A vessel was entering harbour by day with a pilot on board. After settling on a course of 168°, the pilot asked for a new course of 170° to set up for a wide turn onto the next (160°) leg.

The helm correctly repeated back the 170° course to the pilot who then looked down at their portable pilot unit (PPU). When they looked up, they saw that the ship had started to swing to port. The master and OOW challenged the error just as the pilot realised what was happening, and the swing was quickly stopped.

One possibility considered by the pilot was that the helm might have had the next (160°) course in mind which was to port. Visually too, there was a shoal beacon fine on the starboard bow and the helm might have intuitively turned to open the distance from that navigational hazard. The pilot put the incident down to being human factors slip, which he felt reinforced the need to check the rudder indicator with all course changes.

Our reporter writes “We were sailing in our yacht, with a flat sea, light wind, and perfect visibility, making about 4 knots on a course of 132° degrees. A very large motorboat came into view dead ahead several miles away and continued towards us on a reciprocal course. We watched this motorboat very carefully as it came closer, mainly because its bow pointed directly at us.

As it came closer, it showed no sign of changing course, even though it was motoring, and we were sailing. When it was just a few seconds away, we started our engine and made a 90 degree course change to starboard to avoid being run down by it. We do not doubt that, had we not started our engine and turned out of its way, it would have run us down.

Our AIS receiver gave the vessel’s name and showed a speed of 12.9 knots. The motor cruiser is a 50-meter-long vessel. We called the vessel on VHF Channel 16 and immediately received a response. We said ‘we are the yacht off your stern that has just had to alter course to avoid being run down by you’.  The radio operator on the motor cruiser said three times that they had not seen us and seemed to be completely unaware of our presence or that they had nearly run us down.”

The port berthing officer was attending to a large container vessel’s berthing when he received a radio message from the mooring team to quickly head aft to investigate a serious incident during mooring operations.

The aft mooring launch sat at the stern of the containership, waiting for the third line to be lowered to them. Instead, the two lines that had been run ashore and were fast on the bollards were slackened off by the aft mooring team and dumped into the water. The launch tried to move away from the lines to avoid getting tangled. When the launch was almost clear, the ship heaved up on the two lines again, only to catch the mooring launch, lifting it out of the water and crushing against the underside of the ship’s flare. The two launch crew considered abandoning the craft, as the prolonged shouting and blast of their horn did not affect getting the crew’s attention. Finally, the ship’s after mooring crew realised what had happened and slackened off the lines. Other than the boat crew being severely shaken by the incident, there were no injuries to the crew but some damage to the mooring boat.

Our reporter, a passenger ferry captain, writes: “As per the timetable, we arrived at the standby location for the port at the required time. It was daylight, with good visibility and a stiff wind. We worked, as usual, on the pre-arrival checks and verifications as we closed on the berth. When I called the port per the pre-arrival checklist, I was informed that a large passenger liner had just let go and that I might have to ‘slow her up’ (referring to my vessel). However, given the proximity to the berth, the other boat and the increasingly confined waters, it was clear that I would have to lose speed quicker than I safely could. So, I had to opt for a rapid turn upwind (to avoid being set onto the nearby lee shore). I continued my turn and completed a 360, and during this time, the passenger liner was clear of the port and the berth we were aiming for. Our distance from the breakwater was approximately 3 cables when we started the turn.

For each port of arrival, we plan two abort positions. We had passed the first, where ‘Standby’ is rung on, the crew called to stations, pitch response is verified, and hand steering is engaged. We had not yet reached the second abort position (approximately four cables from the first), so a direct abort was still viable.

Shortly after passing the first abort and confirming the items mentioned, I called the harbour for permission to continue into the berth. I was given the all-clear whilst being advised of a departing cruise ship that might be leaving. The operator told me I “might want to slow her up a bit”, but it was now clear to me that I would need to abort the arrival to avoid a close-quarters situation with the cruise vessel, which was manoeuvring off her berth. Given the proximity of the lee shore to starboard, I elected to turn to port/upwind and gain distance from the shore, together with slackening speed to a minimum.

