On a recent trip at a nearby Airfield, the airfield frequency was set by my pilot colleague upon being released from controlled airspace nearby. With only 10 miles to run, he called the airfield but got no response but we could hear aircraft in the circuit. I called as well from my side in case his mic or ptt button had failed but with the same result. As we were getting near the field he called blind announcing that we were joining overhead for the runway that we had ascertained from the circuit calls. Upon joining overhead we saw another aircraft in the overhead to the right that we positioned behind and followed him to crosswind. As we were about to join downwind we were alerted by a radio call asking if the aircraft joining had them in sight. We then positioned behind that aircraft giving blind calls throughout.

Upon landing we were approached by the CFI saying that he had had complaints from other pilots that we were not making radio calls. We replied that we had been making calls throughout and that their base radio operator had not responded to our initial calls for airfield information. However, upon leaving and requesting airfield information we were getting unreadable to our calls. We checked all of the normal issues etc believing that it was a fault on our radio system that was causing a transmit problem. I then checked the frequency and discovered that it had been set to .005 out of the correct frequency and, once set right, both transmit and receive worked perfectly.

I wrote to the Chief Flying Instructor at the Airfield and apologised for our error but expressed concern that setting the wrong frequency by the small amount permitted calls to be received but not transmitted leading to the belief that blind calls were being received. I have suggested that they may wish to have an entry made in The Flight Guides warning of this situation. The situation was exacerbated by the Airfield having an unconventional circuit to avoid a nearby village with aircraft joining long downwind and on a dogleg and not being in the expected position. Also on the day, the circuit was very busy with a number in the circuit at that time. I am also aware that some pilots are still flying using non 8.33kHz radios and that the same problem of receiving but not being received exists which is not the case on most other frequencies where a non 8.33kHz radio will continue to transmit and receive without any problems on those frequencies.

The main lesson learned is to double check that the frequency is exactly right and not assume that if you can hear them they can hear you. On blind calls at least try and get a response from an aircraft at the field as a radio check.

My point is in regard to the increasing number of avoid areas being included at airfields, with the term mandatory being used incorrectly. Mandatory is a legal term and means required by law, whereas this may be compulsory by the airfield operators and result in ppr refusal, it is not required by law. The term noise abatement is also being used. I am not wishing to be critical of the Airfield Operators who have an impossible task matching the needs of the based and visiting aircraft pilots and the local public who can be very demanding over aircraft flying over their houses. In some cases (see graphic) the number of noise sensitive areas are such that for a visiting pilot their attention is drawn to identifying and avoiding these areas rather than executing a standard join and circuit pattern. As we are well aware, distraction in the air can be very dangerous. It is also concerning that because pilots have the discretion to ignore these requirements if they feel that they conflict with safety, then a real danger of different landing patterns may occur.

I do not feel that these Avoidance / Noise Abatement Areas are necessary in all circumstances if a proper approach is undertaken on low power and therefore low noise, perhaps with an occasional small increase to hold height. A departure is at full power and therefore much noisier but most of the restrictions required appear to be related to the approach and circuit rather than the departure, which seems rather contradictory. I feel that we should not compromise safety simply to satisfy the public’s dislike of aircraft overflying their houses. I also feel that individual properties which are almost impossible to identify from the air should not be included, the number of areas kept as low as possible, and the circuits made to fit the overhead join pattern where an overhead join is the standard joining procedure.  I also feel that the number of different procedures for small airfields, some with an AFIS and some with nothing, is too complicated and a degree of standardisation is required.

On the morning of the flight I was briefing myself ahead of taking 3 passengers around the local area.  As part of that briefing I had noted a RA(T) that was to be in place during the weekend (SFC – 1500). However, knowing my flight would be away from the NOTAM area and, following local booking-out processes in the knowledge of the airfield operations team, I considered the flight could safely proceed in line with the RA(T).

I departed the airfield before the RA(T) came into effect, leaving in full visibility and comms with the coordinators on A/G radio for my 1 hour flight.  After flying locally outside the RA(T), I headed back to the airfield from the north. On approach to the airfield I was aware of other traffic in the RA(T) with some showing on SkyDemon via SkyEcho, I also noted that they were doing non-standard approaches and circuits into the airfield. I therefore adjusted my join for RWY01, intending to remain outside of the RA(T) for as long as possible. I was also aware of the cautionary non-standard radio calls being made by event participants as they came into proximity of the airfield.

I maintained my clearance of the RA(T) and decided not to descend into the deadside, maintaining no lower than 1800ft QFE and, during the circuit join, climbed back to 2000ft QFE when I observed other traffic joining the circuit close to the top of the RA(T) based on SkyDemon information. Maintaining normal circuit radio calls for situational awareness, I delayed my turn onto the downwind to fly a wider circuit [beyond the western boundary of the RA(T)] as I was concerned for the circuits being flown by the other aircraft. Keeping the downwind leg high (2000ft QFE) as I turned cross-to-downwind, I descended to approx 1600ft QFE for my downwind-to-base turn whilst remaining outside [to the west of] the RA(T).  I became aware of an aircraft on SkyDemon that had appeared to depart RWY19 to commence a race circuit so I delayed my base turn to maintain separation and turned base leg as number 2 to a different aircraft, keeping a good lookout. This longer final allowed me to retain height above the RA(T), only descending into the RA(T) as I flew the base leg as number 2.

