them know what is happening out on the line, just as they need fatigue reports to identify roster stability and if certain routes are contributing to crew fatigue.

Remember, *any* crew member can report a safety concern internally (or to CHIRP); it is not restricted to just senior cabin crew and pilots. Some SMS don't send a response to a report, which is not unusual, but this does not mean your concerns are being ignored or that nothing will change. A decline in reports could signal to your operator that a safety concern has been resolved. If you are still concerned, report it. If you don't feel able to, we are here for you and are ready to receive your report.

Maintaining a just culture of reporting is crucial for ongoing safety improvements. Encouraging open communication and addressing the root causes—such as fatigue, stress, and the reluctance to report illness — will lead to a safer, healthier working environment for everyone onboard.

Stay safe,

Jennifer Curran

Engineering Editorial

CHIRP has received a number of reports where the auxiliary power unit (APU) has been inoperative in a hot location. If you don't know, the APU is a small engine, almost always at the very back of the aircraft on larger jet aircraft. It supplies air and electrical power when the engines are not operating. For Turboprop aircraft, an engine can be left running on a turnround whilst the propeller is held still by a braking system negating the need for an APU, this is also a safety feature to ensure the safety of ground handling staff. Whilst it is allowable for an aircraft to be dispatched with an unserviceable APU, it does put demands on the Operations Department, pressures on the Cabin Crew and concerns for passenger welfare and safety due to the heat within the cabin. There are mitigations for an unserviceable APU, external air conditioning units (if available) pre-cool the air and pump it straight into the fuselage bypassing the aircraft air conditioning systems, however, some airports do not have this provision. Alternatively, an Air Start Unit (ASU) which will be required for engine start at departure anyway, can with certain limitations (noise and night time permits) to running periods and output, supply compressed air to the aircraft air

conditioning systems. Electrical power ideally will be supplied by Fixed Electrical Ground Power (FEGP) or a diesel mobile Ground Power Unit (GPU). The Operations Department should plan and provide these resources even if it means contracting them in from a supplier or another operator, however, this is not always available depending on airport or a last minute aircraft swap as arrangements need to be made in advance for this, both at base and every line station. Even if the aircraft is towed to a remote stand prior to departure, the ground equipment still needs to be made available, unless an engine can be used on the remote stand to supply air to the air conditioning of the aircraft, or in a best-case scenario, Operations should change the roster for the aircraft and send an aircraft with a serviceable APU to hot destinations.

Additionally, your company procedures should give guidance on keeping the aircraft as cool as possible. Keeping window blinds closed (if possible) or dimmed (except as required at emergency exits). On descent a lower temperature selection can be used to cool the aircraft as much as possible before engine shut down on arrival, opening the vents in the overhead passenger units to generate air circulation, and turning off non-essential cabin lighting and IFE might also help to reduce temperature. Remember never to crack a door or open a cabin door without ground equipment/steps in place due to the possible fall from height of cabin crew, passengers or cabin equipment which could injure ground staff. One operators procedure reviewed by CHIRP stated, do not open a rear door because it might let hot air into the aircraft whilst a second operators' procedure suggested opening a rear door to assist with airflow. If the aircraft is too hot to board, don't be pressured to board by gate staff and communicate with the flight crew to discuss options and let them know of your concerns.

Please check your employer's hot temperature procedures, keep safe and comfortable enough to perform your safety duties without distraction.

Phil Young, CHIRP Engineering Programme Manager

BHDV

The CHIRP Aviation Programme also provides a facility for confidential reporting of Bullying, Harassment, Discrimination and Victimisation (BHDV) where there is an identifiable safety-related concern. CHIRP has no specific expertise or resources to investigate BHDV reports. CHIRP's role is to aggregate data to build a picture of the prevalence of BHDV in the aviation sector. See our BHDV page on the CHIRP website for further information. [CHIRP's role in reporting Bullying, Harassment, Discrimination and Victimisation \(BHDV\)](#)

Report to CHIRP!

