We contacted the operations team regarding the content of this report, and no communication has been passed on to SCCMs to start their briefing earlier. They simply cannot do so, as they are required to report at the time designated on their roster to comply with flight time limitations and flight duty period obligations. Crew are encouraged to follow the times on the briefing sheet, and being based in a large airport, this framework should be adhered to as much as possible. If crew are experiencing difficulties, we encourage them to report these, as this feedback will be used to inform the operations trends when we share insight to the trends we’ve identified.

Cabin crew cannot be required to perform any duty or part of a duty at the behest of the operator or personnel employed by the operator outside of a duty or flying duty period.  Cabin crew often arrive at the place of report early for a flight in order to allow time to prepare, however this by choice and cannot be required.

We recognise that no two flights are identical, and while the likelihood of an emergency or medical incident occurring is low, it cannot be completely ruled out. Therefore, we have carried out a comprehensive risk assessment to ensure we are fully prepared to manage any situation that may arise, whether that involves a fire drill, a medical emergency, or handling a disruptive passenger.

Regulatory requirements, together with our own hazard identification processes (which covers all scenarios such as aircraft types, variants, minimum legal crew complements and reduced crew complements in unforeseen circumstances), require us to mitigate and minimise the risk of any safety or security event escalating beyond control. These regulations state that cabin crew must be ready to act and respond if needed. For instance, guidance specifies that cabin crew members taking in-flight rest should be able to return to operational duty and reach their designated cabin stations in the event of an emergency (for reference: AMC2 ORO.CC.205(d) – Reduction of the number of cabin crew members during ground operations and in unforeseen circumstances).

If a safety-related situation arises that necessitates escalation, once landed, crew must communicate with the operations team to ensure appropriate support is provided. This may involve immediate support or roster adjustments depending on the nature of the incident.

Where Class 1 rest is not required to extend the maximum flight duty period (FDP), and crew are on a refreshment break within the cabin during which they are relieved of operational duties for a specified period, they must remain alert to their surroundings. Resting (eyes closed) or sleeping during this time does not comply with the requirements of the regulation. Crew are expected to stay attentive to visual and auditory signals, as well as to colleagues who remain on duty. In the event of an emergency occurring during a break or in-flight rest, the operating crew will assess whether resting crew are required to resume operational duties.

We have planned procedures in place for situations with reduced crew complements, including adaptations to drills such as merging roles during the fire drill. The aim of staying alert and ready to assist is precisely to ensure that if you are required to support your colleagues during a safety, security, or medical event, you will be prepared to do so. Additionally, on longer flights where FDP extension is required with Class 1 rest, the SCCM will liaise with the flight crew to review rest requirements and duty hours accordingly.

When reporting for duty, crew members are responsible for ensuring they are fit to fly and adequately rested. UK Air Ops CS.FTL.A.200 recommends that crew consider arranging temporary accommodation closer to their home base if their commute usually exceeds 90 minutes. Additionally, recognising the challenges posed by shift work, crew are encouraged to follow NHS guidance on best practices for managing tiredness and fatigue.

ORO.CC.205 requires that whenever passengers are on board an aircraft, the minimum number of cabin crew members required in accordance with point ORO.CC.100 shall be present in the aircraft and ready to act.

Alleviation from this is permitted for the purpose of providing in-flight rest during the cruise phase, either in accordance with  ORO.FTL.205(e) or as a fatigue mitigation implemented by the operator. Where this is implemented, specific procedures are required to be described in the operations manual, including for the in-flight rest of the senior cabin crew member, that ensure at all times appropriate passenger handling and efficient management of any abnormal or emergency situations.

Cabin crew on a refreshment break are still to be ready to act in the event of an abnormal occurrence.

From an operational point of view, decisions about whether a flight can safely go ahead are always made using the most up-to-date information available and in line with our standard procedures. Each airline has its own set of guidelines, and weather conditions are carefully considered as part of that process.

When it comes to safety, we always operate our aircraft within the strict limits set by the manufacturer—this includes factors like wind and other weather conditions. Our pilots are well-trained, regularly assessed, and fully prepared to operate safely in a wide range of situations, including strong winds.

We also understand that government travel advisories can raise concern. These advisories are issued based on a wide range of public safety factors and may not directly reflect whether it’s safe for an aircraft to operate. Since different aircraft have different performance limits, it’s possible for some flights to be cancelled while others can continue safely.

Whilst ultimately the decision to continue, divert or terminate a flight rests with the Commander such a decision is often made based on information from a number of sources which may not always be evident to the cabin crew and may be perceived as commercial pressure.

Thank you for raising your concerns regarding the delayed reporting process and how your FDP and report time were handled.

In the Operations Manual, there are set procedures for delayed reporting at home base, outlining the responsibilities of both the crewmember and Crewing:

Notification Timing

The manual states that Crewing must send delay notifications no more than 3 hours and no less than 2 hours before a UK report time. In your case, the text and Crew Portal update were sent 2 hours and 25 minutes before the scheduled report time, which aligns with the policy. The call from Crewing at 1 hour and 55 minutes before report time also appears to have been a follow-up, as outlined in the manual, since no response had been received.

Crewmember Actions

If a crewmember has already left their place of rest, they are given options at [reference] to report as scheduled, then advise Crewing at check-in that they did not receive the delay notice prior to leaving their place of rest and have therefore reported on time.