After taxiing-in to park and escorting the passengers from airside I arranged refuelling and sometime later was approached by another pilot and an organiser. The organiser and I chatted for some time in a civil way as he had been advised that I had infringed the RA(T), discussing and agreed that there was a valuable lesson to be learned in how briefing of pilots operating ‘with a permission’ of the local airfield could be managed.  Due to my stress levels following this event and the accusation of the RA(T) infringement, I returned the aircraft to my hangar as I considered that I was not in a position to fly.

There was no local briefing material available, this was left to self-interpretation which is where I believe my confusion crept in. I also think there needs to be a more strongly worded caveat to the “Flights conducted under permission of the [Airfield] Ground radio”. As I’ve reflected over time on this one, I’ve also come around to the wording being problematic here as technically A/G radio cannot issue permissions or instructions to aircraft in the air, meaning it also potentially put the A/G operator in a difficult position should an aircraft request permission to land or take off.

A training aircraft was landing whilst I waited at the runway hold. The student pilot was early in the flare, and this caught my attention, becoming a point of discussion in the cabin. I waited for the aircraft to touch-and-go and begin its turnout before declaring ready for departure. I am always careful to create a mental picture of the situation at the aerodrome by listening to the RT exchanges. No such transmissions were heard, I declared I was ready for departure (the aerodrome is A/G only), and the wind was provided. As soon as I stated I was entering the runway, A/G advised ‘hold’. I held immediately, wondering what the problem was. I checked the approach to find an aircraft on short final, partially obscured by trees very close to the threshold, having made no radio transmissions at any stage during its arrival to the airfield, and entering the ATZ by a straight-in approach, not overhead, which gave almost no warning of the aircraft’s presence. Concerned that I may have missed a crucial R/T call, I asked if my passenger had heard anything, who said they had not. I asked the A/G operator whether transmissions had been received from the arriving aircraft, and he confirmed they had not.

I can confirm the landing aircraft did not join overhead.  Had it done so, it would have provided a much longer period to be spotted, and would have appeared against a sky backdrop, and not the high ground to its rear that helped mask it. A peculiarity was that, when I asked the A/G operator to advise, before lining-up and after the aircraft had cleared the active runway, whether it had sent transmissions (that I may not have heard) on arrival, the A/G operator responded ‘negative’ and the pilot of the now just-landed aircraft was prompted by this to send what were broken calls and, after what seemed like a ‘fiddle with the connections’, made a perfectly-readable apology for the incident. I simply responded briefly ‘no problem, these things happen’, and no more was heard of the matter.

Lessons learned:

(1) Avoid distraction at busy pre-departure stage; double-check the approach before entering.

(2) Recognise radios do fail

(3) If radio fails, join overhead, not straight in.

(4) Divert asap on radio failure; don’t just continue.

I was returning to my familiar home base with a setting sun to the west for a landing on one of the westerly parallel runways (there being no discerning separation between the two runways other than the numbers on the thresholds which are painted white). In the half-light it was difficult to make out the runways and I initially lined up on the taxiway (also grass). I pointed out this potential hazard to ATC who said to repaint the numbers would involve closing the runway and inconveniencing the pilot fraternity! The controller complained of the need to weed the area first and repaint the numbers.  Unless something is done about it I believe there will be an incident.  At [Airfield] there does not appear to be any formal process to pursue the local ATC to maintain the runways to a suitable standard. Lesson learned:  Positively identify the runway before commencing an approach but if there is a lack of markings it would still prove too difficult.

While visiting various airfields I have become aware of what seems to be a total lack of knowledge of propwash and the damage it can cause. I have seen pilots starting engines and taxying away from open hangars and turning aeroplanes in close proximity to other machines with no regard to the possible damage that can be caused. I took an instructor to task having watched him blast another aeroplane causing the controls to slam to their stops, he seemed almost oblivious that he could have possibly caused any damage!

Before setting off on a local flight from [Home airfield], a fellow pilot invited me to go to nearby [minor airfield], each in our own craft. The flight started in very calm conditions but, during the flight, my GPS failed and could not be restarted. Because I had been there many times, I knew where the field was. Just before arriving I identified a ground feature which is close to [minor airfield], but the colour was different to what I have seen before, this put some doubt about my position, and the wind strength had increased to what we later estimated to be over 35/40mph. The wind direction was from SE/E, and the intended runway was [SSW]. I identified the runway and started to descend on Final. At about 10ft above the runway, a strong gust caught my wing and the starboard wing dropped violently, I immediately decided to do a go-around.

