CHIRP Cabin Crew Advisory Board (CCAB) Comment CC6405 and FC5275:

CHIRP are increasingly receiving reports from both cabin crew and flight crew who are worried about the amount of alcohol that can be bought and consumed whilst in the airport terminal and during flights. Reports CC6405 and FC5275 highlight the concerns seen by the entire crew.

An individual’s tolerance to alcohol is variable but the cabin environment with its reduced pressure and humidity can result in dehydration and mild hypoxia which, when combined with alcohol, can result in intoxication and this is frequently mentioned as one of the major contributing causal factors in disruptive passenger incidents. Whilst many airports and operators are promoting the onetoomany campaign advising passengers of the implication of being disruptive onboard, there are currently no licensing laws in UK airport terminals.

Some airlines have had discussions with the police and airport operators to ensure that the duty-free staff are aware of the consequences of passengers drinking airport bought beverages onboard and how to mitigate the situation, however it’s often a crew member who spots the problem first. Many operators have adopted a zero tolerance PAs and also refuse to serve passengers more than a certain number of drinks each, the drink service can also be aborted if passengers prove to be unruly or intoxicated.

Regardless of whether alcohol is involved the Commander has the authority to off load passengers and the SCCM should liaise with the flight crew as soon as possible if a situation arises in the cabin Please refer to the editorial for more information and advice.

CHIRP Air Transport Advisory Board (ATAB) Comment CC6405 and FC5275:

Disruptive passengers are a particular problem at the moment and are recognised as such by the industry and regulator; this matter has also been discussed by the CHIRP Cabin Crew Advisory Board (CCAB) who have published associated comments in Cabin Crew FEEDBACK Edition 81 offering practical advice about de-escalation but CHIRP agrees that more should be done to deny boarding of potentially disruptive passengers in the first place.

We note that the first reading of the ‘Aviation Banning Orders (Disruptive Passengers)’ Bill recently occurred in Parliament (24th May 2023) and this is intended to give some legal basis for action. However, the second reading in Parliament is not due until 24th November 2023 and so, although a welcome initiative, this is not expected to provide any productive resolution this year.

Part of the problem is that responsibilities for action are not clear: ground staff often just want to get rid of the problem by getting passengers onto the aircraft; airport bars and pubs want to maximise profits; and cabin crew are then often left to deal with the problem. As the commander of the aircraft, captains have a responsibility to support overtly and visibly (when practical) their cabin crew in the handling of disruptive passengers, and airlines could also usefully collaborate with an exclusion list such that problem passengers identified by one airline are banned from all airlines.

Within Annex 17 ‘Aviation Security’, ICAO defines a disruptive passenger as: “A passenger who fails to respect the rules of conduct at an airport or on board an aircraft or to follow the instructions of the airport staff or crew members and thereby disturbs the good order and discipline at an airport or on board the aircraft.” ICAO also defines a hierarchy of 4 levels of disruptive behaviour as below, and the Skybrary article ‘Unruly Passengers’ provides useful further material.

Legal action in respect of Level 3 and 4 is probably fairly straight-forward, but Level 1 and 2 transgressions are harder to deal with legally, and the threshold for when a Level 2 transgression becomes illegal under the Offences Against a Person Act 1861 is sometimes hard to determine. In regulatory terms, once the associated Aviation Banning Orders Bill mentioned above has passed through Parliament and become law, the acceptable level of evidence for legal action and bans should be clearer and more could probably be done in defining how to deal with such incidents, the powers of gate staff / cabin crew and the permitted levels of intoxication of passengers.

ICAO Hierarchy of Disruptive Behaviour

Level 1 – Disruptive Behaviour (verbal)

This can include: irrational or disorderly behaviour involving alcohol or drugs; abusive language; and defiant actions such as non-compliance with Crew Member commands.

Level 2 – Physically Abusive Behaviour

This can include: pushing; grabbing; hitting or kicking a cabin crew Member or another passenger; damage to aircraft equipment and systems; or damage to the personal effects of a Cabin Crew Member or another passenger.

Level 3 – Life Threatening Behaviour (or display of a weapon)

The involvement of a weapon in any passenger disturbance immediately increases the level of threat. A weapon is a means by which terrorists can rapidly achieve control of a large number of passengers and cabin crew by intimidation.