Reporting to **CHIRP** is easy by using either our [website](#) portal or our App (scan the appropriate QR code shown or search for 'CHIRP Aviation' – ignoring the birdsong apps that may come up!). In our reporting portal you'll be presented with a series of fields to complete, of which you fill in as much as you feel is relevant – not every field is mandatory, but the more information you can give us the better. Although you'll need to enter your email address to get access to the portal, none of your details are shared outside **CHIRP**, and we have our own independent secure database and IT systems to ensure confidentiality.



Reports

Report No1 - CC6468 – On-time departure pressures put on SCCMs

Initial Report

Boarded the aircraft following the company's SOP to ensure we departed on time. Caterers were still loading, we were unable to start boarding due to the safety implications of trolleys and canisters blocking emergency exits. During our SEP/Security checks, one crew member immediately informed me that a forward stowage was faulty and they couldn't complete their security check. I asked for an engineer to attend to fix the stowage. The engineer arrived very early on and fixed the issue enabling my crew member to conduct their security check. We started boarding which was slow at first due to boarding lots of PRM pax and the flight being nearly full.

Once I checked into my hotel after a long duty day I was greeted by an email from the office asking me to explain why we had a 4-minute delay which had been attributed to cabin crew. Followed by another email requesting for me to call into the office again to explain why I had 2 delays attributed to the cabin crew. Both were due to safety issues and I spent lots of my rest period trying to find out why this flight had a delay put down to the cabin crew, it transpired that it was because I had asked for engineering support. This practice can potentially cause SCCM to cut corners and think twice about asking for engineering support. Please note this is added to our files and could have detrimental consequences to SCCMs moving forward.

Company Comment

When cabin crew related delay reports are received, the cabin crew management and operations team are keen to learn the events and reasons that led to the flight departing after the target time. The cabin crew management and operations team were contacted and a copy of the email communication that is sent to crew was reviewed.

It states:

- There is no obligation to reply on a day off.
- The communication is not positioned as a performance issue.
- The communication seeks to understand 'what happened' to allow a review of the process and prevent recurrence. It also identifies if crew require support – there are no punitive actions associated with the follow up.

There are many factors that contribute to on-time performance, it's important that as a team we continue to engage, learn and deliver improvement.

Action has already been implemented from the responses already received. The team have received many responses to date. So far, changes have been made to some report times for more challenging flights and at stations where there is a long transit time through the airport. These adjustments will help crew complete their pre-flight safety and security checks in the time provided.

CHIRP Comment

CHIRP was advised that some of the points in the company comment have only recently been included in the internal communications, these changes may have been as a result of internal reporting.

It is commercially important that operators monitor timings, this reporter's concerns however are related to the communication between the reporter and the company. Whatever your safety concerns are please report them to your operator, without reports and the data gathered from these reports other internal teams cannot make the appropriate/required changes/improvements. The more information you can include in your report the better, if a report doesn't contain any information then contact from the management team is usually to establish delay codes. As stated in the company comment above there are no punitive actions associated with the follow up.

Report No2 - CC6572 – Operated a flight with 6 crew, the minimum is 8

Initial Report

We had an incident where two crew members were not fit for flight two hours before check out in AAA.

We thought we would need to stay or not be able to operate the flight back as we were 8 cabin crew reduced to 6. The manual said it was a minimum of 7 cabin crew on the aircraft that we flew back on. It also mentioned about it being 50 pax per crew member. We had around 230 passengers.

We got told that it had been approved by the UK CAA to fly back with this amount of crew.

We had check out delayed and flight delayed by around two hours while this was being decided.

The flight went okay but safety wise this didn't feel that great. If anything were to go wrong there was a lot less of us to evacuate or deal with emergency/medical situations.

CAA Comment

It is permissible to operate with less than the minimum number of cabin crew in unforeseen circumstances when away from an operating base. The procedure is required to be described in the operations manual and should specify revised allocation of duties for normal and emergency operating procedures and the maximum number of passengers permitted to be carried. The number of passengers may be restricted by the reduced number of cabin crew (i.e. one cabin crew member for every 50 or fraction of 50 passengers carried). If the flight in question was operated with six cabin crew and 230 passengers this is in accordance with ORO.CC.205, however it is necessary to ensure that an equivalent level of safety can be achieved with the reduced number of cabin crew.

