GA1353

The instructor’s comments paint a very different picture to that of the reporter, and, notwithstanding their pre-flight telephone call to the destination, may reflect the difference between the departure airfield local weather conditions experienced during the instructor’s short flight and the reality along the route; it appears from the reporter’s comments that the conditions that actually pertained along the route by the time the students were in that area were very different. We all know that TAFs contain a degree of uncertainty, especially if you’re relying on one from a different airfield in the region [Airfield 3] where local weather effects can cause important differences. It’s easy to get caught out if relying on a destination METAR and another airfield’s TAF in the region, and this needs to be fully considered when sending pre-PPL students on cross-country flights; obtaining as good an understanding as possible of the region’s synoptic situation is vital, including reviewing TAFs from a number of airfields, so that students have weather information that is as comprehensive as possible. The Met Office F214 and F215 charts (spot wind and low-level weather forecasts respectively) and their Aviation Briefing Service (ABS) should be one of the first ports of call for such information – the free version of the ABS provides the essentials.

All that needs to be balanced by the instructor’s comments that the students were briefed on the actions to take if poor weather was encountered. The first student at least was participating in an integrated course; this meant that they had very low hours and experience, no PPL, and were potentially under financial and organisational pressure to complete the course expeditiously. We can only speculate about what was going on in the students’ minds at the time and so mustn’t jump to conclusions, but it does seem odd that both seemed happy to continue towards bad weather despite all warnings, with one reportedly even stating they were entering cloud before turning around. We’ve seen such occurrences before, and the AAIB investigation into the G-BHFI incident of 8^thSeptember 2020 has similarities in many respects.

There are likely many generic lessons in this report relating to flights in deteriorating VFR, many of which are covered in the recently published CAA Safety Sense Leaflet 33 titled ‘VFR into IMC Flight’. Although we make no specific statements as to what actually happened, potential takeaways for training organisations to consider are: assumptions of understanding; press-on-itis in a training environment; pressures to fly (perceived, financial and self-imposed); supervision of students; comprehensive briefing to students about weather limits; fulsome and unambiguous out-briefs (especially to students, and including ‘what if’ scenarios); decision making; and a host of other factors related to training inexperienced students. Indeed, the complete gamut of the Dirty Dozen Human Factors descriptors probably applies in one form or another (although there was no evidence of Fatigue that we know of), namely: Deviation, Complacency, Assertiveness, Teamwork, Communication, Knowledge, Awareness, Distraction, Resources, Pressure, and Stress. Ultimately, this incident emphasises the duty on instructors to look after and think ahead for their students (who were, after all, unqualified at that point and flying under the authorisation of their instructors).