The CAA is to be applauded for instigating a scheme for a rebate towards the cost of an EC device. This (I understand) has recently been extended. However, the rebate is only available to existing licence holders or aircraft owners. As Head of Training for a progressive ATO, I have been asked by several student pilots if they could be eligible for the EC rebate, since they can see the huge benefits of such devices. In fact, some have taken the “alternative route” and actually coerced an existing licence holder to make the rebate application on their behalf where the licence holder has chosen not to purchase the device (for either financial or privacy reasons)!

The current rebate eligibility criteria (in my view) is a barrier to flight safety, and the scheme should be extended to allow student pilots to participate for the following reasons (which also counter some of the foreseen arguments “against”). I offer the following observations:

1. Increasing the EC population will only help achieve the EC goal – the more aircraft that are equipped, the greater the resolution of EC.
2. By extending the scheme to student pilots who have obtained a CAA reference number the scheme has an audit trail in still only allowing one rebate per person.
3. By offering the scheme to student pilots, it allows the training organisation to integrate such devices into the students’ flight training to ensure the device (along with moving map technology) is used effectively and within context. In particular to avoid the situation of “eyes in the cockpit too much”, and the limitations of EC at the present time (not all aircraft will be observed). In addition, best practice can also be taught, such as configuring the devices to provide aural warnings via Bluetooth which also counters any Threats and Errors associated with a perceived “down-side” of using such devices. Personally, I have incorporated all of these into our ATO PPL syllabus so all students get trained as a matter of course in these devices at our organisation. Even if a student pilot “just” uses the device to provide EC “out” it would enhance the visibility of that student aircraft including giving more situational awareness to existing EC users of a student’s actions (which may or may not be in accordance with standard practices)!
4. Hindsight is a wonderful thing. Perhaps it would have been better placed to offer the scheme initially to students in any event to ensure training in the use and best practice of the device was undertaken. At present, there will be many pilots using devices falling into the trap of relying on EC in its entirety and with a consequential lack of “lookout”.
5. Perhaps a better option would be to offer the rebate scheme to anyone who holds a CAA reference number, and can provide proof of training in the device for the reasons above!
6. In the current financial climate, with increasing fuel and insurance costs (to name but two), it is highly unlikely that a training organisation itself will spend the money on equipping their fleet of aircraft with EC. Hence, individual use of EC should be encouraged, and not limited in its present form.
7. Existing licence holders and aircraft owners have already had ample opportunity to partake in the scheme, so opening the scheme up to include those detailed above would not be retracting the funding for those it was initially offered to. Indeed, if the scheme has been extended due to the lack of uptake and the existing finds still being available, then this also signifies the eligibility should be widened.

For all of the reasons above, I would urge the CAA to extend the scheme as detailed above, and would encourage all training organisations to embrace (and hence include in their training programmes) new technologies that pilots will make use of once they have gained their licence – whether trained in their use or not!

The TAF for nearest airfield included wind W/SW 25 gusting 40 and the ATIS was 250 36 G 42.

Landed on RWY27 uneventfully but on taxiing past hangar just prior to shutdown, a gust caused a wing to lift and the propeller touched the ground. Engine required shock-load inspection. Wind gusts locally may have been exceeding 60 knots. Normally fly PA32, but have considerable experience in C172. PA32 probably would have been OK due greater mass, lower wing and wider track. I failed to allow for this in planning but fundamentally the forecast was not reflective of the actual conditions. Lessons learnt: weather may be worse than forecast – be cautious. Failure to psychologically account for the lighter aircraft than usual (C172) with higher wing and narrower wheel track than in PA32. Don’t be complacent!

As a retired but active pilot and flying instructor I still fly many different types. The gliding club at which I fly and regularly tow operates several tug aircraft, but the particular aircraft of this report is less fuel efficient and is now effectively only used as a backup on very busy days.  I had flown it many times but not recently. On a particularly good soaring day, the primary tug, which is a fully equipped modern light aircraft, was in full use. I offered to carry out a few tows in the aircraft in question to reduce the queue of waiting gliders (I had carried out the daily inspection on it earlier). The tow appeared normal to me but on final approach the stall warning sounded at a higher speed than I expected. On the second tow the glider pilot radioed to say he required more speed. Only after releasing the glider did I realise that I had been reading the speeds marked on the prominent outside ring of the ASI markings as knots, although the knots were on the inside ring and the outside was in mph. Matters were compounded because I had recently flown and towed in an aircraft of the same type with an ASI marked in knots only.

I was the instructor checking out an experienced pilot on a Cessna 152 at [Airfield]. We briefed the flight and we needed to do some stalls that ideally required an altitude of at least 3500ft in order to recover by approximately 3000 ft AGL. The cloud base from my previous sortie suggested that this may have to be done between breaks in the cloud or above the cloud layer. The pilot being checked-out completed all external and internal checks and we departed the circuit and climbed out to the North West under the CTA with a base of 4500ft and 5500ft AMSL. We climbed up to around 5000ft under the base of 5500 leaving sufficient space.

