Confidential Human Factors
Incident Reporting Programme
The Charity
Aviation
Maritime
M2279
Initial Report
Our reporter informed CHIRP about contractual requirements for a recent operation involving an Offshore Supply Vessel (OSV) and Floating Production Storage and Offloading vessel (FPSO).
The OSV was a DP1 vessel and did not require a follow-target function for normal operations. However, given the FPSO’s movement in the operating environment, having one was a contractual requirement.
According to the agreement between the contractor and the charterer, the contractor had to equip the vessel with two reference systems: a Differential Global Navigational Satellite System (DGNSS) and either a laser or microwave system capable of ‘Follow Target’ functionality. These systems are essential for FPSO operations. They ensure that a specified distance is maintained between the vessel and the FPSO and adjust the angle between their longitudinal axes to match any horizontal rotation of the FPSO.
Under pressure from the client’s schedule, the master proceeded with the operation despite his vessel not having the required ‘Follow Target’ function. This decision led to potentially unsafe conditions, requiring the crew to manually adjust the vessel’s position against visual references for a 12-hour fuel oil transfer. The Designated Person Ashore (DPA) cautioned against operating under such precarious circumstances, but the master continued anyway. The crew realised safety was being compromised to meet client demands and reported this to CHIRP.
CHIRP Comment
The agreement between the contractor and the charterer stipulated specific technical requirements for the OSV, including having a ‘Follow Target’ function and being capable of dealing with the expected movement velocities of the FPSO, which can be considerable. This function is crucial for maintaining a safe distance and alignment with the FPSO. The OSV in question was only equipped with a DP 1 (Dynamic Positioning Class 1) system, which typically does not include a ‘Follow Target’ capability. This discrepancy meant that the OSV did not meet the contractual requirements necessary for safe operations with the FPSO.
Despite not meeting these requirements, the OSV’s master proceeded with the operation under pressure from the client’s schedule. This decision led to potentially unsafe conditions because the vessel lacked the automated capability to maintain safe proximity and alignment with the FPSO. The crew recognised the compromised safety conditions during the operation, particularly during a critical 12-hour plus fuel oil transfer. They resorted to manual adjustments based on visual and radar references, which are less precise and more prone to error compared to automated systems like ‘Follow Target’.
The crew’s awareness of the compromised safety and their decision to report this to CHIRP indicates a responsible approach to safety reporting and an understanding of the potential risks involved. The Designated Person Ashore (DPA), who is responsible for ensuring compliance with safety and environmental standards, ensuring adequate resources are applied, and providing a vital link between the vessel and the company, cautioned against proceeding, given that the “follow target” function was required. This caution from the DPA underscores the seriousness of the safety concerns. Despite this explicit advice, the master proceeded with the operation, disregarding the DPA’s recommendations. This decision not only heightened the risk involved but also called into question the company’s safety culture and organizational structure. The master’s choice to ignore the DPA’s advice raises significant concerns about the prioritisation of safety within the company and highlights potential flaws in its risk management and communication practices.
In recent years, several collisions have occurred aboard vessels undertaking DP operations near mobile assets, such as drilling vessels and FPSOs. While having a relative position referencing system fitted, such as the “Follow Target” function, training on its use is essential.
CHIRP would like to acknowledge the Information note provided by the International Maritime Contractors Association (IMCA) No 1650- November 2023, which details the Important Position Reference Systems (PRS) considerations when operating close to an asset that is not rigidly fixed to the sea bed.
Key Issues relating to this report
Pressure — Pressure to meet commercial objectives overruled safety considerations regarding the crew, the FPSO, and the environment. What would you do in the same situation, given the request by the DPA to stop the operation from being carried out due to a lack of safeguards?
Teamwork — The master’s behaviour does not indicate teamwork. The master is acting alone, and the crew do not appear empowered to exercise ‘stop work’ procedures. What would you have done in this situation?
Culture- Company culture applies to everyone, and the master has a responsibility to demonstrate the company culture through actions.
Capability — Would you operate outside the requirements if your vessel lacks the capabilities to meet dynamic positioning standards? In this case, are DP safety standards being disregarded?
Local Practices – Keep local practices from becoming a new standard. Ask the company to install the necessary equipment to meet compliance requirements.