The Charity
Aviation
Maritime
I would like to pass on my learning following an EFATO at a low height but too far along the runway to land back on. After a cross-country, I returned to the home airfield and made several touch-and-goes on runway [1] which terminates close to a [dual carriageway] with a heavy wood of trees beyond. To the right is runway [2] which I had been taught could be used if experiencing an EFATO.
The engine cut at perhaps 75-100 feet. As it was a touch-and-go in a taildragger with no flaps and not inspiring climb performance, my climb had started later along the runway than normal and towards the end of the runway. I had made around 100-150 feet and was climbing fine. The engine cut and the propeller stopped. At this point I was unable to land back on the runway. Ahead was the [dual carriageway] full of traffic, and beyond a dense wood. You are taught to consider your options and take time. There was no time. From the engine cutting to being on the ground was at most 10secs.
I dropped the nose to maintain flying speed (as taught when I was gliding and practising a cable break) and only had the time to repeat a swear word about 3 times before I pulled back to round-out. The aircraft did not act as it normally does, the nose raised to horizontal and not beyond to the landing attitude, the aircraft struck the ground and the bungee landing gear collapsed. I had not reached runway [2] but instead a patch of uncut rough. I was physically OK, although the aircraft had taken a knock. Thoughts:
Main lessons learned:
The reporter highlights a number of valid lessons learned but this incident also usefully highlights the potential pitfalls that pilots should consider when conducting touch-and-goes. As with any take-off, pilots should always have in mind a Plan B for if the engine fails, and touch-and-goes are no exception. Touch-and-goes should only be conducted if there is the capability to land ahead or remain on the runway if engine problems are encountered as the throttle is advanced. If the runway length is potentially limiting then consider carefully the merits of conducting touch-and-goes versus go-arounds or a full-stop and taxy back to the runway threshold for a full-length take-off. Also, if touch-and-goes (or go-arounds) are conducted, then it is good practice not to climb at minimum speed (i.e. maximum climb angle) but to climb nearer to best glide speed (i.e. a shallower angle and higher speed) so that there is energy in hand to adjust the aircraft’s attitude and glide if engine problems are experienced. Furthermore, if touch-and-goes (or go-arounds) are to be conducted, then it is good practice to run through a ‘departures brief’ eventualities TEM process when downwind to consider what options might be available if the engine were to fail.
As the reporter comments, glide performance is much reduced with a stopped engine compared to one that is idling (which is what is normally practiced), and so setting a familiar nose-down ‘glide’ attitude that has been practiced before might not be enough to maintain speed during the real thing; pilots should factor that into their considerations for engine-failure options. We also strongly agree with the comment that changing fuel tank selections during circuits is almost certainly not advisable (subject of course to any aircraft-specific POH statements) because it leaves open the possibility of leaving the fuel selector in the wrong position by mistake – the main tank is normally the one to use in the visual circuit.
Finally, it is disappointing to read that people at the airfield had reportedly not better assisted the mishap pilot after their experience. Aviation is a collective endeavour and we all owe it to others to be supportive in such circumstances irrespective of how we might perceive the situation had unfolded.
The following ‘Dirty Dozen’ Human Factors elements were a key part of the CHIRP discussions about this report and are intended to provide food for thought when considering aspects that might be pertinent in similar circumstances.