M2576 - Close quarters situation

Initial Report

“We are a large sailing yacht under power, motoring on a south-westerly course at 9 knots and around 1.5nm from a navigational strait/passage. I noted the ferry steaming almost north, clearly visible, showing her starboard bow. Visibility was very good, and both radars were operating with a lookout on the bridge.

The CPA was causing concern, and it was a clear crossing situation (R15 COLREGs).

In this situation, my vessel was the stand-on vessel, as confirmed by the lookout. I maintained my course and speed. I expected the ferry to turn slightly to starboard (about 10-15 degrees) as there was plenty of sea-room and no immediate traffic, and the ferry had cleared the strait, so there were no depth restrictions. Then both vessels would have passed port to port.

The ferry maintained her course and speed, crossing my bow at a range of less than 2 cables. We then passed starboard to starboard, close enough (about 70 metres) that I could clearly see the master/watchkeeper on the bridge, who gestured that I was in the wrong, which surprised me, as there was no doubt about the situation, or which vessel should take what action.

Although ferries operate on regular routes, they must still comply with the COLREGs. This potentially close-quarters situation could have been avoided with better application of the COLREGs.”

CHIRP Comment

CHIRP followed up with the master of the motor yacht to clarify and obtain additional information.

The account suggests that both vessels failed to follow the appropriate rules (2, 7, 8, 16, and 17) of the COLREGs, leading to a close-quarters situation. Expectancy bias may have influenced their actions, as the ferry assumed the large motor yacht would give way, which is sometimes the norm in busy coastal waters.

A further factor may have been commercial pressure. Tight schedules and repetitive crossings can subtly influence decisions, sometimes leading mariners to prioritise efficiency over compliance. However, passing at only 70 metres is clearly hazardous, regardless of vessel type or familiarity with the route.

This event serves as a reminder that the COLREGs exist to remove uncertainty. Expecting other vessels to deviate from them introduces unnecessary risk. Challenging assumptions and maintaining situational awareness are critical, as is early and unambiguous communication; a timely signal of five short light flashes/sound blasts can often break the chain of misunderstanding before it leads to danger.

For ferry operators, there is also an essential organisational lesson. Companies operating to tight schedules should ensure that management regularly reviews passage plans, either through marine manager visits or independent navigational audits, to confirm that bridge practices remain compliant with the COLREGs. Encouraging crews to report and discuss near misses openly and without blame helps to identify patterns and reinforce safe behaviour before incidents occur.

While both vessels had clear obligations to act to avoid collision, this case reinforces a simple truth: being righteous and right is not the same as being safe and compliant.

Key Issues relating to this report

Local Practices – The ferry’s failure to alter course reflects a potentially ingrained local practice of prioritising routes and schedules over safe crossing protocols.

Communication – No VHF call or signal exchange occurred, even when intentions were unclear, which denotes a breakdown in clear communication.

Situational Awareness – No/wrong/late visual detection: The close crossing suggests the ferry didn’t adequately gauge the yacht’s trajectory in time. Even though radars were operating, the impending crossing wasn’t detected or acted upon sufficiently early.

Complacency – Familiarity with regular route traffic may have led to underestimating the risk, assuming no deviation or hazard would arise, and failing to challenge the crossing scenario.

Alerting – Despite the yacht’s clear expectation of port-to-port passing, there was no challenge or signal to the ferry indicating concern, nor was there any cross-check or speaking up.

Pressure – Operational pressures, such as maintaining schedules, could have influenced the ferry crew’s decision-making; insufficient personnel or workload management may have contributed.

Key Takeaways

Regulators: Spot the patterns, close the gaps, enforce the COLREGs.
Track recurring close-quarters incidents involving scheduled ferries and other vessels. Apply human factors frameworks (MGN 520 Deadly Dozen, SHIELD taxonomy) to identify systemic issues. Strengthen oversight to address shortcuts or local habits that undermine COLREGs compliance, and promote clearer guidance on proactive VHF use and bridge team management in congested waters.

Managers: Culture and training must take precedence over schedule pressure.
Ensure bridge teams are empowered to follow the COLREGs, even under time pressure or on familiar routes. Build a culture that values challenge and open communication. Reinforce that safety decisions are supported, even when they delay schedules.

Seafarers: Don’t assume, check, communicate, and act early.
Use every available tool, radar, AIS, and visual bearings, to confirm other vessels’ intentions. If in doubt, clarify via VHF before the situation escalates. Never rely on what “should” happen; anticipate, question, and take early action to stay clear and stay safe.