CHIRP Comment

The operator's manual (OM) should contain a process for reducing the crew complement in certain situations and these dispensations are all about managing risk. The flight reported operated in accordance with the regulations and if the OM stated so, may have been reduced further by one more crew member (230 passengers to 5 crew).

After an event such as this, a Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR) must be completed by the flight crew to advise the CAA of the event.

'Unforeseen' allows an operator to return an aeroplane to a base from a layover/turnaround destination (where a replacement cabin crew member is not available) this is for unforeseen circumstances only and not for 'planned' or a known eventuality where-by the operator has time to position a replacement crew member.

ORO.CC.205 Reduction of the number of cabin crew members during ground operations and in unforeseen circumstances...

(b) By way of derogation from point (a), the minimum number of cabin crew members may be reduced in either of the following cases:

(1) during normal ground operations not involving refuelling or defuelling when the aircraft is at its parking station;...

(3) at least one cabin crew member is required for every 50, or fraction of 50, passengers present on the same deck of the aircraft;...

For the full regulations please click on this link [ORO.CC.205 Reduction of the number of cabin crew members during ground operations and in unforeseen circumstances \(caa.co.uk\)](https://www.caa.co.uk/industry-guidance/industry-guidance-articles/industry-guidance-article-205-reduction-of-the-number-of-cabin-crew-members-during-ground-operations-and-in-unforeseen-circumstances)

Report No3 - FC5332(C) – Fitness to fly

Initial Report

As a Commander, in recent months I have had to offload crew members on 3 occasions due to being unfit to fly, both pilots and cabin crew. On all occasions it was due to cold symptoms, which whilst weren't that obvious at report time, manifested themselves throughout the subsequent sectors leading to an offload part way through the day.

There are 3 issues I feel need addressing; Commanders responsibility for crew members fitness to fly. Assessing a crew members fitness is subjective, as a cold can vary in severity and can be hidden well during the briefing. Asking the crew member if they are fit will inevitably lead to a 'yes' – and as captains are not doctors it is difficult to make a judgement. We need clear guidance from the Company that the Commander's decision will be final and non-punitive to both parties.

1. Perceived pressures from the Company. While the Company says it has a sickness policy and crew will be paid, cabin crew in particular will not receive any extra remuneration for the duty if they are sick – and this was quoted to me as a reason for not calling sick for the duty as

‘they didn’t have many hours that month as it was and couldn’t afford it’. There is also the threat of an interrogation from management depending on the individuals sickness record. The Commander is then under considerable pressure and may have to argue with a crew who may consider themselves fit even when they are clearly not – but as before this is subjective.

2. Inadequate education of crew on the risks of flying while unfit. In the case of the pilot offload, he was unaware that flying with blocked ears could have serious consequences when it comes to burst eardrums etc. I feel that time should be spent during initial training/induction establishing the company culture re sickness and how various ailments that might be mild on the ground can be very different in the air.
3. The Company often stays quiet on such matters as they obviously don’t want to ‘encourage’ sickness, but I have seen a definite trend of crew reporting when unfit and offloads during the duty, which creates additional problems.

CHIRP Comment

CHIRP Cabin Crew Advisory Board Comment –

If you are feeling unwell, please consider; Am I fit to do my job for the whole duty? What’s the impact of me operating when I’m not fit to do so? What effect will flying have on my health, since it could exacerbate an existing illness? Don’t expect your SCCM or Captain to make the decision for you, if you are offloaded the duty will depending on your operator probably still be classed as an absence. As the reporter states ‘Captains are not doctors’, it is a personal assessment to evaluate whether or not you are ‘fit’ to operate as cabin crew.

