GA1370 - CAS clearance cancelled

Initial Report

I was given a clearance to transit through [Airspace] IFR at 3000ft. The IFR clearance was cancelled at the last minute with, “Stay clear of controlled airspace and Basic Service”.  This while in IMC.  I could not avoid entering controlled airspace due to the late cancellation –  a turn to the right was the only option because another aircraft was 1-2 miles behind, similar level. I turned right and commenced an immediate descent; this turn put me in controlled airspace at 1500ft. I raised this as an issue and was given a clearance to enter and track to [Reporting point].  In checking my track I did enter controlled airspace.  I called the Radar unit on return and was advised the controller was under training and admitted that the situation could and should have been handled better. I said my issue was that I couldn’t do a 180 degree turn because I was aware of an aircraft behind me and that I had very few options: I was IMC and rate 1 turns were my only option.

I was prepared to have had radar vectors but was not prepared for a ‘remain clear’ and dropped to a Basic Service whilst on the boundary of controlled airspace.

CHIRP Comment

The report referenced an unfortunate incident that, although we do not have all of the circumstances that pertained from the ATC perspective, appears sub-optimal in how they managed the situation. The pilot would most likely have been under a Traffic Service as they approached controlled airspace, and so there should have been ample opportunity for the controllers involved to plan ahead and ensure integration (or at least a location to orbit if they could not accept the aircraft at that point). But we don’t know all of the factors that may have influenced the situation and so there could have been any number of reasons why the late call was made. That being said, a last-minute cancellation of clearance, coupled with a downgrade to Basic Service at the CAS boundary is certainly not best practice, and we commend the supervising controller for their acknowledgment of this when the reporter contacted them after the event.

Ultimately, it was the On the Job Training Instructor’s (OJTI) responsibility to ensure that appropriate decisions were made and, although there are benefits to allowing students to make mistakes and then recover from difficult situations, the OJTI should always be able to step in and provide appropriate instructions at any time. Whilst the cancellation of the clearance at the last minute might well have been the OJTI salvaging the situation by trying to ensure that the aircraft did not enter busy airspace, simply cancelling IFR and applying a Basic Service with another aircraft following behind put the pilot in an unenviable situation. As part of that decision-making process, the fact that the pilot was IMC at the time might have been a piece of information that was missing in the controller’s decision to downgrade to a Basic Service and so, whilst not suggesting that this was necessarily the case in this instance, this reinforces the importance of good two-way information transfer so that the controllers are able to take all factors into account.

What would you have done in similar circumstances? The pilot was clearly aware of the other traffic in their vicinity and so we commend them for weighing up all of the options and deciding that the least worse outcome was to penetrate controlled airspace for a short period as they manoeuvred. Although this call was very late and there were few options available, always have a Plan B in mind in case entry to controlled airspace is denied. In this respect, Threat and Error Management (TEM) is the key to anticipating external things that might potentially cause difficulties (threats) or come about as a result of your own vulnerabilities, weaknesses or mistakes (errors). We’re not saying that every circumstance can be anticipated, but it certainly helps to have a bank of options available if things go pear-shaped.

No doubt the student controller received a thorough debriefing from the OJTI, but were any lessons promulgated more widely for the benefit of others to learn from? Given that the pilot had no choice but to effectively infringe the airspace as they reacted to the last-minute cancellation, and in the vein of promoting Just and Learning Cultures, they could have submitted an airspace infringement occurrence report or, perhaps more appropriate, a CAA Form FCS1522 (Airspace Access or Refusal of ATS, see QR code) which would have raised the issue with the CAA and provided an opportunity for other units to learn lessons. CAA Form FCS1522 is a simple way of reporting airspace access or service provision problems that we recommend all pilots consider using when appropriate: without such data, improvements in ATC resourcing or service availability will be unlikely to be forthcoming (CluedUp GA Update April 2023 also refers).

Dirty Dozen Human Factors

The following ‘Dirty Dozen’ Human Factors elements were a key part of the CHIRP discussions about this report and are intended to provide food for thought when considering aspects that might be pertinent in similar circumstances.