System Functionality – Unnotified Duty

As you’ve pointed out, the system does not allow check-in for duties marked as ‘unnotified’ — and a delayed duty that has not been acknowledged is treated in this way. This is an intentional safeguard which acts as a prompt for the crewmember to call Crewing or discuss with the crew check-in team. This is important not just to allow check-in, but also because Crewing may need to reassess whether the crewmember can continue to operate the flight under the FTL and FRM rules. This is outlined in [reference] of the procedure.

Correct Procedure in This Scenario

When a delay notification hasn’t been received or acknowledged before leaving your place of rest, the crewmember should report as scheduled and contact Crewing at check-in. At that point, Crewing will manually revert the duty to the original report time, assess the FDP limit and discuss any IFR/augmentation needs, which when completed, will allow check-in. This ensures compliance with both the Operations Manual, FRM policy and system controls.

An operator may delay reporting for a flying duty in the event of unforeseen circumstances in accordance with the procedure for notification detailed in the operator’s flight time limitations scheme.  Where a crew member does not receive notification this should be communicated to the Commander and SCCM for the flight in question and the operator notified.

Clear and effective communication is essential to ensure that Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are followed accurately and efficiently. Timely exchange of safety, operational, and customer service information between the Commander and the SCCM is critical. This information should also be shared with other crew members when operationally necessary to maintain situational awareness and ensure coordinated action.

In the reported incident, a crew member brought food trays into the flight deck, suggesting that the flight crew were not wearing oxygen masks at the time in order to eat, implying that the cockpit environment was considered safe. However, transient smells can occur throughout a duty, with varying intensity depending on the phase of flight and location within the aircraft. Regardless of these variations, it is essential that trained procedures are followed, and that communication remains a constant foundation of flight safety.

Regarding the flight crew receiving a phone call, all crew members are reminded that they can contact the operations team at any point during the duty for advice or support. Welfare support can also be arranged when needed.

Finally, the completion of Cabin Safety Reports is a vital part of the safety management system. These reports help capture key learnings and support continuous improvement through a just culture.

Communication between flight crew and cabin crew is essential to facilitate shared situational awareness and assist in identifying the cause and extent of a potential occurrence.  Questioning techniques and use of language are key elements of  information acquisition skills and should consider whether individuals may be led to a conclusion rather than forming their own.

The safety and security of the airline is never compromised. Decisions about whether to operate flights to a particular destination are based on a wide range of factors. These include internal risk assessments as well as guidance from trusted external security partners and government bodies such as the Department for Transport (DfT).

It’s understandable that when a situation is frequently covered in the media, it can influence public perception. However, security risks exist in many regions. Our destinations are continuously reviewed, and decisions are made using the most up-to-date and credible information available from both internal and external sources.

The DfT provide the conduit for airspace threat assessments based on various intelligence feeds, CHIRP reached out to the DfT and I have the following comment from them to share –

DfT is responsible for providing advice to UK registered aircraft operating in overseas airspace where there are risks linked to ongoing conflict. It is a host state responsibility to issue warnings of potential risks to civil aviation operations but, where this is not done, the UK will issue its own advice. This is done through issuing Notice to Airmen (NOTAMs).  The UK follows a three-tiered approach to NOTAMs as follows:

Level 1 (Advisory) is the lowest level of advice and highlights concerns for airlines to consider in their own risk assessments.

Level 2 (Recommendation) recommends airlines do not operate either below a certain altitude, or at all, over specific airspace.

Level 3 (Legal Prohibition) the NOTAM is accompanied by a legal Direction under the Aviation Security Act to UK airlines, making it an offence to enter certain airspace.

DfT-issued NOTAMs only apply to UK airlines and UK registered aircraft and His Majesty’s Government (HMG) has no ability to require airlines registered in other countries which may be carrying UK nationals to avoid using particular airspace.

Aside from a Level 3 NOTAM, which utilizes legal powers, it is ultimately down to individual airlines to decide if they will operate or not based on their own internal risk assessments, however going against formal HMG advice may impact on their liability and insurance should an incident occur.

Industry will (and do) take operational decisions on pausing flights where they judge the risk has reached their threshold. Different airlines have different thresholds. DfT remains in regular contact with UK airlines operating in the wider region. This includes: ongoing bilateral engagement with individual carriers on route-specific queries; bi-annual “all carriers” meetings on overflights risks (including a threat briefing at SECRET from UK intelligence partners); and ad hoc “all carriers” meetings in response to developing events (a crisis response mechanism). All of the major UK air carriers have security cleared staff within their security departments who are able to be briefed by appropriate HMG partners.

Internationally, DfT represents the UK in a number of expert forums including the Safer Skies Consultative Committee (SSCC) and the Expert Group on Risk Identification for Conflict Zones (EGRICZ) which bring together states-level experts in this area to develop best practice and guidance in this area; EGRICZ also has a coordination function in a crisis to try and align state responses where possible. DfT also works closely on a bilateral basis with key like-minded partners including the 5Eyes as well as France, Germany and EASA amongst others.

DfT assesses the level of threat to civil aviation in overseas airspace in line with ICAO guidance (Doc 10084, 3^rd edition, published October 2023). This is informed by information from the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) and Defence Intelligence on state-based capabilities. There is a rolling programme of assessments for those areas where DfT has existing airspace advice, ensuring advice does not remain in place when it is not required. For fast developing situations (e.g. Sudan, Israel/Hamas) DfT uses fast-time reporting from HMG and open-sources to make an initial assessment of the situation and issue relevant advice which is then refined as more information and considered assessments become available.