The stalls and steep turns where completed and occasionally the altimeter read as high as 5200ft. I noted that GPS integrity was lost during the steep turns and awaited for it to return before descending back toward the airfield. I was using the small moving map on the installed electronic navigation system and confirming the boundaries against a current map rather than using SkyDemon as I would in my own aircraft. Alerts for approaching airspace were set to appear but no aural alert was set. Noting our position I did briefly take control to hasten the descent as we approached the lower CTA with a limit of 4500ft. As we continued back towards the airfield, I briefed the pilot to complete a standard overhead join at 2000ft AGL. At that point I checked the pressure setting on the altimeter to discover it was still set on QFE and hence realised that we had probably been at least 400ft higher than indicated and had potentially been inside the CTA by around 100ft or so. We completed the remaining aspects of the flight without incident.

I phoned [Airport] on landing and they confirmed that they had not identified any infringement over the last hour or so in that area. They confirmed with the CTA controlling authority that they also had not identified any infringement during the same time period. So on this occasion it would appear that my decision to try and maintain a margin of 500ft had prevented an infringement caused by a 400ft error in the altimeter indication due to the incorrect altimeter setting. I was relieved but annoyed as earlier in the same week I had watched the GASCo seminar on airspace infringements and I had previously set the altimeter to QFE to aid the previous student’s knowledge of the height during a circuit. I had failed to notice the licensed pilot on my next flight had not taken off on QNH which is my preferred method of operation.

Lessons learnt:

1. All pilots are different and some will depart on a QFE. As an instructor I should have monitored the completion of the checklist better, double checked the altimeter setting and then discussed the merits of whether to depart on QFE or QNH.
2. Despite the broken nature of the cloud coverage it was higher than I thought and I lost a degree of situation awareness. Whilst I utilised the simple map on the installed GPS, I did not utilise the better display of my SkyDemon in order to check my positioning.
3. Prior to flight I did not complete a TEM briefing nor a proposed outbrief which may have helped increase awareness of the altitude and airspace risk.
4. As a new instructor, flying with a more experience pilot can lead you into a false sense of security and belief that the pilot flying will do everything correctly or as I would.

I guess on further reflection I learnt that whilst checking out an experienced pilot I should watch everything they do and treat them as a student. I watch my students doing checks but didn’t double check his checks. As P1 I guess I learnt that it’s my licence at stake not theirs!

As part of the power checks before take-off, I checked the RPM drop on both mags. The mag selector is a rotary key type switch. Whilst performing this check I accidentally rotated the key to both mags off. As I heard the engine dying I quickly turned the key to switch the mags on before the engine stopped. My main concern was that the engine requires starting by hand-turning the propellor, and I didn’t want to go through this procedure, particularly near the threshold of the runway.

On completion of the checks I lined up and began the take-off run. Immediately I noticed a roughness in the engine, which was about 200 RPM below what I expected. The runway was long and the aircraft eventually became airborne with a reduced rate of climb. I decided to continue into the circuit and return to the airfield. On the downwind leg I noticed that the mag switch was at magneto 2 only. I turned it to both and full power was restored. I continued the flight uneventfully.

I had recently converted to this aircraft. My previous type had separate magneto switches which provides a clearer visual picture of the magneto states than a rotary key switch. Furthermore there are no markings to indicate “off”, “mag 1”, “mag 2”, “both” on this aircraft.

Lessons learned: Do not ignore poor engine performance during take-off. The runway was long enough to have done a safe abort and investigate the problem before becoming airborne. If a problem or distraction occurs during checks, repeat them from the beginning.

On this particular day  I was flying for the first time to an airfield some distance away, I had spent many hours viewing google maps of the site, and rehearsing different approaches and scenarios on arrival. I had specifically waited for a good VFR day. The site was by its own admission difficult to find with the added risk of gliders very nearby, and controlled airspace to the South.

I had got my aircraft out, refuelled it, and did my checks. Whilst I was doing this the airfield was coming to life, other aircraft being pulled out and started. I had done my start checks, and asked and got airfield information, I had then taxied to the runway intersection and held. My vision throughout the taxi to my left was restricted by tall corn or wheat growing. Another aircraft was on the other side of the intersection doing its pre-flight checks. At this point I decided to cross the active runway to also carry out my pre-flight checks, the other aircraft seemed to have finished its checks and had turned to come onto the active runway, though not on it.

From memory I think I called crossing the active runway. Two thirds of the way across, the shadow of ANOTHER aircraft taking off passed over me, which I was completely unaware of. I spoke briefly to the other aircraft and offered my apologies also speaking to him by telephone later that week.

I have looked carefully at the chain of events, and tried to find the point at which this near disaster could have been averted. My mind was very much focused on the long flight, to an unknown airfield, hence an early take off. My awareness of other aircraft was not clear, I had seen another aircraft taxi past me, whilst doing my own checks and had seen the same one I believed on the other side of the active runway. At the point of crossing the intersection I assumed there was only one aircraft ahead of me, I did not hear or did not receive a transmission of taking off from the other aircraft. I did not clear to my left before crossing the runway.

There is no doubt in my mind that the fault in this near miss is all mine. In retrospect, a visual cue of another aircraft on the active runway would have stopped me crossing, but the lack of view in itself  should have made me stop and CHECK. My unknown cognitive assumption being the aircraft directly to my front was the only one ahead of me. In order, the chain of events leading up to this near miss was: 1) lots of focus on the flight itself, 2) anxious to get going, 3) missed radio calls? 4) not checking the active is clear, 5) being misled by your own visual cues.