The CAA stipulates in MED.A.020 Decrease in medical fitness: *Cabin crew members shall not perform duties on an aircraft and, where applicable, shall not exercise the privileges of their cabin crew attestation when they are aware of any decrease in their medical fitness, to the extent that this condition might render them unable to discharge their safety duties and responsibilities.*

Sickness and absence days are routinely tracked (as is customary in all businesses) and operators will have various policies, which are detailed in your terms and conditions. Both cabin crew and flight crew can feel pressurised to operate when they are feeling unwell and CHIRP frequently receives reports related to sickness policies and this topic was also discussed in the editorial of [CCFB edition 79](#). CHIRP has expressed and will continue to voice its concerns to the UK CAA regarding absence policies.

CHIRP Air Transport Advisory Board Comment –

Although fitness to operate is a personal obligation, as the ultimate arbiter for the safety of the flight, CHIRP feels that captains clearly have an operational and moral responsibility as the final barrier not just for the safety of the operation but also to save people from themselves or deal with situations when they don’t realise they are unfit to operate – ultimately, peoples’ fitness to operate has relevance not only to the flight’s safety if they can’t conduct their duties but also for their personal safety and well-being. That being said, captains offloading crew members if they suspect they are unfit to fly must be done circumspectly given that captains are not specifically qualified to make such decisions for others. If someone is clearly not functioning well enough then that’s one thing, but if someone is just a bit ‘under the weather’ or has a minor ailment that they are happy to continue with but the captain is not, there is potential for all sorts of disputes about medical judgements. In this respect, it’s important that captains are supported by medical help and guidance. There are various third-party medical services that some airlines subscribe to depending on their chosen provider, and these are important sources of professional assistance in supporting the decisions made by captains so that they don’t have to shoulder the burden themselves when things may not be clear-cut. Aeromedical physiology is an element of pilot education and licencing so we’re genuinely surprised that a pilot would not know about the risks of flying with a cold. Cabin Crew are not licenced and their aeromedical training varies from company to company but, although they might perhaps not have the same level of knowledge, they should also be well aware of the risks of flying with colds etc. A minor snuffle might not be a significant risk, but operating with a heavy cold would of course not be a good idea. Ultimately, we acknowledge that there are huge financial and perceived adverse company policy pressures on crews to fly if they are unfit and so third-party oversight from captains is appropriate in applicable circumstances and must be supported by the companies.

Report No4 - CC6471 – Pressure to depart from home base in discretion

Initial Report

Flight departing from base was delayed due to a technical issue. I was called from standby to join the crew. Extended delay and heat on aircraft meant that the food was no longer deemed safe for consumption for both crew and all passengers. Nobody wanted to inform passengers of this. The aircraft was reading 44 degrees Celsius in the cabin whilst the crew completed their security checks, we were

delayed on the aircraft awaiting engineer sign off. The crew were hungry with no food and uncomfortable from having to stay in the heat. Flight Crew went into discretion and for some reason were adamant on the flight departing still.

As I was called from standby I went into discretion first. Suddenly a new flight plan reduces the flight time by 30 minutes so we had more hours to work. None of the cabin crew were asked in a way or in a place where they felt safe and able to make an honest decision about working into discretion. It seemed like it was decided for us all to go into discretion. Passengers started boarding and halfway through boarding, the SCCM came round and asked crew members if they were happy to operate in discretion. We were all already in discretion and half the passengers had boarded so we all felt unable to say no we are not happy. We were tired and hungry with no access to food. The cabin was still quite hot too. Flight Crew didn't ask cabin crew how they were feeling. There was no duty of care for the cabin crew. My boarding position was in the cabin, in front of passengers so I did not feel able to say I was not happy to operate into discretion (even though I was already in discretion at this point). While the SCCM asked me if I was happy to operate into discretion, she said "if you're not, then you need to go and talk to the Captain". No cabin crew felt able to say no. It did not feel like we had a choice to say no.

During boarding, two passengers heavily under the influence had to be offloaded. Crew made the decision we did not want to travel with them as we had no food to sober them up and we didn't want a situation on board. Police had to be called and their hold bags offloaded which caused further delay. The pressure from both Flight Crew and SCCM to operate into discretion was overwhelming. It felt like we were all being manipulated to operate well into discretion.

