The Charity
Aviation
Maritime
Report summary: [Location] NOTAM indicated airfield was closing for 35 minutes (11.00-11.35) to observe ATC break. Vectors given for runway [number] with low cloud base and marginal conditions. [The situation] was made worse by being told aircraft needed to land by 10.50, [10 minutes earlier than the NOTAM-stated closure time]. Calculated 10.48 so [timing] was ok. During landing, a significant tailwind was experienced, just within aircraft limits but not ideal for an [AT aircraft type] on a short runway. Notified ATC when landed and this was simply put down to changing wind direction. Would have been better to have been vectored for reciprocal runway 08, but this, I assume would have taken longer to vector and [therefore] would have been closer to the closure time.
CAA Comment
Although the Scheme for Regulation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Hours (SRATCOH), previously in Part D of CAP670, is no longer included as a requirement (following publication of ORS 9 Decision 6), it is still available as guidance, and most ANSPs use it. The purpose of SRATCOH is to ensure, so far as is reasonably possible, that controller fatigue does not endanger aircraft and thereby to assist controllers and ANSPs to provide a safe and effective service. The adjustment in regulations allows ANSPs to develop bespoke fatigue risk management systems if they wish. We would expect that any fatigue risk management system would (like SRATCOH did/does) allow for discretionary extension of duties (when a controller is not fatigued) similar to the discretion applied to flight crews. However, current FRM systems in ATC have historically been perceived as somewhat ‘rigid’, with an unjustified assumption that the CAA will take licensing action as a result of each and every any fatigue risk management breach. In reality the CAA reviews every breach report but will only take action where breaches are systemic or excessively repetitive, or where there is an indication that a controller may have continued to provide services whilst fatigued. The CAA recognises that that there will sometimes be circumstances when (for example) extending a duty is a sensible and pragmatic decision provided the controller does not feel fatigued. Example situations include facilitating a landing aircraft that would otherwise need to be diverted, or that was operating on a medical evacuation / organ transfer flight. Provided the event is reported with a clear explanation for the breach and includes reasonable and safe decision making, then the CAA will be sympathetic; licencing action is highly unlikely. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of each individual ATCO not to control when fatigued, but there is always scope for being flexible and adaptable when it is sensible to do so.
This report highlights a number of human factors-based issues. Firstly, it serves as a reminder that captains shouldn’t feel obliged to accept an unsuitable runway, no matter what the circumstances. The captain is responsible for the safety of the aircraft, and it is always advisable to question ATC instructions that are either out of limits or marginally safe. The reporter was clearly uncomfortable with the alternative runway given and seemed to feel pressurised into accepting it. It might have been better in this situation, when there was a more ‘into wind’ option, to have pressed the controller for this option. Albeit that it is human nature to ‘show willing’ and accept instructions as given, especially when there is perceived pressure i.e. the notification that the aircraft needed to land 10 minutes before the NOTAM’d airfield closing time. Although the full details behind this incident aren’t known, it is possible that the controller was working both tower and ground and would need to get the aircraft on stand before their mandatory rest period began. There is sympathy for controllers trying to juggle lots of variables and remain within limits; it is also possible that the controller wasn’t aware of the full implications of the runway offered. Given that the incident occurred some time ago, it hasn’t been possible to gain more information than that presented by the reporter, however, it seems likely that the airfield was closing for a 35-minute break to facilitate a Fatigue Risk Management (FRM) requirement. It was on basis of this assumption that CHIRP consulted the CAA for a view of the application of FRM in Air Traffic Control (above).