With the above avoidance measures well underway and having the desired effect, I communicated with the cruise vessel to establish which general direction they intended to take upon clearing the harbour to allow me to plan the rest of my manoeuvre and not result in additional unnecessary risk. With them advising a course to the east initially before turning to the north, I elected to complete a full 360, allowing time and space for the cruise ship to exit the immediate harbour area and for me to generally pick up the standard approach to our berth for arrival.

The main hazards were the proximity of the lee shore, with easterly winds, something that is factored into the passage plan to allow extra room, including the shoaling waters to the south of the berth; this knowledge allowed me to decide on early, positive and bold avoidance measures quickly, rather than allowing the risk to increase by proceeding onwards, even at a reduced speed, and allowing an unnecessary close quarters situation to develop.

As my vessel is on a timetabled service, we arrive and leave at the same time every day, weather permitting. Despite this, the cruise ship was allowed a departure that directly clashed with our arrival. A clash in movements such as this should have been avoided with a simple telephone call or email. After that, we could have timed our arrival later, thus preventing the situation above entirely.

It’s worth noting that the bridge team worked very well together in the initial arrival, the abort actions, and the passage/arrival resumption and subsequent safe berthing.

Combination ladders: Trapdoor Type Combination

The pilot who reported this incident had reported the same non-compliant transfer arrangements on this vessel 2 months earlier. At that time, the master was advised, including drawings of required modifications. The port state was also informed. On arrival at the port two months later, nothing had been done to rectify the situation.

The new master on board knew nothing of the previous non-compliance report. The new pilot ladder could not rest against the ship’s side as part of the trapdoor combination. It was hanging free of the ship’s side by 200mm. This time the formal notification was given to the PSC authorities to attend the vessel.

The skipper of a 17m sailing yacht with a draught of 2.5m and a crew of five were on passage in a large sea area.  They approach port with charted depths that should have presented no difficulties. However, a chart note stated that the marina entrance was prone to silting and that vessels should proceed with caution, keeping a close eye on the depth sounder.

Sails had been lowered about a mile from the marina entrance, and the engine engaged.  The crew used up-to-date paper charts and the pilot book for the area.  This warned of reports of shallow spots extending up to 50m from the marina breakwater, and advised giving this a wide berth.

As they approached the entrance, the following sea became more pronounced as the depth decreased. Mindful of the pilot book’s warning, they kept clear of the end of the breakwater, and expected to see the three starboard-hand lateral beacons and four port-hand lateral buoys to guide them in.

They began their turn to starboard, having seen a single set of port and starboard lateral buoys inside the entrance and made a course between them.  The depth was being monitored, but reduced quickly, falling below 1m under the keel.

In the belief that this was one of the shallow areas noted on the chart, they continued, but grounded shortly afterwards. The engine was put hard astern, but the swell was driving them further towards the beach.  They were able to bring the boat head to sea using the bow thruster, and the anchor was deployed.

Fortunately the vessel re-floated and they were able to motor into the marina, taking a course much closer to the breakwater than that advised by the pilot book but which they had observed in the previous hour being successfully used by vessels of a similar size.

When the boat was lifted out of the water and inspected, nothing more than superficial damage was found to the keel bulb.

The reporter clarified that mistakes had been made by not referring to the chart notes and acting on their information concerning silting at the approaches. The reporter had become too focussed on the advice in the pilot book, which was four years old, regarding the shallow patches extending from the harbour breakwater.

When the depths began to reduce, instead of stopping and going astern, the yacht continued with the approach resulting in the grounding.

The reporter also informed CHIRP that the yacht’s engine was not working at full efficiency due to an, at the time, undiagnosed, broken turbo.  While it could propel the yacht at between 6 and 7 knots in calm conditions, there was insufficient power when needed in an emergency.