Company Comment

This is an example of why we rely on crew reporting incidents in the safety management system. This allows us to follow up, establish the facts, determine the root cause, causal factors as well as provide recommendations, if applicable. Learning, feedback and change are driven from reports to prevent occurrences from happening again. It is a fundamental and crucial part of our just safety culture to report incidents so that they can be reviewed. We have access to systems to gather data, collect information which in turn helps us provide a response to the reporter. Reporters are assured that reports are dealt with confidentially to meet the requirements UK Reg (EU) No 376/2014 (the UK Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Regulation) i.e. "the continued availability of safety information by introducing rules on confidentiality and on the appropriate use of information and through the harmonised and enhanced

protection of reporters and persons mentioned in occurrence reports."

There are a few points in the report we cannot verify, therefore we are unable to respond to.

Information about Commander's discretion is found in our operator's manual, section 7, it can only be exercised once the crew have reported for a flight duty period. The management of unforeseen circumstances during flight operations is a shared responsibility between operations management, flight and cabin crew; with the Commander exercising their overall responsibility for the safety of the flight. Therefore, in the case of unforeseen circumstances, and at their sole discretion, the Commander may extend the FDP provided they consider that the safety of the flight will not be adversely affected by that extension.

Cabin crew should inform the SCCM and Commander if they are feeling the effects of fatigue where they are unable to perform the safety and security functions of their role, we also have a non-punitive fatigue reporting process cited in the operators manual.

CHIRP Comment

On 24th August 2023, the UK CAA sent an open letter to all operators about Commander's Discretion, the letter in full can be viewed here on the CHIRP website <https://chirp.co.uk/hot-topic/commanders-discretion/>

Commander's discretion may be used to modify the limits on the maximum daily FDP (basic or with extension due to in-flight rest), duty and rest periods in the case of unforeseen circumstances in flight operations beyond the operator's control, which start at or after the reporting time regardless of being at base or not.

UK Reg (EU) No.965/2012 AMC1 ORO.FTL.2059(f) comments on the "...*shared responsibility of management, flight and cabin crew*..." and that consideration should be taken of "*individual conditions of affected crew members*...". Regulation does not state how the Captain should consult their crew or whether this should be conducted face-to-face, individually or as a whole crew. The reporter raises that they felt there was no duty of care from the Commander, onboard the aircraft we are a team, the flight crew at this point may have been very busy dealing with the technical issue and so it is appropriate that the SCCM was tasked with liaising with the crew. The reporter also states that they were consulted by the SCCM in front of the passengers, if possible, any questions of this nature should not be asked in front of the passengers for them to overhear. Although you may feel that there is pressure to operate, you must speak up if you feel

that you will not be able to perform the duties that are required of you for the duty.

When you report for a duty, you should be mindful that there is often disruption and that you may end up operating to your max FDP on that day up to and including discretion. However, if you are feeling the effects of tiredness and are unable to complete your duty then you must communicate this to your SCCM and the Commander.

Report No5 - CC6577 – Delayed Report Confusion.

Initial Report

I feel like I've been coerced into operating today. My report was 1300z, but the flight was delayed.

Crewing said they left me a voicemail at 1100Z, but I didn't receive this. I later found out that my phone network was having nationwide issues (I've screenshotted the tweet as I don't think crewing believed me). Crewing told me that they have made reasonable attempts to inform me of the delay so it's on my shoulders.

I rang them just after my report time to tell them I had just picked up Wi-Fi and been made aware of the delay, they then changed my report time to one hour later to protect my duty hours. I emailed them and had my original report time reinstated. When the rest of the crew arrived, the captain told me I would not be legal to fly home. Crewing told him that if I "refuse the duty", and they await a standby, the flight would be further delayed and it was "on his head" (mine). I felt coerced into operating and deeply upset.

On the return sector, the pilot told me he'd use the rest of the crew's report time for my hours and I am no longer in discretion, disregarding my original report time which I arrived for.

Captain told me I ought to be contactable 24 hours a day and crewing said they don't need me to acknowledge a delay for them to have "done their bit".

Further to this, my roster app which 'pings' a delay had signed me out without my knowledge, so this line of communication didn't happen either. The captain said I should have been contactable and I ought to ring crewing before every duty to ascertain if the flight is on time.

