GA1394

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Wing tank fuel starvation

Report Text (precis): During a short general aviation flight in a light single-engine aircraft, two qualified pilots were on board – one acting as pilot in command and the other flying as a passenger. The fuel state prior to departure was known to be low in both tanks, and although topping up was considered, the decision was made to proceed with the flight using the available fuel.

The outbound leg was flown without incident. However, on the return leg, having flown entirely on one fuel tank, the engine suffered a sudden failure while descending overhead the destination airfield. The pilot in command immediately switched to the opposite fuel tank and the engine restarted. The aircraft was then landed calmly and safely.

After shutdown, a visual inspection revealed that the tank in use at the time of the flame-out was empty. The situation was later reported to the flying club by the pilot in command.

This incident provides a powerful reminder of several key GA safety principles, particularly around fuel management and cockpit communication. It is a positive step that the event was reported to the CFI and that the P1 remained calm and acted swiftly to recover the situation. However, the situation could easily have ended very differently.

The key lessons include:

  • Never rely on minimum fuel for a flight, no matter how short – build in a margin and err on the side of caution. Fuel in the aircraft is always better than left in the bowser.
  • Cross-checks are essential – especially when flying with another qualified pilot, there is value in mutual oversight and the sharing of observations.
  • Threat and Error Management (TEM) principles should be applied to every flight, however routine – particularly in planning stages, where risks like low fuel can be identified and mitigated.
  • FREDA checks are there for a reason. Rigorous in-flight checks provide multiple opportunities to spot and correct developing threats before they escalate into emergencies.
  • Crew Resource Management (CRM) and authority gradient considerations are not exclusive to the commercial cockpit. It can be difficult to speak up assertively as a passenger, but it can be even harder for a PIC to receive advice, especially if ego or familiarity plays a role. Respectful two-way communication and a willingness to listen are vital. Breaking down a hierarchy in the cockpit and stressing that none of us are infallible can assist a voice to be heard. To assist a passenger or crew in escalating concerns, the graded assertiveness method – Probe, Alert, Challenge, Emergency (PACE) – is a useful guide. Another suggestion if you’re feeling uncomfortable is Ask, Suggest, Insist (ASI). This enables a discussion rather than an argument and highlights the outcome or consequence of not taking a suggested action, eg in this case the outcome of not taking sufficient fuel could be “we will run out of fuel”.

The reporter in this case did the right thing in voicing concerns and remained observant throughout, as all passengers with relevant knowledge should. A shared culture of openness and mutual support in the cockpit, regardless of role, is critical to safe flying.

CHIRP encourages pilots to see such near misses not as failures, but as invaluable learning opportunities that, when shared, can make a real difference across the wider community.

Finally, although not necessarily relevant in this case, CHIRP notes that some syndicates have informal rules about landing with minimal fuel remaining to allow flexibility for the next pilot. Such practices can create undue pressure to operate with marginal fuel reserves. This is not considered good practice; pilots are encouraged to prioritise safety and maintain an appropriate margin for error over adherence to syndicate conventions.

Human Factors Considerations

The following ‘Dirty Dozen’ and Human Factors were a key part of the CHIRP discussions about this report.

Positive Considerations:

  • Prompt decision-making – the PIC responded quickly to the engine failure and restored power effectively.
  • Calm under pressure – both pilots managed the situation without panic and ensured a safe landing.
  • Post-flight transparency – reporting the incident to the club enabled learning and reflection.
  • Vigilant monitoring – the passenger remained observant and engaged, contributing to situational awareness.

Areas to consider:

  • Decision-making – choosing to depart with low fuel introduced avoidable risk.
  • Planning & preparation – insufficient fuel reserves suggest inadequate pre-flight planning.
  • Authority gradient – potential reluctance by the passenger to challenge the PIC’s decision.
  • Communication – a clearer, shared discussion about the fuel state may have prompted a different choice.