CC7577 - Electrical burning smell in cabin
Initial Report
On the flight back from {airport A} to {airport B}, an electrical burning smell was noticed in the cabin. I was acting as SCCM at the time, as the SCCM was on rest. I am fully trained as SCCM. The situation was treated as a smoke/fire/fumes incident and procedures were followed; electrics were isolated. We landed from the flight. Engineering dismissed the concern, and the issue had not been rectified.
The flight later departed to {airport B}, and the same issue occurred. Engineering at {airport B} attributed it to plastic in the oven. This was not the case, as the ovens had not operated for multiple hours at the time of the incident.
I feel the company is not treating this seriously. This incident has happened before and could cause a fire of unknown origin. I suspect a short in the internal wiring.
comments
Company Comment
As an organisation we do understand the seriousness of odour/fume/smoke events, and this is directed into the Engineering department too. The Engineering department has a detailed and well documented process for all of these events, with senior managers reviewing each event and trends weekly. This is documented in the weekly safety meeting. The information presented includes the number of events, sectors with events per day and registration, longer term trends by week, and the details for each event that week including the odour type (e.g. exhaust/chemical), whether rain/de-icing could have played a part, and what action was taken. The maintenance teams have dedicated work packages to action to ensure each incident is investigated, documented and corrected. These processes are being continuously improved to ensure that a safe and reliable aircraft is presented each sector.
In the case cited, following the first sector, a contracted maintenance organisation looked into the reported defect. While the issue did not appear to be resolved while the SCCM was present, the technical log shows that the component identified was changed prior to the next sector as a precaution, although no fumes or electrical smells could be reproduced prior to, or after the component change. It has been noted in the technical log that a brighter LED within the unit has led to reports prior to this event of the units ‘glowing red hot’.
The next sector included a crew report of a mild intensity, acrid odour. The rear galley power was turned off during the flight. On arrival, oven 3 was identified as having a black plastic burn mark and was deactivated (ADD – Allowable Deferred Defect raised) for replacement at main base. The technical log includes pictures of the plastic burn mark. The oven was replaced the next day at main base and no further odour/fume/smoke events were identified.
CAA Comment
All airlines must have a process for reporting defects and it is important that the cabin crew feel confident in how to report defects using the operators defect reporting process.
When reporting defects that are not visible, such as smells, a clear description of where you think the smell originates from and the type of smell is extremely important.
It is a requirement before each flight for the commander to decide whether to accept an aircraft with unserviceabilities. When a crew member has concerns about an aircraft’s serviceability, they should communicate this to the commander, the commander can review any actions taken as detailed in the tech log.
The company’s safety reporting system is an additional tool to raise awareness of concerns.
CHIRP Comment
It is essential that crew feel confident to speak up when they have safety concerns and to continue to do so if they believe those concerns have not been fully addressed.
However, from a crew perspective, the continued presence of an acrid or electrical smell across sectors is understandably concerning, particularly when the source is unclear or when previous reassurance has not resolved the issue. These concerns must be communicated to the SCCM / flight crew.
Repeated or unexplained odours can undermine crew confidence and raise doubt about whether a potential fire risk has been fully eliminated. While technical investigations may not always immediately identify a fault, crew rely on clear feedback and visible action to feel assured that their concerns have been taken seriously.