I don't feel I should be calling crewing on my rest time to check if flights are on time.

CHIRP Comment

It is disappointing that this reporter felt 'coerced' into operating and some of the comments made by their colleagues made are incorrect and inappropriate, generally cabin crew are not required to be 'contactable 24 hours a day'.

ORO.FTL.105 Definitions (23) '*single day free of duty*' means, for the purpose of complying with the provisions of Council Directive 2000/79/EC, a time free of all duties and standby consisting of one day and two local nights, which is notified in advance. A rest period may be included as part of the single day free of duty;

CS FTL.1.205 Flight duty period

(d) Unforeseen circumstances in flight operations – delayed reporting

1. *The operator may delay the reporting time in the event of unforeseen circumstances... Delayed reporting procedures establish a notification time allowing a crew member to remain in his/her suitable accommodation when the delayed reporting procedure is activated.*

When a crew member does not receive the notification and is therefore not in '*his/her suitable accommodation when the delayed reporting procedure is activated*' then the report time used should be the original report time.

Reporting concerns internally is crucial so that any issues may be fully investigated and addressed within the Safety Management System (SMS) and prevented from happening again.

Report No6 - CC6507 – Briefing Down-route

Initial Report

Down-route the expectation has always been that we give a pre-flight brief on the bus.

The company details in the operations manual a lengthy list of what is to be discussed with the crew prior to the inbound flight.

I've written to the company and the union stating that the bus is not safe, I have highlighted that the bus is moving and the transport is up against time and we are officially on duty 1 hr before departure. Crew are spread out over a large bus, the

lights can be turned off and pitch black, crew can't be seen as they are all spread out and some wear ear pods and basically aren't listening. The bus will not wait for me to give a brief and I should not be expected to stand, kneel on a seat or shout down a bus/coach to my crew to deliver an effective, safe briefing. If I was to fall the company would ask why was I not seated with my seat belt on if I was injured and I'm certainly not twisting my back or neck to turn around or shout down the length of a bus/coach.

When I emailed the company, I explained my concerns about delivering the inbound briefing and where I'm expected to do it? Their reply was I could ask the crew to come down before report time! This is an absolute No! We were operating home on a different aircraft type so change of working positions and I should have been asking new SEP questions relevant to aircraft type.

The point of all this is, there is no time allocated to conduct a briefing, my operator doesn't want to change the report time because it will increase FDP eating into our 900 hrs and probably trigger additional costs to the company.

Company Comment

The pre-flight briefing is an important part of the duty to share information, collaborate with the flight crew to promote safety and security, issue reminders and address any concerns. Whilst a briefing is always conducted from a base, following a night stop, an abbreviated, shorter briefing is required. The SCCM shall liaise with the Commander to discuss factors affecting flight safety for the next flight or series of flights, there might be aircraft changes such as type or variant. There is no requirement to "ask SEP questions". Only when there is a variant or type change, there will need to be a short discussion to 'frame' the crew's minds for any changes or differences compared to the aircraft on the outbound such as location of the AED, other safety equipment, crew working position changes, special category passengers etc.

There is no expectation for crew to report before their report time for a briefing. Whilst there is a requirement for an inbound briefing as per the operating procedures manual, some SCCMs elect to conduct this on the transport to the airport. If the SCCM determines that they are unable to utilise the bus to complete a briefing due to environmental factors such as the transport size and layout, lack of light (time of the day), noise, distractions etc., a safety report is required to highlight the issue and what they did as a corrective action. As an airline, we continue to review the briefing structure, including inbound briefings following a nightstop, to identify if there are any other solutions. If the SCCM is unable to complete a briefing on the transport, in the airport, there is

usually space around the gate or beyond the gate to complete this task i.e. out of earshot of passengers.

CAA Comment

Pre-flight briefings as described in the operations manual form part of the pre-departure procedures and are therefore to be completed following report for duty. An operator should specify the procedure for the conduct of pre-flight briefings and ensure provision of a suitable location that enables achievement of the required content.

