The Charity
Aviation
Maritime
A pilot told us:
The captain left the bridge around 15 minutes after we left the dock, leaving the chief mate on the bridge with me. The captain returned about 15minutes prior to disembarkation.
During the Pilot Master exchange (PMX), I asked the captain what his plan was as there was a “strong wind forecast” due later in the day with waves of 2.5-3.5m expected…” big seas for a small ship with only 3.0m draft” and advised that seeking shelter would be a sensible decision. He intended to proceed to his next port regardless. It was only when he returned to the bridge before I was to disembark that we had a further conversation about the weather, and only after some discussion did he change his mind and decide to seek shelter for a couple of hours.
When I arrived at the pilot ladder to disembark, it was clear the ladder had not been checked by an officer (since the officer had been with me the entire time), and he hung back as I approached. Immediately, I noticed the lashings, which were roughly 6-8mm polyrope secured with what can only be described as a “granny knot”. I told the AB that these lashings needed to be replaced with a suitable type, and he replied “yes” but then just stood looking at me, perplexed. I also noticed that the ladder ends were not secured, and I highlighted this to the AB for rectification. I must have told him and the chief mate four or more times that the lashings needed to be changed immediately, that the ladder’s ends needed to be secured, and that I would not use the ladder until it was properly secured. At this point, I returned to the bridge, asked the pilot launch to delay coming alongside because the ladder was not adequately secured, and informed the captain that this issue needed to be rectified immediately before I disembarked and that I would be reporting the matter. The master did not have much to say at all.
Once the crew confirmed that the ladder was “properly secured”, I returned to the ladder, and the chief mate apologised. I told the chief mate that, although I appreciated the apology, this situation was totally unacceptable and that an apology would be of no comfort should I or anyone else end up in the water and be unable to return home.
I again checked the ladder, and with the defects having been resolved, I disembarked without incident.
CHIRP finds that this report shows unsafe practices in both bridge management and pilot transfer, with human factors playing an important role. The situation was not caused by a single mistake, but by a pattern of poor communication, acceptance of poor practices, and a lack of proper supervision at key points.
Pilot transfer arrangements must be actively checked and supervised. The officer responsible is expected not just to arrange the task but also to ensure it is properly done and safe. Relying on others without checking is not acceptable when the risk is high.
The report also shows how operational decisions can be influenced by pressure to continue despite adverse weather. Clear, practical guidance that is owned and used by crews can help support safer decisions and give masters confidence to delay or seek shelter when conditions are marginal.
There is also concern that routine checks were not properly carried out. While the issues were eventually fixed, the main point is that they should have been identified and corrected before the pilot’s involvement. Safety-critical equipment and rigging must be checked properly the first time, not only after a concern is raised.
Although the situation was corrected, it is not clear that the lessons have been fully taken on board. Good safety practice depends on consistent checking, open challenge, and making sure that “done” always means properly verified.
CHIRP has contacted the vessel’s management company to highlight concerns around seamanship standards, safety discipline, and communication during this pilot transfer.
Communication – issues are evident in both weather decision-making and pilot ladder preparation, with concerns either not shared effectively or not acted upon despite repeated raising.
Alerting – the crew did not challenge unsafe ladder rigging or escalate concerns prior to the pilot’s intervention.
Complacency – is suggested by acceptance of substandard pilot ladder arrangements and the initial willingness to proceed into adverse weather without sufficient reassessment.
Teamwork – The lack of teamwork is evidenced by the absence of cross-checking and shared responsibility, particularly for a safety-critical task such as rigging the pilot ladder, and is reflected in the captain’s limited presence on the bridge during a developing risk situation and in the lack of oversight of critical safety preparations.
Situational Awareness – is present in both environmental risk perception and the failure to recognise the severity of an improperly secured ladder.
Local practice – Norms are strongly indicated, with unsafe practices (poor lashings, unsecured ladder ends) appearing routine rather than exceptional.
Capability – is suggested by incorrect rigging techniques and inappropriate materials being used.
Regulators – Compliance on paper does not guarantee safety in practice. There is a need to ensure that compliance with pilot transfer regulations and procedures is not only documented but consistently verified in practice, particularly where routine tasks may drift from standards over time. Greater emphasis on auditing real-world behaviours, especially around pilot ladder rigging and bridge resource management, would help identify gaps between “work as imagined” and “work as done.” Strengthening oversight of how safety-critical procedures are trained, assessed, and reinforced could address latent cultural issues that allow unsafe norms to persist.
Managers (Operators / Companies) – What leaders tolerate becomes the standard crews follow. This report highlights the importance of actively reinforcing safety culture onboard, particularly around supervision, communication, and challenge. Bridge leadership behaviours set the tone; an absence of, or limited engagement during key operational phases can weaken standards and reduce crew responsiveness. There is also a need to ensure that crews are both trained and empowered to stop unsafe acts, with clear expectations for verification of critical equipment like pilot ladders. Routine tasks require the same discipline as high-risk operations, as this is where complacency and norm drift often develop.
Seafarers – If something is unsafe, stopping the job is the safest course of action. The event demonstrates the importance of speaking up, cross-checking, and not accepting “good enough” when safety is involved. Even familiar tasks like rigging a pilot ladder carry significant risk if not completed correctly. Repeated instructions from the pilot were required before action was taken, highlighting the need for clearer communication and immediate response to safety concerns. Every crew member has a role in maintaining standards, and timely intervention can prevent escalation into serious incidents.