I climbed to 500ft and started another circuit; at this point the other pilot had not reported his position and I was unsure of his position. Whilst looking for him I was travelling further north than I have ever done before and entered the Drop Zone for [Parachute centre], which is only 1 mile north of [minor airfield].  I could see the drop plane on the ground but could not see any parachutists.  When the instructor at [minor airfield] landed after a lesson, they informed me that the parachute centre had reported to him the infringement and would I contact the parachute centre to discuss the incident. During our conversation I was shocked/upset to find that there were 8 parachutists descending while I flew over the DZ. In future I will stay well south of [minor airfield] until I can identify positively the runway and, if [SSW] runway is being used, I will fly a tighter base leg.

I consider myself to be a sensible and low risk-taking pilot. I have always trained and had no real rush to the finish line. I have been learning to fly with the ambition of flying my ex-military aircraft. Over the 4 years of the aircraft’s restoration I learned to fly (PPL), did a night rating, IRR and built up my hours on PA28’s and others. There was no rush. The military aircraft was completed and over the course of 2018/2019 I qualified to fly it. During this instruction I met fantastic pilots, all ex-RAF guys and/or RAF instructors and their training was and still is, world class.

I solo flew the aircraft with 2 others down to a weekend meeting where I mixed with incredible pilots of unattainable standards. On the Sunday the weather was bad but 3 aircraft had to fly back to home base some 150 miles north, mine included. We agreed there was an hour-long window around 11am and so we all set off with the 2 other aircraft in formation and me behind them solo navigating. The journey was the hardest flight I have ever undertaken. The weather was raining with low clouds and bad visibility all the way – there was a front coming down that I had to pick through. It is important to note here that ex-military aircraft are ‘Permit to fly’ aircraft and can only fly VMC otherwise I would have climbed above the weather. Eventually the weather cleared, and I landed at home base about 15mins after the other 2 aircraft. At no time during the flight was there any danger, and my training had kept me calm and focused. I was elated. After a debrief I got ready to fly my SEP back to its home base but the weather had closed in and the visibility was low with a cloud height of 300ft. I waited.

Eventually the visibility got slightly better and the cloud height raised a little. This is where it all went wrong. I decided to depart and started to taxi to the hold. I missed a turning on the taxiway and had to turn around. I got to the hold and the tower asked if I was sure that conditions were safe. I waited, rang my home airfield, who confirmed the bad weather was local to me, waited a few more minutes then lined up. There was a strong crosswind from the left and the clouds were around 400ft. I sat there for a few seconds then applied full power; 10secs later I was stopped on the grass to the left of the runway having slewed to the left at 40 knots or so and gone straight off the runway. I was not hurt nor the plane damaged, but this inevitability shut the airfield for 2 hours while I was recovered. I got a taxi home.

So, what happened? After many hours and sleepless nights, I have come to these conclusions:

• I was extremely tired after the taxing flight. I was on a high and didn’t realise this.
• Being around pilots way beyond my ability made me over-confident.
• I ignored my own limits. The weather for the home flight was way too bad for my experience level. I had ‘get home-itis’.
• There were obvious signs that I ignored during the Taxi. I missed a turn! Why? The Tower we’re concerned! I should have turned back to the Apron.
• The conditions were poor. I should never have approached the aircraft.

I consider myself to be reasonably intelligent person, aware of these issues, and yet I ended up where I did. Thankfully no one was harmed but it could have been so much worse. My advice is to never breach your own self-set limits. You set them when you are thinking straight, so trust them.

Whilst disembarking a PA38 post flight I placed my left foot on the step secured to the fuselage below the starboard wing trailing edge. As I released my footing from my right leg – which was on the trailing edge – my left foot slipped from the step and I fell vertically-upright to the apron and landed heavily. I then lost my balance and fell back, impacting my head and lower lumbar region on the apron. I suffered a small cut to the back of my head and bruising as well as back pain. I subsequently learned that other persons have experienced similar falls over the last 3 years due to slippage on the steps of these types: one had severe leg injury and complex surgery; and another had a contusion along his inner quad which could easily have been serious in respect of femoral artery damage. To clarify, the step does have non-slip tape on it (see picture) but, as with all these things, it is below its original efficiency, especially when wet. I would suggest that all operators/owners of these aircraft inspect the condition of the step surfaces and, where necessary, ensure the non-slip surface is intact.

I also think it’s worth highlighting that the PA38 has a shorter wing chord than the PA28 so to close the door and lock the top latch means you have to slide around the door; if a person is used to a PA28 with a longer wing chord (where you can remain comfortably on the inner wing to close the door) it’s an easy ‘oversight’ if you expect footage when stepping back on a PA38. I have communicated my observations to my line manager for awareness and promulgation within the organisation because it is important to highlight the hazards of access/egress if the surface of the steps are not non-slip. They responded positively and requested an SMS report form be completed – the incident will be discussed at the next Safety meeting.