GA1373

Instructor induction

I was in communication with an organisation regarding engagement as a Flight Instructor. Previous contact with the organisation when I went for a preliminary discussion/interview with the responsible person and attended an SMS brief had given me a good impression. The day came for an ‘induction’ brief and standardisation flight with the CFI. The weather forecast was poor for the day, and I offered to defer to another date, but on arrival I met the CFI and we sat and discussed the ‘plan’, which was to, “Go up and hopefully find a hole to do some stalling, if not and we can’t do that we’ll stay close and do some circuits”.

The flight was to be in a C150 so I asked about Weight/Balance/Performance and Airfield Data. The response was, ”We don’t usually do these – you don’t look like a big bloke” (I have no ego, so it wasn’t an insult, but individual physiology differs, as does mass depending on muscle density versus fat density). “We can get the data if you wish” so I waited whilst the Weight/Balance/Performance data was ‘looked for’ but it was not readily available.

I decided there and then to terminate the appointment and departed. The C150 is notorious for limited payload capacity and fuel issues, and there are several C150 safety reviews and other items with titles such as ‘Why are we crashing the Cessnas’? Irrespective of the weather on the day (it was not suitable) pre-flight planning is essential, and if flying students are not coached by setting an example of due diligence and standard operating procedures – especially with a low performance aircraft – then safety is compromised.

I think that with the advent of less regulated DTOs in the UK, a cultural gradient is still to be climbed because PROFIT/VIABILITY sometimes appears to be the paramount motivation. I was disappointed with the outcome at this DTO because my preliminary meetings had been positive – all the ‘right’ SMS noises were made, but I was utterly taken aback to be confronted on the day as I was. I felt under stress to be advised ‘we will fly and we’ll try and find a hole to do stalling’ when clearly the weather was not suitable (it was BKN/OVC 1800ft with rain and reduced visibility).

This is a very concerning report. The C150 has known performance issues that require it to be treated with caution and should certainly be the subject of an extensive pre-flight briefing, especially with a prospective new instructor of which the CFI would have had no prior knowledge.  Although it was recognised that pilots do not have to conduct Weight & Balance calculations for every flight, we strongly recommend that they do if any parameters have changed or additions been made since the last calculation. But the situation is different in the instructional context, and instructors should expect the student to do the calculation as a matter of course. In this respect, and as also stated in Safety Sense Leaflet 9 ‘Weight, Balance & Performance’, UK Regulation NCO.GEN.105 ‘Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority’ requires that the pilot in command of Part 21 aircraft be satisfied that a flight can be safely made, and that the weight and centre of gravity location remains within the prescribed limitations for the aircraft. Article 69 of the Air Navigation Order 2016 applies the same requirement for flights involving non-Part 21 aircraft. In short, pilots must at least always satisfy themselves that the aircraft is being operated within CG, AUW and performance limits. It is CHIRP’s opinion that any check of a new instructor should certainly include their capability to do such calculations as a formal part of the assessment.

The CFI’s approach to the assessment seemed substantially lacking, and the poor impression that that created reflected on the culture likely to be present within the organisation. As a result, the reporter’s subsequent decision not to have anything to do with the organisation was understandable. If a CFI is checking out a new instructor then we’d certainly expect them to want to see and do everything required to confirm the instructor’s instructional and flying ability, not just for their professional satisfaction, but also to make sure that the potential new instructor was the sort of person who does things properly when it comes to students. Perhaps it’s understandable that the CFI was trying to make the most of an opportunity, but this was not really the time and place to act in such a manner.

We wondered when the last time the organisation was scrutinised by the CAA, and it seems that at the time they had not yet been audited in their current guise within the new DTO regime (although they may have been audited in a different incarnation previously).  When an organisation initially declares themselves as a DTO, they are able to commence operations immediately, prior to an audit taking place. The CAA states that, in general, DTO inspection frequency depends on the level of safety risk based on previous inspections, with the maximum oversight planning cycle not exceeding 6 years (see CAP1637 Para 6.7). This particular organisation was on a 36 month inspection cycle and has since been audited for the first time after this report was submitted. In addition to CAA inspections, DTOs are required to conduct their own annual reviews and submit their results to their allocated Licensing Standards Inspector.  CAP1637 Chapter 6 (DTO.GEN.270) details the required content of such annual self-assessments.

The issue of ensuring proper assessment of new instructors was previously the subject of ‘AIC P 022/2001 – Newly Qualified Flight Instructors’ (recently revoked) that had been issued in response to an AAIB investigation into a fatal accident involving a newly-qualified flight instructor conducting a trial lesson in a Piper PA-28-140 at Bournemouth (G-OSOW 18 December 1999). This accident had attracted an AAIB comment within their report that: “Whilst the pilot did receive briefings on various club matters, no formal check flight or assessment of his instructional or flying ability was required or carried out. The accident flight was the first occasion that the pilot had flown the PA28 Cherokee, all his previous flying was on the PA28 Warrior.”

AIC P022/2001 had referred to the need for thorough checks on new instructors to be carried out and “if the [training facility] operated a class or type of aeroplane not covered by the experience of the newly appointed instructor, specific differences should be identified to the instructor and the differences training recorded in his/her logbook.” Unfortunately, this particular AIC, which had conveyed a very useful flight safety message about new instructors, is now no longer available but the CAA state that the associated responsibilities for instructional staff are now captured in CAP1637 Chapter 3 (DTO.GEN.210) Para 3.2 under the responsibilities of the Head of Training. However, whilst this articulates responsibilities, it does not provide specific guidance as to content for the induction and ongoing assessment of instructors; there appears to be a gap in available guidance in this respect.

Dirty Dozen Human Factors

The following ‘Dirty Dozen’ Human Factors elements were a key part of the CHIRP discussions about this report and are intended to provide food for thought when considering aspects that might be pertinent in similar circumstances.

  • Stress  – uncertainty as to organisational competence and safety culture.
  • Pressure – compulsion to operate in unsuitable weather and without aircraft performance data.
  • Resources – aircraft data not immediately available.
  • Knowledge – lack of rigour by CFI.
  • Complacency – assumptions as to aircraft performance and candidate instructor capabilities.
stress, pressure, lack_of_resources, lack_of_knowledge, complacency