The Charity
Aviation
Maritime
This is my summary of the incident that I wrote as my personal learning experience and shared it with other members of the aircraft group. Events leading to infringement:
On pre-flight check, I saw that the step onto the wing was cracked and had to find engineers to confirm aircraft was safe to fly, this didnât leave me in a relaxed frame of mind.
Mistake 1 â Maybe should have cancelled flight at this stage, felt I was rushing as I had given a booking out time to ATC.
I had planned for departure via [Reporting Point 1] and was cleared with this route and taxied to the holding point. A [Aircraft 1] was cleared onto the runway at [RWY entrance point 1] and, at the same time, in front of me at [Runway entrance point 2], a [Aircraft 2] was also cleared onto the runway. [Aircraft 2] took off first planning to turn left, [Aircraft 1] was given take-off clearance with a right turn almost immediately [Aircraft 2] had got airborne. As the [Aircraft 2] was starting to turn left they contacted the tower saying a nose locker had opened and they needed to return to land â stated no immediate danger. I contacted Tower saying I was at [Runway entrance point 2] ready for departure, [Aircraft 2] had only just turned crosswind.
Mistake 2 â I should have been patient and not tried to âpushâ the controller, just left me feeling frustrated, although I know [Aircraft 2]s donât fly well with a baggage door flapping about!
[Aircraft 2] landed without incident, and I was cleared onto [RWY] and instructed to backtrack to [Runway entrance point 1] to allow a FOD inspection. Vehicle entered runway to carry out the check. When vehicle cleared the runway, I was given an amended departure via [Reporting Point 2], controller noted my hesitation and stated if I couldnât accept [Reporting Point 2] I would be delayed. I checked my chart, noted position of [Reporting Point 2], and accepted.
Mistake 3 â I hadnât figured out how I was going to get from [Reporting Point 2] back onto course to [Airfield 1]. Should have accepted a delay and if necessary vacated runway.
Took off and routed to [Reporting Point 2] â Tower controller asked me to stay with him until I was very close to [Reporting Point 2] when finally handed to Approach. I was told I had left controlled airspace, to squawk Conspicuity, and to route to destination, controller seemed hesitant on who I should contact and eventually suggested [Airfield 2] approach.
Mistake 4 â should have been more assertive with controller and confirmed exactly what he wanted me to do, and I should have just continued flying in a straight line as I had been told at that point, I was clear of controlled airspace.
[Airfield 2] frequency was busy and as I was making my turn, I could see [Aircraft 3] was on final approach to their [RWY] so I continued my left turn to ensure I went behind it, doing this caused me to enter the [Location] restricted zone. I didnât notice this on the chart at first as I was busy looking out of the window and trying to communicate with [Airfield 2] who did give me a transponder code and Traffic Service; however, he was clear that I had entered the restricted area and they asked me to call on landing at [Airfield 1].
When I landed, I called [Airfield 2] and the controller I spoke to was very understanding and sympathetic but stated he had to make an MOR, which is correct, and I have no complaint. We discussed what had happened and he suggested the best thing I could have done was to continue straight ahead, climbing to a safe altitude, and then contact [Airfield 2] ATC to turn back and fly through their airspace, with hindsight this seems so simple and obvious. Other learning points were:
As a result of the incident, the CAA asked me to do some ground school with an instructor on: Threat and Error Management (TEM); Pre-flight planning and preparation and contingency planning; Local airspace construct and procedures; Integration of VFR Moving Maps in flight planning; and flight management and decision making associated Human Factors. I did this and it was useful.
In terms of the incident, as the reporter states themselves, there were a number of things that they could have done to be better prepared, not least in making sure that they had a Plan B for all the relevant options for departing their airfield (and who they might have to talk to), so that they would have an understanding of where ATC might route them if their primary plan was overtaken by events. The reporter had clearly been overcome by a series of relatively minor factors that, in isolation, are part of everyday aviation but had combined to distract them as they were ânibbled to death by ducksâ and got airborne in a rush.
In response to the infringement, the reporter received a âJust Cultureâ letter from the CAA recommending some further training on TEM and associated issues. All airspace infringements must be taken seriously, but the CAAâs response was both proportionate and context aware, highlighting that things have come a long way in respect to how airspace infringements are now dealt with more pragmatically (in recognition that, although we must all endeavour to ensure we remain clear of airspace, mistakes do happen). Looking at the Airspace & Safety Initiative (ASI) website (as at June 2024), the statistics show that 76% of decisions so far in 2024 resulted in either no further action or an advisory letter as in this case. Of the remainder, 4% were required to do the online tutorial and test, and 15% were required to attend an Airspace Infringement Awareness Course (AIAC). The emphasis is on finding out what happened, learning lessons (both for the system and the pilot) and education rather than punishment – thereâs a plethora of good material on the ASI website thatâs well worth a visit to get some good tips on how to avoid infringing airspace.
Dirty Dozen Human Factors
The following âDirty Dozenâ Human Factors elements were a key part of the CHIRP discussions about this report and are intended to provide food for thought when considering aspects that might be pertinent in similar circumstances.