CHIRP Comment

An appropriate area and sufficient time should be allocated to brief the crew as required in the operators manual, if that time is not allocated, then the SSCM should conduct the briefing as required and be sure to document the incurred delay allowing the operator to investigate this specific instance. There may be occasions where the bus is an appropriate place to conduct a briefing and a suitable use of time. From a health and safety aspect crew should not be stood up or kneeling on seats on the bus to address the crew, they should be sat facing forwards and wearing a seatbelt if one is supplied.

There is a review on UK FTLs (flight time limitations) currently taking place by the CAA, this review will include looking at the impact of things such as car parking locations, briefing times etc. have on FTLs, not just at base but down-route as well.

Report No7 - FC5322(C) – Operating pressures

Initial Report

As a Commander, I have been told by the cabin crew numerous times that they skip their meals until reaching daily sales target limit. If not reached, they are being called by the company or management to explain why they haven't sold as much as planned.

Constant fear is present among the crew as they think they will be fired. Same issue with the commander's discretion. Most of the cabin crew will never report fatigue as they are scared for their job. One of the colleagues was called for a meeting after stating that she would not be able to continue her duty and threatened to be fired if it happens again. This is totally unacceptable, illegal and shows pure example of misuse of commander's discretion.

I, find this practice by my operator extremely unsafe. Safety should always be top priority, and not the profit. I don't even want to imagine an incident or accident happening with my

crew not feeling 100% ready because they didn't eat as sales target had to be reached first.

CAA Comment

An operator's safety policy should encourage and ensure open reporting and promote the principles of just culture. The decision to exercise discretion to extend a flying duty period rests with the commander of the aircraft based on an assessment of all influencing factors, including the fitness of the crew members. Exercise of discretion is not an individual decision, however this does not preclude a crew member from advising that they feel unable to operate owing to fatigue. This should then be reported using the appropriate method of company reporting.

CHIRP Comment

Cabin crew are on board primarily for safety and if you have not had your meal break, then you must speak up and inform the SCCM, the SCCM is responsible for managing the breaks on board and adapting the service if these breaks have not been achieved.

ORO.FTL.240 Nutrition

(a) During the FDP there shall be the opportunity for a meal and drink in order to avoid any detriment to a crew member's performance, especially when the FDP exceeds 6 hours.

(b) An operator shall specify in its operations manual how the crew member's nutrition during FDP is ensured.

The nourishment required from these breaks includes hydration, and not eating and/or drinking properly throughout the day will exacerbate the symptoms and feelings of tiredness, possibly leading to fatigue. One of the most common key-issue safety concerns that people

report to CHIRP is 'pressure'. When targets are set, whether they are based on sales or Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), pressure can be felt to meet them, particularly when they are financially connected. Nevertheless, whether the pressure is real or perceived, the crew should not be skipping nourishing meal breaks.

The reporter remarks that the crew 'think they will be fired', this practice, if true, goes against the principles of a just culture. All crew should feel empowered to report their safety concerns, be they the reason that they failed to meet a sales target or because they are fatigued.



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
Bullying, Harassment, Discrimination and Victimisation (BHDV) in Aviation

One-off or repeated instances of BHDV can have a deleterious effect on individual performance, mental health, stress and company culture, and these in themselves can have second-order safety implications.



In conjunction with the CAA, CHIRP has implemented a BHDV reporting portal that will log received reports and associated information within the CHIRP confidential database. Reports can be submitted using the CHIRP online reporting portal at www.chirp.co.uk

Although CHIRP has no specific expertise or resources to investigate BHDV reports, when a BHDV report that has an impact on safety is received, CHIRP's role is to anonymously aggregate the data with other associated reports to build a picture of the prevalence of BHDV in the aviation sector, the human factor and safety impacts this may have, and explore improvements that might be made. As part of this, CHIRP will provide the CAA with disidentified, aggregated BHDV statistics and information on a regular basis but only CHIRP staff will have access to report details, there is no connectivity to CAA systems.



See our BHDV page at www.chirp.co.uk for further information.

**CHIRP***Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme*