ATC862 (2 x issues) - Poor controller attitude

Initial Report

This report highlights two occurrences during one flight which had a common theme.

Issue 1 – Similar callsigns equally abbreviated causes confusion

Departed out of [Airfield] in [aircraft] on a FI revalidation flight and switched frequency to Farnborough North for a Basic Service. Our registration G-**IG. We confirmed a basic service (with the Farnborough ATC now abbreviating our callsign to “G-IG”). At this point we had heard no other traffic on the frequency.

About 3 minutes later (there had now been radio traffic previous to this to other aircraft) we heard

“G-IG traffic in your 1 o’clock, same level, 2 miles”.
The candidate queried “G-IG, was that for us?” as he had not heard the entire message.
The reply was “G-IG no, that’s not for you. You are on a Basic Service – you don’t get traffic”.

At that point we understood that there was obviously another aircraft on frequency with the abbreviated callsign G-IG (and they subsequently responded to the message) but at no point did the controller ask for both aircraft to use their full callsign. We had not heard the other aircraft with the similar callsign at this point and so would have had no idea that there was an issue. The controller had the information and should have informed both aircraft to use full callsigns.

I understand that traffic advisory is not a feature of the Basic Service, but many stations will give limited information if they have time and the controller’s response was not only unnecessarily harsh but also incorrect. He should have realised the similar callsign on frequency and asked to adopt full callsigns. Until this point we had not heard the other aircraft and were unaware that there was a similar callsign.

If this had been a call to the other aircraft about traffic in a potentially dangerous situation, the delay caused by us answering could have reduced safety margins to an unacceptable level.

Issue 2 – Limitations of a traffic service

Later in the flight we then overheard another conversation between the same controller and “G-SN”:

Farnborough: “G-SN how much further north are you intending on going?”
G-SN: “We are about to commence a general handling climbing and descending exercise in this area”
Farnborough: “Well, you’re going to have to tell me every time you are changing level”
G-SN: “In which case, we are going to be operating in a block between 2000 and 3000 feet.”
Farnborough: “I can’t possibly be expected to give you traffic information for a block. I’m too busy. You need to tell me every time you’re changing altitude”
G-SN: “In which case, we will downgrade to a Basic Service”

It was a murky day with the visibility about 8km in haze. Not only was the controller incorrect with stating that the aircraft needed to tell him altitude changes if he wanted a Traffic Service (obviously recommended but by no means a requirement of the service) – the controller’s actions effectively forced the instructor of the aircraft to downgrade a service rather than being required to have the requirement of making a call about every 2 minutes! Again, the controller was snippy and unhelpful.

I understand that controllers are busy but the way this controller talked to us and to the other aircraft was not only rude, it was incorrect and did nothing in either case to make flights safer. Quite the reverse.

CHIRP Comment

This report addresses two separate but related issues. It’s a valuable contribution, bringing attention to two minor events that might have been overlooked but instead sparked important and lively discussion about aspects of air traffic services and human factors in aviation safety.

Issue 1 – Similar callsigns equally abbreviated causes confusion

The controller’s handling of the situation certainly seems to have been lacking in some respects. Firstly, if there are multiple callsigns on frequency with the same final two letters then, to mitigate confusion, the controller should immediately revert to full callsign and advise pilots that similar callsigns are on frequency. Therefore, it wasn’t unreasonable for the reporter’s candidate to request clarification, especially since he hadn’t heard the entire message. CHIRP always advocates the use of “say again” or similar if there is any doubt. It’s not safe or sensible for a controller to assume that a pilot will ignore calls for their callsign just because the call isn’t strictly relevant to the service they’re receiving. Overall, an unnecessary level of ambiguity ensued owing to this mistake and, as the reporter identifies, safety margins were reduced by superfluous R/T.

The second area where the controller wasn’t overly helpful was in the tone and manner of their response to the candidate’s question. Even if the controller had been in the right, such a brusque response seems at best unconstructive and could even have unsettled the pilot, especially if they were under pressure or with a high workload, leading to distraction and impacting safety. An angry or even curt approach on the R/T will never improve matters. For pilots and controllers alike, patience, courtesy and consideration, no matter how frustrating the situation or pressure of workload, should always be the overriding consideration on the radio.

Notwithstanding the above, CHIRP does have a degree of sympathy with ATC. Farnborough is a notoriously busy airspace with the same controller often running several frequencies at once. It’s useful if pilots can be aware that when receiving a service from Farnborough, an additional level of vigilance may help controllers manage a challenging task. In this circumstance, controller workload is unknown; but if it was particularly high then they may not have had the bandwidth to realise there were similar callsigns on frequency. We understand that this would not be uncommon with Farnborough. Similar callsigns can be difficult to pick up and are sometimes only noticed when a controller gets an ‘odd’ response to a transmission or a reply from a different voice to what their brain is expecting. Even if the controller had realised, in the heat of the moment it was probably better to call the traffic than not. At worst, this leads to two aircraft looking out, which is better than none if there is the chance of an imminent conflict. The controller’s subsequent response may well have been indicative of someone under considerable pressure with multiple inputs who just didn’t have the capacity to explain the full picture. Nonetheless, as a rule of thumb, pilots and controllers can usually save time by sticking to standard phraseology and not reacting/escalating on the airwaves. Although everyone must achieve a minimum standard to qualify them to participate in aviation, competence and quality will vary with both controllers and GA pilots. Humans, by their very nature are not perfect and changing circumstances affect performance, so ‘cutting some slack’ both ways is the best approach and working together as a team to achieve a more effective, enjoyable and ultimately, safer, day out.

