The Charity
Aviation
Maritime
A report describing a vessel which was apparently experiencing excessive port helm.
As part of my duties as a pilot, I was required to shift a vessel from one berth to another. During the operation, I noticed that she was carrying an excessive amount of port helm, which I estimated to be in the region of 5 to 10 degrees. I pointed this out to the bridge team and on berthing, advised the master to compare the steering gear rudder angle against the corresponding rudder angle indicator display. However, when the vessel sailed outbound, the attending pilot observed that the situation had not much improved.
Recently, the same vessel returned to our port. Whilst inbound, the attending pilot again observed the same phenomenon. This made handling the vessel challenging, and as a result this discrepancy was formally reported to the local authorities.
Last night I sailed the vessel. Prior to departure, I discussed the issue with the master, and I insisted on witnessing the testing of the steering gear. An officer conducted the appropriate tests, and all was found to be in order.
However, the outward passage required a tug to be made fast on the centre-lead aft, and so I briefed the tug master that I would be conducting checks between the bridge rudder angle indicator and the actual angle of rudder observed by the tug master. Throughout the passage, about 50mm of rudder was visible above the waterline and any apparent discrepancies could be observed by the tug master.
On leaving the berth, it was immediately apparent that the vessel still carried a considerable amount of port helm. At various points during the passage, I was able to compare the vesselâs rudder angle indicator with corresponding observations from the tug master. These comparisons led me to conclude that the ship was carrying 8 to 9 degrees of port helm beyond what was indicated on the bridge.
The vessel is relatively new having been built in 2017, and there is no evidence of excessive vibration or load on   the steering gear. The handling characteristics are however, outside the parameters that would be considered normal by the average ship handler and could be considered unsafe in certain circumstances. I feel the matter probably needs further investigation.
CHIRP wrote to the company concerned, which conducted a full investigation. This investigation also included a detailed review of the VDR. This, along with the company analysis of the situation, did not suggest that there was any external force such as a grounding which might have caused the problem. The company requested the attendance of Class, and the following is an extract of the Class report detailing their findings and subsequent repair in drydock. This included damage to the hydraulic rams of the steering gear and the rudder stock. The company concluded that the damage to the steering system was most likely due to workmanship and/or material failure at the new building stage.
A bottom inspection of the vessel was carried out in drydock and there was no indication of any damage to the hull bottom paintwork. In addition, an inspection of the propeller blades and rudder revealed no deficiencies.
Inspection of the steering gear, rudder stock and the rudder blade were carried out in dry dock. Damage was noted as follows;
The Class report additionally gives full details of the repair that was carried out which included a thorough overhaul of the rudder carrier, repairs to the hydraulic rams and the steering gear foundations, heat treatment and straightening of the rudder stock, and machining out the deformations. The tiller keyway and carrier to the rudder stock were renewed. All of the work was carried out as per Class technical specifications.
The repairs were followed by magnetic particle testing, penetrant testing and ultrasonic testing of welding and machined repairs.
Upon completion of the repairs the rudder blade was given a swing test, and the steering gear with associated alarms were fully tested with satisfactory results. In addition, the attending surveyor witnessed sea trials of the steering gear whilst manoeuvring and these also were satisfactory.
The Maritime Advisory Board agreed that this incident was a good example of a company following up and acting upon receipt of a report. Quite apart from the technicalities of the actual repair, the main focus of the Advisory Board comment, was that there was potential for a hazardous situation to develop, such as a grounding. In hindsight, it is easy to see that there was a problem even though the standard steering gear tests did not reveal any issues. It is also easy to note that for many defects (not
specifically this report but in general), if the problem is not detected immediately it can become the norm â âThatâs the way itâs always beenâ. So the main lesson to come out of this report is: if something doesnât feel right, then there may well be an issue â so REPORT IT! This lesson does not only apply to this vesselâs manoeuvring characteristics, but to any piece of equipment or any operation which does not appear to be functioning as you might expect it to.
Report Ends