Confidential Human Factors
Incident Reporting Programme
The Charity
Aviation
Maritime
GA1387
Initial Report
Summary of report: A student pilot, close to completing their PPL, submitted a report about a go-around decision taken after encountering parachutists on final approach at their home airfield. The report is long, detailed and nuanced; therefore, a summary of the salient points is reproduced here.
The pilot had limited experience flying beyond the local area and had not previously encountered unusual operational scenarios. During a local solo flight following a period away from flying, they elected to conduct some circuits on return. On short final at around 700ft, they suddenly became aware of multiple parachutists descending over and near the runway, something they had not been briefed on nor experienced before. Although they had started monitoring the airfield frequency once in the circuit, they hadn’t heard any transmissions from the parachuting aircraft or others and assumed they were alone in the circuit.
Feeling uncomfortable, the pilot initiated a go-around at approximately 400ft but, concerned about overflying descending parachutists, turned 90° left at low level towards the circuit side. They transmitted a go-around call, but, as it was an air-to-ground service, the only response was a “roger”. Hesitant to declare the non-standard manoeuvre, they planned to climb to circuit height, turn 180° near the base leg position and rejoin the circuit. However, this resulted in a near-conflict with the parachute drop aircraft, which was converging on a steep, fast downwind. A collision was avoided only because the pilot heard the aircraft’s downwind call, saw it visually, and adjusted their course.
The reporter noted that they had never been briefed on what to do in the event of a parachuting conflict while on final and were unsure of the priority rules; they also reported feeling ‘panicked’. They reflected that they should have asked more questions during training, particularly given how routinely parachute operations occurred at the airfield. The incident was not followed up with any kind of instructor debrief or discussion at the flying club. Although solo flights were loosely monitored via ADSB, there was little active oversight or supervision.
The pilot also cited under-confidence with radio calls, cockpit distractions (such as listening to music via their headset) and a general lack of situational awareness as contributing factors.
Finally, the culture at the airfield was highlighted. The pilot described a reluctance to seek post-flight guidance due to past experiences of cold or dismissive attitudes on the radio and a general lack of engagement when things go awry.
CHIRP Comment
This was a complex and honest report with multiple learning points for students, instructors and clubs alike.
The Reporter
This was a brave and mature submission from a student pilot, showing an impressive level of honesty, reflection and a proactive approach to safety by choosing to report to CHIRP. They showed good situational awareness (SA) in identifying the parachutists at around 700ft and continued to monitor and reassess the situation before deciding to go around at 400ft. Although the manoeuvre was non-standard, their actions to turn away from the parachutists and rejoin late downwind were sensible under the circumstances. The pilot also maintained a visual lookout, saw the parachute aircraft and took timely avoiding action. Their self-awareness and willingness to critique their own decision-making – including distractions, lack of knowledge and missed opportunities to seek guidance – demonstrates a commendable attitude.
The reporter did a lot well, however, there also appear to have been elements of overconfidence and complacency. Not bringing up the airfield frequency early enough and listening to music probably reduced their SA at a critical time. The go-around call was not accompanied by an explanation of the non-standard manoeuvre, which created a potential for increased risk for other circuit users. The pilot was unsure about the rules regarding parachutist priority; while SERA does not explicitly give right of way to parachutists, good airmanship and a ‘least manoeuvrable’ principle apply. The reporter’s uncertainty and reluctance to communicate openly over the radio was concerning and may reflect broader cultural issues at the airfield.
Flying School & Supervision
Given the airfield’s regular parachuting operations, it’s concerning that the student had not been thoroughly briefed on how to handle such conflicts, especially so late in training. The flight appears to have lacked appropriate pre-flight planning and instructor supervision, placing a low-hours student in a high-risk situation. While ADSB tracking was in place, the lack of visible supervision or post-flight debriefing suggests weak oversight and missed opportunities for learning.
Airfield & Club Culture
The student felt unable to speak up during the flight or seek help afterwards, citing previous negative experiences with radio operators and a lack of engagement at the club. This suggests a concerning safety culture where students may feel unsupported or even discouraged from asking questions. A perceived dismissive or unapproachable attitude from ground personnel can act as a significant barrier to safe decision-making and post-flight reflection. A flying environment that encourages openness and dialogue will help embed good habits in the next generation of pilots.
Although the flying school’s perspective is not available, the report raises legitimate questions about briefing standards, student support and instructor follow-up. It’s possible the student had been taught what to do but either didn’t retain it or lacked the confidence to act. Regardless, clubs and instructors should actively ensure that all student solos are fully briefed, especially when operations like parachuting are routine hazards.
Key Issues relating to this report
The following ‘Dirty Dozen’ and other Human Factors were a key part of the CHIRP discussions about this report and are summarised here to provide food for thought when considering aspects that might be pertinent in similar circumstances.
Positive HF Elements
- Situational awareness – The pilot recognised a hazard mid-approach and made a prompt, considered decision to go around.
- Decision-making under pressure – Demonstrated capacity to analyse a novel risk and act, despite being unsettled.
- Self-reflection and learning mindset – Honest evaluation of limitations, distractions and missed opportunities.
- Visual scanning – Maintained a lookout that enabled them to avoid conflict with the parachute aircraft.
Negative HF Elements
- Distraction and complacency – Listening to music and late to monitor the airfield frequency reduced capacity and awareness.
- Communication breakdown – Not fully informing others of a non-standard go-around created potential for conflict.
- Knowledge gaps – Uncertainty around parachutist right-of-way and appropriate conflict responses.
- Under-confidence – Hesitance to ask questions or request debrief, influenced by a perceived unsupportive environment.
- Supervisory lapse – Insufficient oversight, briefing and post-flight engagement left the student without vital preparation or feedback.