The threat of a concealed weapon, the display of a weapon and the use of a weapon are all life threatening scenarios. When there is a threat of a concealed weapon cabin crew should attempt by peaceful means to confirm the existence of the weapon. When a passenger’s behaviour deliberately threatens life, with or without a weapon being displayed, then the cabin crew should assume that the action may escalate into an attempted hijack. Weapons include: guns; explosives; stun guns; knives, any item incorporating a sharp point or edge; and wires and cords etc.

Level 4 – Attempted or Actual Breach of the Flight Crew Compartment

The highest level of threat is an attempted or actual breach of the flight deck, whether intended, threatened or achieved. Hijackers may concentrate on violence or the threat of violence against cabin crew and passengers in order to gain access to the flight deck, rather than an initial attempt to breach the flight deck.

Any threat or attempt to gain access to the flight deck has one purpose, to gain control of the flying of the aircraft, which may include the possibility of using the aircraft as a weapon.

CHIRP Cabin Crew Advisory Board (CCAB) Comment CC6405 and FC5275:

CHIRP are increasingly receiving reports from both cabin crew and flight crew who are worried about the amount of alcohol that can be bought and consumed whilst in the airport terminal and during flights. Reports CC6405 and FC5275 highlight the concerns seen by the entire crew.

An individual’s tolerance to alcohol is variable but the cabin environment with its reduced pressure and humidity can result in dehydration and mild hypoxia which, when combined with alcohol, can result in intoxication and this is frequently mentioned as one of the major contributing causal factors in disruptive passenger incidents. Whilst many airports and operators are promoting the onetoomany campaign advising passengers of the implication of being disruptive onboard, there are currently no licensing laws in UK airport terminals.

Some airlines have had discussions with the police and airport operators to ensure that the duty-free staff are aware of the consequences of passengers drinking airport bought beverages onboard and how to mitigate the situation, however it’s often a crew member who spots the problem first. Many operators have adopted a zero tolerance PAs and also refuse to serve passengers more than a certain number of drinks each, the drink service can also be aborted if passengers prove to be unruly or intoxicated.

Regardless of whether alcohol is involved the Commander has the authority to off load passengers and the SCCM should liaise with the flight crew as soon as possible if a situation arises in the cabin Please refer to the editorial for more information and advice.

CHIRP Air Transport Advisory Board (ATAB) Comment CC6405 and FC5275:

Disruptive passengers are a particular problem at the moment and are recognised as such by the industry and regulator; this matter has also been discussed by the CHIRP Cabin Crew Advisory Board (CCAB) who have published associated comments in Cabin Crew FEEDBACK Edition 81 offering practical advice about de-escalation but CHIRP agrees that more should be done to deny boarding of potentially disruptive passengers in the first place.

We note that the first reading of the ‘Aviation Banning Orders (Disruptive Passengers)’ Bill recently occurred in Parliament (24th May 2023) and this is intended to give some legal basis for action. However, the second reading in Parliament is not due until 24th November 2023 and so, although a welcome initiative, this is not expected to provide any productive resolution this year.

Part of the problem is that responsibilities for action are not clear: ground staff often just want to get rid of the problem by getting passengers onto the aircraft; airport bars and pubs want to maximise profits; and cabin crew are then often left to deal with the problem. As the commander of the aircraft, captains have a responsibility to support overtly and visibly (when practical) their cabin crew in the handling of disruptive passengers, and airlines could also usefully collaborate with an exclusion list such that problem passengers identified by one airline are banned from all airlines.

Within Annex 17 ‘Aviation Security’, ICAO defines a disruptive passenger as: “A passenger who fails to respect the rules of conduct at an airport or on board an aircraft or to follow the instructions of the airport staff or crew members and thereby disturbs the good order and discipline at an airport or on board the aircraft.” ICAO also defines a hierarchy of 4 levels of disruptive behaviour as below, and the Skybrary article ‘Unruly Passengers’ provides useful further material.

Legal action in respect of Level 3 and 4 is probably fairly straight-forward, but Level 1 and 2 transgressions are harder to deal with legally, and the threshold for when a Level 2 transgression becomes illegal under the Offences Against a Person Act 1861 is sometimes hard to determine. In regulatory terms, once the associated Aviation Banning Orders Bill mentioned above has passed through Parliament and become law, the acceptable level of evidence for legal action and bans should be clearer and more could probably be done in defining how to deal with such incidents, the powers of gate staff / cabin crew and the permitted levels of intoxication of passengers.

ICAO Hierarchy of Disruptive Behaviour

Level 1 – Disruptive Behaviour (verbal)

This can include: irrational or disorderly behaviour involving alcohol or drugs; abusive language; and defiant actions such as non-compliance with Crew Member commands.

Level 2 – Physically Abusive Behaviour

This can include: pushing; grabbing; hitting or kicking a cabin crew Member or another passenger; damage to aircraft equipment and systems; or damage to the personal effects of a Cabin Crew Member or another passenger.

Level 3 – Life Threatening Behaviour (or display of a weapon)

The involvement of a weapon in any passenger disturbance immediately increases the level of threat. A weapon is a means by which terrorists can rapidly achieve control of a large number of passengers and cabin crew by intimidation.

The threat of a concealed weapon, the display of a weapon and the use of a weapon are all life threatening scenarios. When there is a threat of a concealed weapon cabin crew should attempt by peaceful means to confirm the existence of the weapon. When a passenger’s behaviour deliberately threatens life, with or without a weapon being displayed, then the cabin crew should assume that the action may escalate into an attempted hijack. Weapons include: guns; explosives; stun guns; knives, any item incorporating a sharp point or edge; and wires and cords etc.

Level 4 – Attempted or Actual Breach of the Flight Crew Compartment

The highest level of threat is an attempted or actual breach of the flight deck, whether intended, threatened or achieved. Hijackers may concentrate on violence or the threat of violence against cabin crew and passengers in order to gain access to the flight deck, rather than an initial attempt to breach the flight deck.

Any threat or attempt to gain access to the flight deck has one purpose, to gain control of the flying of the aircraft, which may include the possibility of using the aircraft as a weapon.

Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are designed to ensure consistency during a process such as the arming of aircraft doors, having a SOP in place allows every crew member to be aware of the procedure and of what should happen next. If for safety reasons, after considering the risk and safety impact, you have deviated from SOPs you should communicate this to your crew and the commander. Deviations from standard operating procedures, especially concerning errors or near-misses, should be report using the operator’s reporting scheme.  This is essential to enable implementation of measures to prevent re-occurrence and escalation of severity.

Due to the use of the PA by the flight crew, the SCCM crew member was unable to make the standard PA as per the operators door arming SOP. Without the SCCM deviating from the door arming SOP and making an interphone call rather than a PA, the aircraft may have been taxiing for several minutes with unarmed doors, which is also against the SOP.

There may be reasons why the commands were incorrect on the day that can be explained, or it might be that the SCCM needs some additional support, the operator is best placed to offer this support if it is required which is why with any safety concerns it is particularly important to report your concerns internally. Trends are one aspect of reports that are monitored and CHIRP is aware of one operator who recently revised a SOP as a result of safety reporting by crew.

CHIRP are unable to investigate reports without a reporters permission, often when a reporter hasn’t reported their concerns internally they don’t want CHIRP to contact their operator either so CHIRP are in a position where they can’t investigate and/or resolve a reported safety concern.

CHIRP empathise with the crew on any long duty day as they can be very tiring. It is important on any duty to manage your breaks appropriately and if this requires the service to be adapted, then please speak to your SCCM who can support appropriate planning of crew breaks through the duty. Again, any adaptations or deviations should always be documented.

This report refers to an ‘extended duty’, an extended FDP allows the Flight Duty Period (FDP) for acclimatised crew members to be increased without the use of in-flight rest – this equates to an additional hour being applied to the FDP. With the duty being extended so is the amount of rest required, 4 additional hours rest must be included as either a pre and post-flight rest extension of 2 hours, or a post-flight rest increase of 4 hours. You cannot do more than 2 extended duties in any 7 consecutive days. An extended FDP duty must be planned in advance or the crew member must be on a specific standby that is to cover ‘extended duty’ flights.

CHIRP Cabin Crew Advisory Board (CCAB) Comment:

The pilot in command should have informed the senior cabin crew member of the intention for the flight crew member to take controlled rest (in seat napping) and frequent contact should be established between the non-resting flight crew member and the cabin crew.

Given historic industry incidents, the Captain’s failure to respond to the interphone call and the delay in responding to the flight deck door code being entered may have made the cabin crew member question what scenario they were about to confront. Cabin crew should query with the flight crew if they do not answer/make the calls as per the operator’s procedure as there may be a simple reason why the SOP was deviated from.

CHIRP Air Transport Advisory Board (ATAB) Comment

CHIRP has received a number of reports in the past from cabin crew regarding the procedure and practice of flight crew Controlled Rest, and it’s one of those areas where reminders about what the process should be are useful.

Controlled Rest is sometimes referred to as ‘in-seat-napping’ and is used by most UK operators. It is the process where the flight crew can be ‘off task’, including taking short periods of sleep, whilst temporarily being relieved of operational duties in accordance with company prescribed ‘controlled rest’ procedures.

UK regulations GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.210 ‘Crew members at stations’ describes the overall rules for conducting Controlled Rest, which is limited to 45mins per individual at any one time, with a maximum of 30mins asleep so that they don’t enter deep sleep/sleep inertia. Under Controlled Rest, one member of the flight crew should always be awake at all times and, although flight crew can sequentially take controlled rest, there should be 20mins between such periods to ensure that the crew member who has come out of rest is fully alert and briefed before the other one enters rest.

Controlled Rest should only be used during periods of reduced cockpit workload i.e. during cruise, and has been proved to increase alertness levels during other critical stages of flight such as the approach and landing. Some of the longer-range aircraft have designated rest areas for the flight crew to use but these should only be used when there are more than two flight crew rostered to operate the flight.

The need for flight crew to inform cabin crew that they are undertaking Controlled Rest is a fundamental requirement both to ensure that such periods are not interrupted by the cabin crew but also for safety reasons so that the cabin crew can ensure that both operating flight crew have not inadvertently fallen asleep.

The flight crew must tell the cabin crew how long they will be conducting Controlled Rest for, and the plan for regular contact intervals (e.g. every 30mins) to ensure that communications between the cabin crew and flight crew are maintained. In support of this, there should be procedures stated in the company’s OM-B for how controlled rest will be managed. When conducting contact at the prescribed interval, cabin crew should understand that an immediate response may not be possible if the awake flight crew member is busy with other tasks such as communicating with ATC or carrying out critical flight activities that delay them responding.

In recent months, CHIRP has received an increasing number of reports regarding the usage of the commander’s discretion and the belief that it is being relied on in some rosters. Commander’s discretion should not be used on a planned basis but is intended to be employed for those unplanned and unforeseen circumstances and delays that occur which would take the crew beyond their FDP limit. The use of commander’s discretion is not a safety issue in itself provided it is managed properly.

CHIRP has presented these reports to the CAA in aggregate and has asked that they consider both reviewing the specific companies’ policies on discretion and the reality of actual current rosters. As a result, the CAA have focused some of their oversight activities for particular airlines in this area and have commented that there needs to be a better understanding of discretion within the industry overall. In recognising this, the CAA have recently published an open letter to operator’s giving more detailed guidance and advice on what discretion is and the rules for its use which is now available on the CHIRP website. https://chirp.co.uk/hot-topic/commanders-discretion/

AMC1 ORO.CC.100 states: when scheduling cabin crew for a flight, the operator should establish procedures that take account of the experience of each cabin crew member. The procedures should specify that the required cabin crew includes some cabin crew members who have at least 3 months experience as an operating cabin crew member.

Some operators stipulate in their operations manual an additional experienced crew member is required however, some operators do not, technically as long as one crew member is experienced on board then that meets regulatory requirements.

It can be more challenging to operate on an aircraft with an inexperienced crew than one with an experienced crew, and CHIRP is sympathetic to the crew in that circumstance. Naturally, experienced crew should assist new crew members whenever feasible, as we were all new once. Since all new crew members have undergone intense training, one could counter that, from the standpoint of an emergency, someone who has just finished their training is more familiar with the emergency procedure than someone who is about to have their annual recurrent; however, even though they may have received recent training, they may not be as confident in using these procedures. Keep in mind that safety comes first, so any service-related tasks should come after any safety-related tasks. If the senior needs to change the in-flight service to reflect this, they should document the reason why so that the operator can monitor their reports for trends.