M2704 - Unauthorised removal of LSA and modifications to the ship’s structure

Initial Report

A master joined a motor yacht for a short handover period while the regular master was away on a short break. During the onboard induction, several arrangements were identified that could adversely affect vessel safety.

The first concern related to the rescue boat (RB), which had been removed from its operational position to create storage space for an additional personal watercraft requested for guest use. The RB had been taken off its chocks, deflated, and packed away. It was reported that the RB was normally reinstated for inspections and surveys, but there were no plans to reinstall it for an upcoming coastal voyage.

A second concern involved two spaces that had originally been designated as partially open or “wet” spaces as part of the vessel’s certified tonnage arrangement. These spaces incorporated ventilation or freeing arrangements that prevented them from being considered fully enclosed areas.

To increase usable storage capacity and protect equipment from water ingress, removable panels had reportedly been fitted to close off sections of these openings during normal operations. It was understood that this arrangement had been used routinely throughout the season.

The reporting master was concerned that enclosing spaces not originally intended to be fully watertight could affect drainage arrangements, bilge capacity, and, potentially, the vessel’s stability if water accumulated. No evidence was seen that the implications of these modifications had been formally assessed or reflected in the vessel’s stability information.

The concerns were raised with the senior officer on board, who explained that the arrangements had been implemented in accordance with previous instructions. The reporter later discussed the matter internally within their management company; however, as the vessel was not under their management, they were uncertain whether any further action had been taken.

CHIRP Comment

The reported arrangements raise serious concerns regarding both compliance with statutory safety requirements and the management of operational risk onboard.

The rescue boat forms part of the vessel’s approved Life-Saving Appliances (LSA) inventory and is essential for recovery, rescue, and emergency response. Removing it from operational readiness to create additional guest storage space significantly reduces the vessel’s emergency capability. Of particular concern is the indication that the rescue boat was reinstated only for inspections and surveys. This reflects the “normalisation of deviance”, in which deviations from established standards gradually become routine. Left unchallenged, such practices can significantly erode safety margins over time.

This behaviour suggests that safety equipment may have been treated as a compliance exercise rather than an operational necessity. CHIRP reminds operators that lifesaving appliances must remain available, ready for immediate use, and maintained in accordance with statutory and manufacturer requirements at all times, unless formally exempted by the Flag Administration.

The reported modifications to partially open or “wet” spaces also raise significant concerns. These spaces are often integral to the vessel’s approved tonnage and stability arrangements, with ventilation, drainage, and freeing arrangements carefully considered during design approval. Installing removable panels to enclose such spaces, even temporarily, may alter drainage characteristics, introduce the risk of downflooding, or allow water to accumulate in unintended areas. Any modification affecting watertight integrity, stability assumptions, or tonnage arrangements requires formal assessment, approval where necessary, and appropriate documentation.

This report highlights a broader cultural issue sometimes encountered in the yacht sector, where commercial, aesthetic, or guest-service priorities can erode established safety margins. Temporary or seasonal alterations may become normalised without proper risk assessment or oversight. Senior personnel should remain alert to any “drift” from the vessel’s approved configuration, particularly where operational convenience overrides original safety intent.

Finally, this case reinforces a common misconception that passing a survey guarantees ongoing safety. Inspections are sampling exercises, not assurances. Safe operation depends on continuous adherence to procedures, effective oversight, and a strong onboard safety culture. CHIRP encourages masters and crew to report concerns whenever they identify arrangements that are inconsistent with statutory requirements or safe operating practices. Early intervention and open reporting are essential to prevent unsafe conditions from becoming embedded as accepted routine.

Key Issues relating to this report

Factors related to this report

Local practice (norms) – Unsafe practices became accepted routine.

Alerting (assertiveness) – Personnel may have felt unable to challenge established practices.

Pressure – Guest expectations and operational convenience likely influenced decision-making.

Capability – It is possible that the implications for stability were not fully recognised.

Teamwork – Safety concerns were not collectively owned, which may indicate a poor safety culture.

Key Takeaways

Regulators – “Survey compliance is meaningless if the vessel only becomes compliant for the survey.” Vessels should be assessed in their true operational condition rather than only in their inspection configuration. Temporary removals of lifesaving appliances or removable structural modifications can significantly alter risk, stability, and emergency preparedness. Regulators should also continue encouraging confidential reporting pathways so that relief crew and visiting personnel can raise concerns without fear of repercussions.

Managers and Operators – “Convenience-driven changes must never outrank safety-critical design assumptions.” Any modification affecting lifesaving appliances, drainage arrangements, stability assumptions, or tonnage certification requires formal risk assessment and technical review. Informal workarounds introduced for convenience or guest operations can gradually bypass the safety management system and become normalised. Leadership decisions, including decisions not to act, strongly influence onboard safety culture.

Seafarers – “Fresh eyes often see risks that familiar eyes have stopped noticing.” If an arrangement appears inconsistent with vessel certification, emergency preparedness, or safe operating practice, it should be questioned and reported. Long-term exposure to unsafe practices can normalise risk and reduce challenge within teams. Relief personnel and new joiners often identify hazards that established crews may no longer recognise.