As an aside, regarding the level of information provided, the controller is correct that calling traffic is not a feature of the Basic Service and indeed controllers are not even required to monitor such flights. However, controllers should give Traffic Information about general aerial activity and will do so when they perceive a definite risk of collision exists, so it is not uncommon to hear this practice. Indeed, the controller has a ‘duty of care’ and cannot let a collision occur if they’ve noted a conflict on the radar screen, therefore some kind of deconfliction action should be taken where possible. CAP 774, para 2.5-2.9 provides further information. Alternatively, for general, easily accessible, refence material covering the different air traffic services available to GA pilots, try these:


Issue 2 – Limitations of a Traffic Service

To clarify a pilot’s responsibility under a Traffic Service – pilots are required to advise the controller of altitude changes under a Traffic Service as noted in CAP774 ‘UK FIS’ Chapter 3 ‘Traffic Service’ Para 3.11 ‘Levels’ which states:

Unless safety is likely to be compromised, a pilot shall not change level or level band without first advising and obtaining a response from the controller, as the aircraft may be co-ordinated against other airspace users without recourse to the pilot.

Although CAP774 para 3.11 does allow for pilots to request a block to operate within, this is at the discretion of the controller, who may not have the capacity to provide such a service or may be aware of other aircraft that prevent the allocation of a block. This was communicated to the reporter, who was grateful for the update and responded.

Response from Reporter: I have to admit to a slight misunderstanding of the pilot responsibility in terms of level changes under a traffic service so that’s definitely one I can pass onto my students. I don’t often operate under a traffic service as it generally isn’t that suitable for instructional flights for exactly the reasons I believe the other pilot then changed service.

While the controller’s message was technically correct, their tone came across as abrupt and unhelpful. As in the earlier example, they may have been under pressure owing to traffic levels, but being antagonistic on the radio rarely helps and can unsettle less experienced pilots, potentially affecting their performance. This report highlights the importance of staying constructive on the radio and remembering that pilot skill levels vary widely in general aviation—something controllers should always keep in mind.

As with the previous issue from this report, there was also some sympathy for the controller. Non-face-to-face communication is particularly prone to misinterpretation and it’s unclear whether the Farnborough controller was indeed ‘snippy’ or it was a case of the reporter interpreting it as such. Either way, some consideration for controller workload, especially in busy airspace like Farnborough, can help with a smoother service. By all means ask for a block but expect to be advised “unable due workload” or “reduced traffic information due controller workload” and have another plan (such as downgrade to a Basic Service, which is what the pilot did here). In quieter parts of the country, it’s much more reasonable to expect to be able to operate in a block whilst receiving a Traffic Service, but with Farnborough, especially at busy times of day, it’s highly unlikely that any controller would have the capacity to accommodate such a request. As with so many reports to CHIRP, this highlights the importance of being aware of and making allowance for the situation of others in the wider team. Everyone remembering the ‘3 Cs’ will go a long way to safer skies – Caution, Courtesy and Consideration.

Finally, although not specifically germane to this report, did you know that there are recourse options if airspace access doesn’t work out as hoped.  It’s frustrating — you plan a route, note the frequencies you need, refresh your RT wordage, get well into the flight, request a transit through a piece of controlled airspace and are refused entry. What do you do? Ideally you fall back on Plan B and continue outside that piece of airspace. But what about after landing? Do you simply shrug your shoulders, or perhaps complain to a few friends, and then forget about it? While some pilots do follow up a refusal to try to find out why they were denied access, many others don’t which is a pity because there’s a straightforward system to record these denials and, importantly, this provides data for the CAA to use to help improve airspace access for all. It’s called the UK Airspace Access or Refusal of ATS Report Form and is designed to highlight airspace refusal issues that can be resolved so that others might in future get the access you were denied. If you haven’t yet come across it, it’s an online form (technically known as FCS 1522 – UK Airspace Access or Refusal of ATS Report) that lets the CAA know you were denied access, refused an air traffic service, or type of service you wanted. Read more about it in this edition of Clued Up – GA Update.

Dirty Dozen Human Factors

The following ‘Dirty Dozen’ Human Factors elements were a key part of the CHIRP discussions about this report and are intended to provide food for thought when considering aspects that might be pertinent in similar circumstances.

Communication – Confusion caused by similar callsigns not being used in full.

Awareness – Controller may not have realised similar callsigns on frequency.

Pressure & Stress – High controller load likely impacted capacity and tone.

Teamwork – Mutual respect and professionalism on the RT essential for safety.

Distraction – Confusion with similar callsigns distracted candidate on test flight.