We have not received any further reports internally concerning issues related to allegations of contaminated potable water, other than the issues raised in this report, which have also been raised separately via the Cabin Crew [Union] H&S Reps at their meeting.

As part of our water quality monitoring programme, [Contract Organisation] continue to monitor our potable water which includes regular audits and monthly potable water testing, this is managed via our Airports Business Area. ([Contract Organisation] also conduct our food safety audits at our catering units worldwide). Findings from this monitoring are reviewed each month at internal meetings and actions taken, this includes alerting the Engineering team should an aircraft require the water tank to be decontaminated. In the event that there are bowser issues and sufficient potable water cannot be uploaded or, alleged contamination (until testing has taken place), alternative measures are taken – this can include provision of bottled water to customers, suspension of hot beverages, antibacterial wipes/gel in LAVs and additional bottled water supplied to our crew.

We have reminded [The Trade Union] to encourage their members to continue to raise safety related ORs to ensure that we are able to monitor trends and take action in a timely manner.  This also enables us to ensure our Airports and Engineering and Maintenance teams to take the necessary action (such as water treatment). [Element of Operators Defect Recording System] are in place to advise crew and engineering of what action they are required to take in regards to serving of water from the galleys – this information is also shared by the Senior Cabin Crew Member to the cabin crew at the briefing to ensure they are forewarned.  It is also very important that cabin crew record any issues in the Cabin Defects Log or Tech Log, to ensure Engineering are aware after the flight has landed. In regard to the galley heated floor issues, the [scheduled] cabin activity will not comprise of any work on the galley floor heating. From a safety perspective, the decision was made to deactivate the floor heating system due to overheating.

Having reviewed the internal safety and technical reports, there appears to be a very infrequent number. However, a report relating to the CHIRP occurrence has been identified. As a result of these infrequent reports, the operator does not see a systemic issue across their aircraft which can be narrowed down to a fleet, tail or station which is causing particular concern. The water is routinely tested and treated per their procedures.