Confidential Human Factors
Incident Reporting Programme
The Charity
Aviation
Maritime
ENG753
Initial Report
We have been the maintenance provider for this airline for many years. There have always been problems with the airline’s crew not reporting faults, but lately it seems to have got worse. It is now commonplace for there to be no defect entries in the log but a number of status messages on the EICAS. In addition, there has been an increase of their own maintenance engineers extending deferred defects (Deferred Maintenance Item – DMI) by clearing a fault in the Tech log on the day the MEL restriction expires or a few days before, then immediately raising another DMI with the same fault and the same MEL reference for another period. e.g. Cat C of 10 days. I have seen evidence of this being performed up to three times, effectively extending a Cat C MEL restriction to 30 days. This clearly violates international regulations.
In addition, very recently a VVIP flight transited through [Station] and the aircraft taxied on to stand with flames around the left main landing-gear bogie. There are video images available. [Station] emergency services attended, the ‘fire’ self-extinguished with no intervention by fire services. On inspection, ‘sooting’ was clearly visible on one of the electric brake actuators of the #5 brake unit. As this was a VVIP flight the aircraft carried its own certifying engineers. We attended to assist only. The certifying engineers from [operator] took a quick look at the brake and, as far as I know, took no further action. I found this a bit odd. I would have, at the very least, carried out a spin-check to check for brake binding and a function test to ensure the fire was not caused by an electrical fault. I did not have access to the tech log that day so I have no idea what, if any, trouble shooting was carried out from the flight deck or if indeed the incident was reported.
I could go on, there are regular issues with non-compliance of regulatory requirements. A recent example is of a cargo hold lining that is clearly unserviceable. It has been found detached from the rear of the forward hold on several occasions. This week we took a stand and made the forward hold inop I.A.W. the MEL. This caused problems as no cargo or bags may be carried in that hold. We were begged by the station manager to allow use of the hold because they would have to off-load 50 bags, with the promise that it would be fixed at main base. Considering that we have seen this problem multiple times on the same aircraft for months and it hadn’t been fixed in that time, we had no confidence that it would be dealt with effectively on this occasion either.
It is getting to the point where I and my colleagues no longer feel confident certifying these aircraft, the turnrounds are stressful and invariably the aircraft arrives late and pressure for a quick turn round is obvious. SAFA inspections do not seem to be working.
CHIRP Comment
The reporter’s employer was contacted with the reporter’s permission. The initial response was that the Quality/ Safety/ Compliance Department were aware of the issues and were reluctant to cancel the contract because it would effectively reduce the workload at the station and loss of contract could in turn be detrimental to staffing requirements. No follow-up communication was received due to Quality/ Safety/ Compliance work pressures.
Flying with EICAS messages that are no go, or cannot be deferred by the MEL, is obviously unacceptable but the manufacturers of a modern aircraft would ‘see’ these and therefore the ADDs would not align with the electronic history of the aircraft. The extension of ADDs can also be checked with the electronic history. Perhaps these were Rectification Interval Extension defects (RIE). Although the re-raising of a defect three times would be very strange unless it’s non-airworthiness related, e.g. CAT D. The fire should have been addressed in accordance with the Aircraft Maintenance Manual and its cause established.
A great many of us will have experienced these difficulties in both Line and Base maintenance. The Base environment has a certain amount of time and speed alleviation in this situation. The MRO can take the required time for rectification whilst sending in a raft of MORs as applicable. The Line is a different thing altogether; fewer staff, with possibly only a sole engineer. The pressure from the customer is face-to-face, and the MRO’s commercial department may be thousands of miles away. Discussions can be difficult, possibly stressful with differing cultural practices and expectations.
AMC1 145.A.50(e) Certification of maintenance Para 2 Note states: “Whether or not the person or organisation responsible for the aircraft continuing airworthiness does have the authority to defer maintenance, is an issue between that person or organisation and the CAA. In case of doubt concerning such a decision, the approved maintenance organisation should inform the CAA of such doubt, before issuing the certificate of release to service. This will allow the CAA to investigate the matter”.
These situations should hopefully get picked up during Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft Audits (SAFA) in normal circumstances, and good reporting from the suffering engineer/s may lead to an increase in surveillance by SAFA audit. It is not that unusual to find that certain operators, or just certain types in their fleet, become excluded from our airspace.